海角大神

Is China鈥檚 courage failing?

Exasperated and embarrassed by North Korea鈥檚 nuclear and missile tests, Beijing is nonetheless shrinking from using all the influence it has to stop them. China reportedly refused to back US proposals for an oil embargo against Pyongyang, for example, forcing Washington to debated on Monday.

US President Trump has publicly chastened Beijing on Twitter for its hesitancy,听and China鈥檚 caution risks undermining its growing reputation as a decisive player on the world stage. But that apparent weakness is a price that its rulers seem willing to pay now, in return for longer-term leadership dividends.听

Stronger sanctions could throttle Kim Jong-un鈥檚 regime. And though the young dictator is a humiliating thorn in China鈥檚 side, Beijing still sees North Korea as more of an asset than a liability for its overriding purpose: to take America鈥檚 old mantle as the unchallenged power in Asia.

鈥淚f you are a major global power you are expected to step up at a time of crisis,鈥� says David Shambaugh, an expert in Chinese politics at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. 鈥淐hina is not doing that.鈥�

Instead, China is setting its own rules, and charting its own path to a bigger global role. Chinese President Xi Jinping is not vacillating, Prof. Shambaugh adds. He is simply pursuing interests very different from, even diametrically opposed to, the goals that the United States and its allies have set. 鈥淚t鈥檚 a rational position,鈥� he says.

Revamped leadership

Where once Beijing worked with Washington to find a common stance on North Korea, 鈥渢heir approach to the problem now is quite different from the US, South Korea鈥檚, or Japan鈥檚,鈥� says Susan Shirk, a former US deputy assistant secretary of State for Asia. 鈥淲e鈥檝e gone back to the cold war era鈥� when Russia and China routinely opposed Washington鈥檚 international policies.

Gone are the days when China followed the dictum promulgated by former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, 鈥渉ide your strength, bide your time.鈥� Mr. Xi 鈥渉as moved China into a very different strategic posture鈥� over the past five years, says Zhang Baohui, who teaches international relations at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. He now talks openly of 鈥済uiding鈥� the international community.

If Beijing is taking the lead on global issues such as the defense of free trade and the Paris accord to limit climate change, it is partly because the United States is abdicating the responsibilities it once took in these fields. But China also sees clear self-interest in such policies.

Self-interest also drives Xi鈥檚 trademark 鈥淏elt and Road Initiative,鈥� an ambitious trade and development strategy designed to link China with Central Asia and Europe as it takes a larger role in world affairs. With growth slowing at home, China is looking to open new markets for Chinese goods and find new projects for its heavy industries.

And Beijing鈥檚 assertiveness in laying claim to, building up, and then militarizing a string of reefs and shoals in the South China Sea has illustrated its view of the region as rightfully a Chinese domain.

These territorial forays have earned China the reputation of being a bully among its neighbors 鈥� a striking contrast to听the kid-glove approach that the regional behemoth has taken to tiny, impoverished North Korea.

Beijing's limits

Some observers see unexpected weakness in this behavior. 鈥淐hina has all the points of leverage over North Korea but seems terrified of doing anything,鈥� says Kerry Brown, a professor of Chinese politics at King鈥檚 College in London.

If Beijing were able to use its influence to defuse the crisis, such a coup would burnish its international reputation as a constructive player on the global stage. 鈥淭hat would be a very significant sign of China demonstrating much more clout [and] effective diplomacy,鈥� points out Amy King, who teaches defense studies at Australian National University in Canberra.

But the way it is currently dealing with the crisis, Dr. King adds, 鈥渟hows the limits of China鈥檚 power and sway.鈥�

China appears to have accepted North Korea鈥檚 de facto status as a nuclear power. Condemning recent belligerent US comments, Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations Liu Jieyi said last week that Beijing would 鈥渘ever allow chaos and war on the peninsula.鈥� That formulation, later repeated by Foreign Ministry spokesmen in Beijing, made no reference to China鈥檚 traditional insistence on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

North Korea as a nuclear power would appear to pose obstacles to China鈥檚 regional leadership ambitions.

鈥淪ince the end of the cold war, China鈥檚 main goal in Asia has been to deter the influence of the United States in the region,鈥� points out Zhu Feng, a professor of international relations at Nanjing University in China.

鈥淲e are not ready to abandon the DPRK politically and economically,鈥� he adds, using the abbreviation for the country鈥檚 official name, 鈥渂ut the situation is getting less controllable. The DPRK is increasingly explosive.鈥�

Long-term goals

The drawbacks for China are clear: The Korea crisis sucks the United States back into China鈥檚 backyard; it strengthens Washington鈥檚 alliances with Japan and South Korea (setting up THAAD anti-missile defenses around Seoul that China fears can see into its own territory, for example); and it encourages its rival Japan to strengthen its own military defenses.

But in the long run, argues Dr. Shirk, who now runs the 21st Century China Center at the University of California San Diego, a nuclear-armed North Korea capable of destroying US cities would be well-placed to undermine America鈥檚 alliances with Japan and South Korea, the two key pillars of Washington鈥檚 military presence in Asia.

鈥淲e would have a harder time making our commitment to our allies credible,鈥� she suggests. 鈥淭hey would be uncertain that we would take the risk of defending them against North Korea if that meant putting our homeland at risk.鈥�

If China has 鈥渢he sense that the US presence in Asia is a bigger problem than the North Korean threat,鈥� Shirk worries, 鈥渋t could be that China wants to maintain that threat so as to de-couple the US from its allies.

鈥淭heir government is motivated not just by a fear of the collapse of North Korea, but by the larger geostrategic benefit that China sees,鈥� she argues.

鈥淭he United States is the only country that can get in the way of China鈥檚 goals in the region,鈥� adds Valerie Niquet, a China expert at the Foundation for Strategic Research, a think tank in Paris. 鈥淚n that context, where the main concern is its rivalry with the US, China still believes that North Korea is a strategic asset.鈥�

And there are domestic considerations too, Shambaugh points out. North Korea regards its nuclear program as an existential guarantee of survival. The pressure required to persuade the government to give up its nuclear ambitions would also likely bring it down.

Deliberately destroying a fraternal socialist government, at the behest of the United States, would raise questions about the legitimacy of Communist Party rule in China.

China is not acting as forcefully as it might 鈥渇or very rational reasons,鈥� Shambaugh says. 鈥淚t鈥檚 the perceived potential instability the Communist Party feels about its own system. It does not want regime collapse in Pyongyang.鈥�