海角大神

There鈥檚 nothing secret about Chongyi Church, one of the largest in China. Its lighted steeple and giant cross penetrate the night sky of Hangzhou, the capital of coastal Zhejiang Province. Nearly everything at the church is conspicuously open: the front gate, the front door, the sanctuary, the people, the clergy. Chinese or not, you are welcome seven days a week. No layers of security guards or police exist. Walk right in. Join up. People are nice; they give you water, chat. Do you have spiritual needs? Visit their offices, 9 to 5.

For China, it is a stunning feeling. Most of the society exists behind closed doors and is tough, driven, material, hierarchical. The country values wealth, power, and secrecy 鈥� not to mention that both government and schools officially, at least, promote atheism.

Yet Chongyi looks and feels like any evangelical megachurch in Seattle or San Jose. There are big screens, speakers blaring upbeat music, coffee bars. The choir is a huge swaying wash of white and red robes. Chongyi seats 5,000 people and holds multiple services on Sunday.聽

鈥淪ome Sundays we are full,鈥� says Zhou Lianmei, the pastor鈥檚 wife. 鈥淲e also have 1,600 volunteers.鈥�

While 海角大神ity is waning in many parts of the world, in China it is growing rapidly 鈥� despite state strictures. The rise in evangelical Protestantism in particular, driven both by people鈥檚 spiritual yearnings and individual human needs in a collective society, is taking place in nearly every part of the nation.

Western visitors used to seeing empty sanctuaries in the United States or Europe can be dumbfounded by the Sunday gatherings held in convention center-size buildings where people line up for blocks to get in 鈥� one service after another. In Wenzhou, not far from Hangzhou, an estimated 1.2 million Protestants now exist in a city of 9 million people alone. (It is called 鈥淐hina鈥檚 Jerusalem.鈥�) By one estimate, China will become the world鈥檚 largest 海角大神 nation, at its current rate of growth, by 2030.

Indeed, an acute problem facing urban churches in China is a lack of space. Chongyi Church is building a million-dollar underground parking lot to replace one that worshipers under age 30 have taken over as a meeting place.

鈥淚 come because I found a love here that isn鈥檛 dependent on a person,鈥� says Du Wang, a young businesswoman in Hangzhou. 鈥淚t is like a river that doesn鈥檛 go away.鈥�

Yet there is also trouble brewing for China鈥檚 faithful. As evangelical 海角大神ity grows sharply, officials fear it could undermine their authority. Already, 海角大神s may outnumber members of the Communist Party. That has far-reaching implications both for Chinese society and for a party that frowns on unofficial gatherings and other viewpoints. In China, party members cannot be 海角大神.

More than half of China鈥檚 Protestants attend illegal 鈥渉ouse churches鈥� that meet privately. The rest go to one of China鈥檚 official, registered Protestant churches, such as Chongyi. The official or legal churches, known since 1949 as the 鈥淭hree-Self Patriotic Church,鈥� operate under an arrangement that says in effect: We are patriotic, good citizens. We love China. We aren鈥檛 dissidents. We go to official theology schools. So the party will let us worship freely.聽

And 鈥� until recently 鈥� it has.

Yet in the past year authorities have attacked and even destroyed official Protestant churches, as well as unofficial ones. Many Evangelicals feel they are now on the front lines of an invisible battle over faith in the world鈥檚 most populous nation, and facing a campaign by the party-state to delegitimize them. Underneath it all is a question: Will China become a new fount of 海角大神ity in the world, or the site of a growing clash between the party and the pulpit?

鈥淭here鈥檚 an enormous struggle across China brought by the rise of worshipers that seem to really believe,鈥� says Terence Halliday, a director of the Center for Law and Globalization in Chicago who has worked in China. 鈥満＝谴笊駃ty now makes up the largest single civil society grouping in China. The party sees that.鈥�

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When China opened and rejoined the world in 1979, US President Jimmy Carter asked China鈥檚 Deng Xiaoping for three 鈥渇avors.鈥� Mr. Carter asked that churches shut during the brutal Cultural Revolution be reopened. He asked that the printing of Bibles resume. And he asked that missionaries be allowed back into China. Mr. Deng accepted the first two requests, for open churches and Bibles. But he rejected the one for missionaries.

Thus began a slow restoration process harking back more than a century. The first Protestant church in China was built in 1848 in Xiamen, known then as the Port of Amoy. By the 20th century, American and British missionaries saw China as a rich field. Every city of importance had a church. Missionaries founded China鈥檚 first 16 colleges, and they spurred the first reforms for female emancipation.

But after Mao Zedong鈥檚 victory in 1949, authorities chased out the missionaries. During the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1972, officials closed and trashed churches as China turned violently inward. Mao partly justified the violence as necessary to bring China into the 20th century. But much of it was used to kill off his enemies, real or imagined, including the faithful.

The era produced 鈥渢he most thorough destruction鈥� of religion possibly in 鈥渉uman history,鈥� write scholars David Palmer and Vincent Goossaert. Authorities threw 海角大神s in prison. They burned Bibles and executed believers to make an example.

Philip Wickeri, a leading Anglican in Hong Kong, shows visitors two Bibles that illustrate how far things went in the 1960s, and how much they have changed since. One is a small plain New Testament made of mimeographed sheets embossed with hand-written Chinese characters. It is a Cultural Revolution-era 鈥渟amizdat鈥� Bible, painstakingly produced. Different church cells memorized parts of the Gospels, copied them, and then combined them to form a single New Testament. The shadowy venture lasted several years, during which 150 Bibles were made.

Mr. Wickeri鈥檚 second Bible is gilt-edged and nestled in a rich box of bamboo. It is dated 2012 and was produced by the Amity Printing Company in Nanjing. It was part of a run that included the 100 millionth Bible published in China since the opening in the early 1980s.

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For decades, 海角大神ity here was considered something for older female peasants. But the demographics of religion are changing dramatically. China鈥檚 new faithful are younger, more educated, more urban, and more affluent.

One surprising change is that a majority of believers no longer view 海角大神ity as something foreign. They increasingly view faith as transcending its Western missionary-derived system. Many Chinese no longer accept the idea that being 海角大神 means forfeiting a Chinese identity.

Last summer, China鈥檚 religious affairs chief said that 500,000 海角大神s are baptized each year in the country. A joint study between Baylor University in Waco, Texas, and Peking University in Beijing estimated that there are now 70 million 海角大神s over age 16 in China. Communist Party membership is about 83 million.

Even so, no precise numbers exist for the total number of worshipers. Chinese government statistics put the rise in Protestants in the official churches at 800,000 in 1979, 3 million in 1982, 10 million in 1995, and 15 million in 1999. There the accounting stops.

Carsten Vala, an expert on religion in China at Loyola University Maryland in Baltimore, says 40 million to 60 million is 鈥渢he low end of a conservative鈥� estimate of the number of Evangelicals. Fenggang Yang, director of the Center on Religion and Chinese Society at Purdue University in Indiana, says he thinks there are more than 80 million 海角大神s and that China will have 245 million by 2030 if growth is steady 鈥� making it the world鈥檚 most populous Protestant nation.

In some ways this surge seems counterintuitive. Being a 海角大神 in a country that sees worship as odd or superstitious does nothing to boost one鈥檚 status. 鈥淭here is absolutely no social advantage to being a 海角大神 in China,鈥� says Bob Fu, a pastor who escaped a Chinese police crackdown in the 1990s and now runs Texas-based ChinaAid, which monitors 海角大神 rights in the country. 鈥淭here are no cookies, no status, no outward rewards, no privileges in choosing 海角大神ity.鈥�

Yet as Chinese achieve material wealth and success, many feel lost. The success of economic reforms under Chinese leader Deng, launched in the early 1990s, has not helped rebuild China鈥檚 spiritual infrastructure, decimated during war and the Cultural Revolution. China鈥檚 rise has come with a cost: a loss of traditional values and the rise of cheating, corruption, and fierce competition. As Orville Schell, the Arthur Ross Director of the Center on US-China Relations at the Asia Society in New York, points out, there are 150 billionaires in China but little certainty.

鈥淓veryone is groping and grasping,鈥� he says. 鈥淧eople are turning to Buddhism, 海角大神ity, self-help, and Taoism. CEOs and billionaires run around with their spiritual masters and visit meditation rooms.鈥�

In dozens of interviews with believers in official and house churches, the word they use most for why they turn to church is 鈥渓ove.鈥� 鈥淐hinese have a yearning heart, that is really the reason,鈥� says one woman who goes to the Zion house church in Beijing, which has more than 10,000 attendees and whose pastor is Korean. 鈥淲e need love, and in some ways it is that simple.鈥�

One Chinese intellectual and former newspaper editor agrees that China has become sated and corrupt. But he doesn鈥檛 agree there is a significant turn toward spiritual matters.

鈥淲e are too comfortable and willing ... to say 鈥榶es鈥� to anything,鈥� says Li Datong. 鈥淚 wish there was more spiritual hunger.鈥澛�

Yet Chinese parents complain of a society that teaches math and science in schools but does little to address conduct or character. The case of Little Yueyue is a symbol of the moral void. The 2-year-old girl was hit by a van in Guangdong a few years ago. The driver didn鈥檛 stop. The girl was thrown to the side of the road, and 17 people walked past before an itinerant migrant stopped to help. The event was captured on a video that went viral and spurred some national soul-searching.

Experts say the Chinese have a practical nature, and if they adopt the evangelical message, especially after years of required wrestling with Marxist thinking, they usually don鈥檛 take it lightly. Many work hard at it.

鈥淐hinese 海角大神s know the Bible better than some Southern Baptists,鈥� says Wickeri in Hong Kong. 鈥淭hat鈥檚 not a small thing.鈥�

Typical is the pastor Han Yufang at Chongwenmen Church in Beijing. Ms. Han is one of many women now being ordained in official churches. But for years her father forbade her to look into 海角大神ity. She did anyway, studying it for seven years, the final two praying for most of each night. One evening she was on her knees by the bed and prayed to God, 鈥淔ather, not my will but thine be done.鈥� She says she felt a clear urge to study at a divinity school.

Another woman, a mother in her 40s, first went to church with friends. She says she felt nothing but kept going to be part of the group. She dabbled. She tried Buddhism, but, 鈥渇or all the quiet, I never really found peace.鈥� During one service the concept of 鈥渇orgiveness came from nowhere and washed and melted me in a way I can鈥檛 describe,鈥� she says. At the time she was 鈥渁lways fighting鈥� with her husband. After the experience, the tension stopped. He also started attending church services with her, as did their son, who finds Bible stories 鈥渃ompelling.鈥澛�

For the most part, Protestants try to keep the altruistic activities they do in society quiet and low-key. China officially recognizes five faiths 鈥� Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, and Taoism. But only Buddhism and Protestantism are experiencing lively growth. Evangelicals do not want to draw attention to themselves and perform most of their good works without publicity.聽

Yet in cases such as the Sichuan earthquake in 2008, which killed 70,000 people, churches sent groups to help on the ground. By some estimates, as many as half the volunteers were evangelical.

Some 海角大神s are trying to improve business practices and fight corruption as well. One business group asks members to pledge a 鈥淭en Commandments鈥� of good behavior that includes no bribing, no taking mistresses, no avoiding taxes, and no mistreating employees. Zhao Xiao, a researcher at the University of Science and Technology in Beijing, tells of a 海角大神 in Harbin who lost $8 million his first year applying the principles but is now a leader in his industry.聽

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One January morning last year in Hangzhou, Chinese officials showed up unexpectedly at the Gulou Church. It is a massive gray-stone edifice across the famed West Lake from the Chongyi Church. The Gulou clergy was informed that the cross on their edifice was scheduled to come down.

Church leaders were stunned. It was the first they鈥檇 heard of any plan to remove the cross. Then for much of the spring, they and other 海角大神s in China heard of little else, as both official and unofficial churches were raided, destroyed, or dismantled in a campaign that has lasted more than a year.聽

Gulou itself was established by Presbyterian missionaries in the 1880s. The cross atop the steeple was enormous, a fixture next to a well-known highway overpass. It is dear to members as a symbol of their faith, says a pastor who declined to be named. For months, Gulou鈥檚 leaders delayed the removal of the cross. Meanwhile, authorities attacked churches and, as of this writing, have stripped or desecrated more than 426 of them, including knocking one down while President Obama was visiting Beijing last fall. In many cases, tearful worshipers surrounded the churches and scuffled with police. Zhejiang itself has become ground zero in China鈥檚 growing clash between church and state.

On Aug. 7 at 5 p.m., authorities returned to Gulou. They summoned the head pastor and said that at 10 p.m. the cross would be removed by crane. Word got out (the pastor only told one person since he could otherwise be jailed for calling an unofficial gathering). The church was surrounded by worshipers praying and chanting 鈥渃ross, cross, cross.鈥�

鈥淲e felt helpless,鈥� a junior pastor says. 鈥淲e told them how important this cross is, but they didn鈥檛 listen.鈥�

鈥淭hey can take the cross from our church,鈥� he adds, 鈥渂ut they can鈥檛 take it from our hearts.鈥�

Crackdowns on 海角大神s are nothing new in China. What is different is how broad and systematic the suppression has been and how the state, for the first time, is attacking official churches. To be sure, it was clear by summer that Chinese President Xi Jinping was conducting a harsh roll-up of civil society in general 鈥� artists, lawyers, scholars, as well as 海角大神s 鈥� as part of a new emphasis on orthodox party thinking and rules.聽

鈥淭he party isn鈥檛 satisfied with just keeping people behind a great firewall,鈥� says one lawyer. 鈥淭hey actually want to indoctrinate.鈥�

So far, the cross on Chongyi Church remains intact. But Evangelicals here who thought they were adhering to the proper political decorum are not happy. 鈥淧eople are angry and feeling betrayed,鈥� says a local volunteer who did not want to be named for fear of retribution. 鈥淚f I were the government I would not do this.鈥澛�

Why authorities would alienate believers who think of themselves as loyal Chinese is unclear. Many local 海角大神s first thought it was a mistake or something engineered by local authorities in Zhejiang Province. Officials said large crosses near highways were a driving hazard.

But as more churches lost their crosses, many far from highways, and other official churches were bulldozed, feelings changed. One church quietly offered to pay a series of fines, thinking the attacks were about money. 鈥淲e were fooled at first,鈥� says one local pastor. 鈥淭hen we discovered they didn鈥檛 care about fines. They went after our crosses and gave the impression they enjoyed it.鈥� The aim was to humiliate and shame, he says.聽

In recent years, Evangelicals in east China were 鈥渄oing well,鈥� the pastor continues. 鈥淏ut that is now changing. We are going backwards now. Everything is changing with the new leadership in Beijing. We know what is happening. We are not visitors here.鈥�

Zan Aizong, a local journalist who became an Evangelical, says the government is trying to clamp down on churches and faith without causing a global outcry. Officials 鈥渦se the legal system,鈥� he says. 鈥淭hey go after crosses and building codes because it will not cause an uproar abroad. They want to turn 海角大神ity into Chinese 海角大神ity, controlled by the party.鈥�

In August, amid the suppression in Zhejiang, the party issued a statement that it would soon unveil an official 海角大神 theology. Wang Zuoan, head of China鈥檚 religious affairs ministry, told the state-run Xinhua news agency that 海角大神ity was spreading so rapidly that a new theology was needed to avoid problems. 鈥淭he construction of Chinese 海角大神 theology should adapt to China鈥檚 national condition and integrate with Chinese culture,鈥� he said.

As the attacks continue, church leaders are debating how to respond 鈥� whether to publicly challenge the crackdown or try to ride it out, the argument being that authorities could do much worse things if provoked.

鈥淢any 海角大神s are scared of the government,鈥� says Ling Cangzhou, a 海角大神 blogger in Beijing. 鈥淚n China you rely on the government for jobs, position, for money. Families and relatives are affected. Dissidents don鈥檛 get promotion or advancement.鈥�

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One effect of the new religious persecution in China is that it is bringing the official and unofficial wings of the Protestant Church closer. For years, the two sides have often been clashing siblings: In essence, private house churchgoers saw the Three-Self churches as compromised by the party. Official churches often saw house churches as misbehaving cults.聽

Yet now, as they share a common threat and as more young people take up 海角大神ity who have little knowledge of the historical divide, the two wings are starting to converge, reinforcing a grass-roots movement that has already been under way for some time.聽

Worshipers are being introduced to 海角大神ity in official churches and then moving to house churches for a deeper experience of Bible study and preaching. In turn, house churches are becoming less secretive and are reaching out to influence the official churches. 鈥淭here is a growing but quiet cooperation among Three-Self pastors who aren鈥檛 as invested in the institution 鈥� who care more about church and the basic evangelical mission,鈥� Mr. Vala says. 聽

To be sure, real differences remain between the two sides. Three-Self pastors are trained at theology schools watched by the party. Mr. Zan, for example, attended one and says that former President Hu Jintao鈥檚 concept of a 鈥渉armonious society鈥� was taught as something to emphasize in preaching, which Zan calls 鈥減ropaganda.鈥� 鈥淥fficial churches are not allowed to touch subjects like the Apocalypse or eschatology,鈥� he says. 鈥淎 lot of the preaching is about how to be good and loving and ethical, which is fine. But they are often antiseptic and less radical.鈥�

Many house meetings last all day, whereas official churches have 60- to 90-minute services. 鈥淭he [Three-Selfs] are too big,鈥� says a musician from Anhui who started at an official church but moved on. 鈥淵ou can get lost in them. Smaller is more like home, more like the love you feel at home.鈥�

In Beijing, the official Chongwenmen Church is near the train station, found by walking through a rabbit warren of streets and noodle shops. It is old and slightly creaky. Services are packed and believers are devout. Across town, the official Haidian Church is a huge white modernist structure in a high-tech zone. Outside there is a band and chorus and kids with 鈥淚 [heart] Jesus鈥� caps. People wait in line for services by the hundreds.

One private Calvary church feels much different. Set in a seminar room in an office tower, it seems far less institutional but more intimate. The pastor is from Taiwan and won鈥檛 talk with reporters. Yet in all three churches the focus is on 海角大神ity as a life practice and not a philosophy, and of the Bible as a revelation whose meaning brings change and redemption.聽

During services at these churches in August, as the cross removal campaign intensified, pastors spoke openly of the 鈥渕eaning of the cross.鈥� Hymns sung included 鈥� 鈥極nward, 海角大神 Soldiers鈥� ... with the cross of Jesus, going on before.鈥澛�