海角大神

For Russians, ideology looms as all-important in political discourse.

Since the collapse of the USSR, a state in which ideology regulated everything from foreign affairs to personal life, some Russians have searched hard for to animate national existence and impart a sense of belonging and purpose. Many others push back at any attempt to impose an official ideology, which they view as the bane of Russian history.

But Vladislav Surkov, the Kremlin鈥檚 once-foremost ideologist, last week argued in a newspaper article that the political regime set up by Vladimir Putin is itself a complete ideology 鈥� a聽鈥淧utinism鈥� 鈥� that can survive any challenges, even the loss of its founder.

And in doing so, Mr. Surkov has triggered a firestorm of debate among leading Russian intellectuals over the essential nature of Russia, and particularly whether the undeniably resilient regime that Mr. Putin has created can outlast his personal rule.

And even those who take issue with the substance of Surkov鈥檚 arguments, of whom there are many, assume that the article鈥檚 publication has a greater significance.

鈥淪urkov used to be the Kremlin鈥檚 chief ideologist, he is always interesting and entertaining, and he is one who tries to invent grand political systems,鈥� says Nikolay Petrov, a political scientist at Moscow鈥檚 Higher School of Economics. 鈥淣o wonder so many people take this article as more than an expression of personal opinions, but as a signal from above. People are sure he must have been instructed, or at least given permission to publish this piece.鈥�

Russia鈥檚 鈥榙eep nation鈥�

Surkov鈥檚 article, landing at a time of growing social unrest and uncertainty over what happens when Putin leaves the scene, was bound to set off an explosion of controversy.聽Surkov鈥檚 grand schemes have shaped the political landscape of the Putin era 鈥� and unabashedly manipulated Russians鈥� perceptions about democratic choice.

Surkov聽was the architect of Russia鈥檚 so-called managed democracy,聽 which included an array of somewhat differently flavored pro-Kremlin political parties that Surkov, acting out his own conception of how Western democracy works, offered voters an elaborate illusion of choice. It also included civil society groups such as the pro-Kremlin youth movement Nashi and the Civic Chamber, a kind of parallel parliament of public groups. He lost his Kremlin job a few years ago after Putin apparently grew tired of his scheming. But he has been brought back repeatedly , most recently as the Kremlin鈥檚 main point man to handle Russia鈥檚 crisis of relations with Ukraine.

The central idea in his article, titled 鈥淧utin鈥檚 Lasting State,鈥� is that Putin has developed a form of government that cuts out the middle men, like parliaments and bureaucracies, and unites the will of the leader with that of the people. In Putinism, he claims, the Russian state has found the 鈥渟weet spot鈥� of harmony with the eternal Russian people, and it expresses their will without any need for elections, opinion polls, or other trappings of what he openly derides as the fake dog-and-pony show of Western democracy.

鈥淭he stress tests which [this model] has passed and is now passing have shown that this specific, organically arrived at model of political functioning provides an effective means of survival and ascension of the Russian nation not just for the coming years, but for decades and, most likely, for the entire next century,鈥� Surkov writes.

Whereas Western democracy requires a hidden 鈥渄eep state鈥� to steer the ship despite the capricious choices voters might make, Surkov writes, Russia has a 鈥渄eep nation鈥� that runs in harmony with its leaders.

鈥淥ur state is not split up into deep and external; it is built as a whole, with all of its parts and its manifestations facing out,鈥� he writes. 鈥淭he ability to hear and to understand the nation, to see all the way through it, through its entire depth, and to act accordingly 鈥� that is the unique and most important virtue of Putin鈥檚 government.鈥�

鈥楴ot an ideology鈥�

Surkov鈥檚 article has brought howls of derision from many leading Russian intellectuals, who tend to be aligned with the opposition. Most of them regard the article as a transparent attempt to flatter an audience of one: Putin.

The key bone of contention is as Putinism.

Gleb Pavlovsky, who worked in the Kremlin with Surkov during the early Putin years, suggests that聽Surkov has mistaken the relative stability of the Putin years for some kind of eternal formula for social harmony.

鈥淚n post-Soviet Russia, we, alas, have not created a real state,鈥� Mr. Pavlovsky , an internet newspaper. 鈥淥ur system is a system of power whose behavior has no normal values. And this model of behavior is common for elites and for the population of Russia in general.鈥�

Although Putin has developed mechanisms for communicating with average Russians over the heads of officialdom, such as his regular electronic town hall meetings and some impressive innovations in 鈥渄igital democracy,鈥� there is nothing that would add up to a mystical bond between leader and people, say experts.

鈥淲e can only understand Putinism as this particular regime, which has demonstrated its durability and flexibility in ways that need to be explained,鈥� says Mr. Petrov. 鈥淏ut it鈥檚 not an ideology. It鈥檚 just a cynical and pragmatic manipulation of power, a constant search for majority support, which has until now been quite successful.... Surkov鈥檚 article shouldn鈥檛 be taken seriously for any of the ideas it presents. It should be seen as a mirror of our present moment, with its uncertainties and complications.鈥�

A simplified proto-fascist state?

But some do see a distinct Putinist ideology emerging. In the West, scholars like Timothy Snyder see Surkov and Putin drawing on the 海角大神-fascist ideas of to create a modern-day to establish a Mussolini-like corporatist state. [Editor's note: The original version misspelled Ivan Ilyin鈥檚 last name.]

But Western critics often appear to read too much into Putin鈥檚 occasional references to ideological thinkers. At one point the Russian Eurasian nationalist Alexander Dugin was labeled 鈥淧utin鈥檚 brain鈥� in . Yet Mr. Dugin, fired from his university job a few years ago, is who has never acknowledged any connection. [Editor's note: The original version misidentified the source of the 鈥淧utin鈥檚 brain鈥� article.]

Andrei Kolesnikov, a political expert with the Carnegie Moscow Center, says that Putin, with Surkov鈥檚 help, has been constructing a fascist-type state out of familiar ideological elements.

鈥淪urkov represents the views of very influential groups, in the Kremlin and security services, and that鈥檚 why it鈥檚 very important to analyze this,鈥� he says. 鈥淗is views are a simplification of social reality. It鈥檚 a fascist, or proto-fascist, conception. He is testing the waters to see how liberal opponents and other people react.鈥�

Putinism, Mr. Kolesnikov says, 鈥渋s a mixture of nationalism, imperialism, dirigisme [state control of the economy], and anti-Western discourse. It鈥檚 authoritarianism with an imitation of democracy. It is not unique, and Surkov surely exaggerates its potential. But this is a serious moment.鈥�

Olga Kryshtanovskaya, Russia鈥檚 top elite-watching sociologist, says Surkov is just trying to stay relevant as the national conversation shifts to life after Putin.

鈥淚 heard all these ideas from Surkov 10 years ago,鈥� she says. 鈥淚 think he鈥檚 trying to reassure public opinion that what we have now is durable. At times like this there is alarm, fear of transition, and people turn critical of the authorities. His message is: Calm down, everything will turn out OK.鈥�