Coronavirus outbreak highlights cracks in Beijing鈥檚 control
A man in Wuhan, clutching a mask across his face, described his emotions from inside the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak. .
China鈥檚 leadership has escaped to an island, he claimed, his face reddening with anger, while ordinary Chinese were left trapped. 鈥淲e have no power,鈥� he said, begging the public to spread the word. 鈥淚 want to create some public pressure so the Chinese government doesn鈥檛 escape their responsibilities.鈥�
In Shanghai, an infectious-disease doctor proclaimed he鈥檇 switch out his front-line doctors with Communist Party officials. 鈥淒idn鈥檛 they all pledge an oath when they joined the party?鈥� his sarcasm apparent despite his level voice.
Why We Wrote This
China has mobilized to forcefully fight the coronavirus outbreak. But the crisis has highlighted cracks in its rigid governance 鈥� and raised key questions about its top-down system that could linger long afterward.
In a political and social environment that typically allows little room for criticism of Chinese leadership, cracks have begun to appear in Beijing鈥檚 control of its populace. The coronavirus outbreak, now logging over 10,000 cases, with more than 200 deaths and an infection spreading worldwide, raises fundamental questions about China鈥檚 style of government.聽
Will 鈥�2019-nCoV鈥� be the thing that most tests the limits of Beijing鈥檚 authoritarian, centralized style of governance? Would greater transparency in the early days of the virus, back when only a few dozen were sick in an interior Chinese city, have prevented a global spread? Is this the first big political test for Xi Jinping 鈥� China鈥檚 most powerful leader since Mao Zedong?
A 鈥済olden window,鈥� gone
In Wuhan, a city of 11 million in Hubei province, the first patients showed symptoms of a mysterious new virus in early , linked to a wholesale market selling seafood along with wild animals.
Thus began what Minxin Pei calls the critical period.
鈥淢id-December through mid-January,鈥� says Dr. Pei, a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in Claremont, California. 鈥淭hey lost the golden window聽鈥� that鈥檚 roughly a month when they could have issued a general alert. At least, people would have been screened, they wouldn鈥檛 be going places.鈥�
The first evidence the central government was aware of the situation came on Dec. 31, when Beijing dispatched a team of medical experts to Wuhan. 聽From there, the situation . On the first day of 2020, authorities interrogated eight Wuhan doctors and accused them of 鈥渞umormongering鈥� for simply posting about the virus. Another few weeks of inaction passed until Jan. 20, when the number of cases seemingly doubled overnight. Finally, the central government sprang to action.
The system鈥檚 opacity may have prevented a rapid early response, explains Professor Pei, an expert on Chinese governance. When Chinese government officials are confronted with a problem, 鈥渢hey usually perform what I call triage, dividing the issue into technical or political.鈥澛�
A technical problem they might handle on their own. 鈥淚f it鈥檚 political,鈥� Professor Pei says, 鈥淚 would think first about how it will reflect upon me, then I just kick the ball upstairs. I just keep kicking it upstairs, and wait for decision-making.鈥�
At the top of the stairs, of course, is Mr. Xi, who has further consolidated Beijing鈥檚 power.聽
Therein lies the problem, says Professor Pei. 鈥淒ecision-making is a lot slower when there鈥檚 excessive centralization.鈥�
Missing headlines
Meanwhile, from the China Media Project at the University of Hong Kong shows state-owned papers made little mention of the virus in the first 20 days of January. In the lead-up to the Chinese New Year 鈥� the largest annual migration of people in the world聽鈥� the papers trumpeted reports of the party鈥檚 success in eradicating poverty, convening top leaders in a show of solidarity, and strengthening Mr. Xi鈥檚 connection with the people.
On Jan. 23, the world learned of Beijing鈥檚 order to quarantine Wuhan. But inside China, the papers were still relatively mum; only two days later did two reports appear on the right-hand side of the People鈥檚 Daily鈥檚 front page, hardly reflective of the panic developing on the ground at that point, with more than 2,000 sick in China and 40 infected overseas.
Today, with the cat out of the bag, anger is rampant.
鈥淓veryone鈥檚 on WeChat, everyone鈥檚 on Weibo, and the amount of messages going back and forth is in the billions,鈥� says Elanah Uretsky, an anthropologist of China at Brandeis University in Massachusetts. 鈥淚t鈥檚 spreading panic, and it isn鈥檛 serving anyone well.鈥�
Ultimately, in her estimation, Beijing simply wasn鈥檛 prepared to handle an outbreak of this size. Though decision-making has been centralized, the health care system is still largely local or provincial, Professor Uretsky says.
When the SARS epidemic emerged in November 2002, the World Health Organization (WHO) wasn鈥檛 informed or fully involved , until about 300 people had already died.
David Bandurski, co-director of the China Media Project, says there鈥檚 been no real transformation in the way China handles major crises since then 鈥� and he鈥檚 not surprised.聽
鈥淩eal restraints on hard news and investigative reporting, when combined with [a] push for positivity, are a toxic combination,鈥� Mr. Bandurski writes in an email. 鈥淭hey risk creating a society that has essentially no immune system.鈥�
鈥淲ar鈥� mode
Yet the power of the Chinese state has now been brought to bear. The central government announced that new multistory hospitals would be built in a matter of days. More than a thousand doctors have been dispatched to Wuhan, according to Professor Pei, and the production of masks has certainly been cranked up. 鈥淭his is what I call the militarization of government,鈥� he says. 鈥淭hey treat such a task as war.鈥澛�
In a country of 1.4 billion people, the government has also managed to quarantine entire cities totaling around 50 million people聽鈥� with no rioting.
鈥淲ith SARS, the same thing happened,鈥� says Brandeis鈥� Professor Uretsky. 鈥淎s soon as they鈥檝e acknowledged the problem, they鈥檙e solving the problem, despite all the justified criticisms of that style of governance.鈥� Wuhan also has a BSL-4 laboratory, the highest possible rating for handling dangerous agents.聽
WHO has now declared coronavirus a public health emergency, the United States has given its diplomats in China a choice to leave, and many airlines are halting flights. On Thursday, the U.S. State Department warned Americans against traveling to China.
The Chinese economy is bound to take a hit, as will countries whose economies are closely intertwined with China鈥檚. During SARS, China鈥檚 economy was just a whisper of the global behemoth it is now.
Which brings up the question: What does this all mean for Mr. Xi?
The Hong Kong protests don鈥檛 register for most mainland Chinese, meaning the coronavirus is really the first significant domestic challenge to Mr. Xi鈥檚 authority. Indeed, with all provinces showing disease outbreak, no one is untouched by the crisis.
For years, China watchers had posited any number of events as 鈥渢he event鈥� that might shift China鈥檚 political thinking, says Jeremy Wallace, a China expert at Cornell University聽鈥� including SARS, the global financial crisis, and the Bo Xilai political scandal.
In communist regimes, 鈥渢urning points are few,鈥� argues Professor Pei. 鈥淏ut 鈥� this could be part of a constant erosion.鈥�
Back in Wuhan, the young man in the mask concludes his 10-minute video imploring the world to care about ordinary people like him. He asks for 鈥渋nternational pressure and awareness.鈥�
鈥淲e have high housing costs, living costs, inflation,鈥� he says. 鈥淲e, too, want to live with democracy and freedom ... but we can鈥檛. We are helpless.鈥�
