海角大神

When the White House announced May 15 that it was effectively barring Chinese telecom giant Huawei from selling its products in the United States, it was perhaps the most extreme position taken by a nation against the colossal communications firm.

But the competing interests behind it 鈥� national security versus commercial and technological benefit 鈥� are being calculated across the West, as countries weigh whether to allow the Chinese firm a role in building their future telecommunications infrastructure.

In Germany, the math came to a very different result 鈥� but also highlights the challenges that countries will face as they try to balance security with economic competition as they pursue partnerships with Huawei and, by extension, the Chinese government.

Huawei鈥檚 German rise

Inside a former army barracks in March, Germany鈥檚 telecoms regulator set a large clock ticking. The country鈥檚 multibillion-dollar auction for bandwidth in cutting-edge 5G mobile networks was on.

Germany鈥檚 three main operators 鈥� Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, and Telefonica 鈥� all use Huawei equipment in their networks. (A fourth company, newcomer 1&1 Drillisch, is also taking place in the auction.)

In fact, Huawei has been ensconced in the German telecommunications landscape for decades. In a story that mirrors China鈥檚 metamorphosis into a global power, the company opened its first German office in Eschborn, near Frankfurt, back in 2001.

Four years later it signed its first major contract for DSL technology, and since then it has become a real presence. Revenues in Germany last year were around 鈧�2.2 billion ($2.5 billion) and the company now employs 2,500 people. Its Western Europe headquarters has been in D眉sseldorf since 2007, and it started selling Huawei-branded smartphones in Germany in 2011.

But providing 5G network infrastructure touches a higher level of national security than simple smartphones. 5G technology will create high-speed links for everything from autonomous vehicles to factories.聽

German intelligence services argue there are particular risks from the hitherto unseen degree of interconnectedness between 5G and other areas of critical national infrastructure in Germany. It is this concern that prompted the White House action in May. The U.S. argues Huawei is too close to the Chinese government, which could press the company for backdoor access to networks using its technology.

Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei 鈥� whose career as a People鈥檚 Liberation Army officer is one of the reasons many fear the company is too close to the Beijing government 鈥� has responded to Germany鈥檚 concerns by saying he would 鈥渘ot do anything to harm mankind.鈥� And Huawei has stressed its role as a good corporate citizen in Germany committed to fulfilling all security criteria that are currently being developed by the government for technology vendors.

鈥淗uawei has established a fruitful working relationship with the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and opened a cybersecurity lab in Bonn where cooperation with the BSI on several levels takes place,鈥� says Patrick Berger, Huawei鈥檚 head of media affairs for Germany.

鈥楪erman economy rises and falls with China鈥�

For Germany, the Huawei problem may indeed be rooted in its integration with China, but not in the espionage risk. Rather, the problem may be that Germany needs China too much.

China was Germany鈥檚 most important trading partner for the third consecutive year last year with a total trade volume of 鈧�199.3 billion ($225.7 billion). Germany sent exports to China worth 鈧�93 billion ($105 billion) in 2018, a rise of 8%.

Germany鈥檚 auto firms like Volkswagen and industrial giants have become too dependent on China for economic expansion. Now that it is so deeply invested in its relationship with China, Berlin needs to balance security concerns with trade. As J枚rg Kr盲mer of Commerzbank put it: 鈥淭he German economy rises and falls with China.鈥�

The Chambers of Industry and Commerce estimates some 900,000 jobs in Germany depend on exports to China.

鈥淚f technological key competences are lost and if this affects our position in the global economy as a result, this would have dramatic consequences for our way of life, for the state鈥檚 ability to act and for its ability to create in almost all areas of politics,鈥� said German Economics Minister Peter Altmaier.

Also, Germany sees the development of 5G technology as crucial to the country鈥檚 future as a leading industrial nation.

鈥淚f 5G delivers on its promise, it will be the backbone of the 鈥榠nternet of things鈥� infrastructure. This creates dependency,鈥澛爏ays a European cybersecurity expert who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of his research in the sector.

鈥淭hus, I would not worry 鈥榦nly鈥� about espionage, I would worry about the larger dependency on Chinese tech, including availability, but also leverage due to the dependency. Thus, the bigger question is how to manage the increasing dependency on the Chinese trade relationship, and what the long-term game in this is.鈥�

Espionage concerns聽

Nonetheless, concerns about Huawei鈥檚 inclusion in the development of 5G infrastructure linger, especially in the intelligence community.

Germany鈥檚 foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), has warned the Chinese government could install electronic 鈥渂ackdoors鈥� in Huawei 5G technology for espionage and surveillance and could even use hidden 鈥渒ill switches鈥� to disable the 5G infrastructure.

Gerhard Schindler, former director of the BND, said most of the risks were because China was not a democratic state, but a strongly authoritarian regime with security organs that can require any companies, even private ones, to supply information if they want it.

鈥淎nyone who installs this technology is also in a position to monitor them,鈥� Mr. Schindler told German radio.

Samantha Hoffman, an analyst at the International Cyber Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, warns the German government would be irresponsible to ignore the BND鈥檚 advice.

鈥淥ne issue is that it seems Germany has bought the Chinese Communist Party鈥檚 argument that the bilateral trade relationship can be separated from politics, but the party itself doesn鈥檛 separate political and economic issues, so why would it do so in the bilateral relationship with Germany?鈥� says Ms. Hoffman, a former visiting academic fellow at the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin.

鈥淔or a long time, the German government and business have operated as if these are two distinct relationships, and they continue to do so,鈥� she says. 鈥淣ow Germany finds itself in a difficult position where it must deal with the reality that its bilateral trade relationship with China exposes it to national security risk.鈥�

鈥淚鈥檓 certain that state actors will attempt to compromise 5G networks to enable spying,鈥� says Tom Uren, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 鈥淲e鈥檝e seen other telecoms networks at times being used for espionage, and there have been state sponsored groups that have compromised internet routers too. In general telecommunications are attractive to state sponsored intelligence because that is where communications take place.鈥�

鈥淲hether Huawei itself will be pressured to assist is a different question, and is entirely up to the Chinese state,鈥� he adds. 鈥淚 think Huawei has relatively little ability to resist if the Chinese Communist Party asks. After all, it鈥檚 written into Chinese law that they must assist.鈥�