Why continued US support is crucial for Colombia's peace process
A version of this post ran on the聽聽site. The views expressed are the author's own.
The Trump administration鈥檚 likely secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, has聽an intention 鈥渢o review the details of Colombia鈥檚 recent peace agreement, and determine the extent to which the United States should continue to support it.鈥� There are many reasons to hope that once he reviews those details, Mr. Tillerson will conclude that the 2016 agreement, which ends 52 years of fighting between Colombia鈥檚 government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group, deserves strong support.
1) Plummeting levels of violence.聽The 2016 government-FARC accord, and accompanying United Nations-monitored ceasefire, have brought Colombia鈥檚 violence to the lowest levels in decades. The gains are not irreversible: They depend on strong accord implementation.聽In 2016,聽聽members of the Colombian security forces, guerrilla groups, or paramilitary groups died in situations that could be defined as combat 鈥� a 46 percent drop from 2015, and a 93 percent drop from a decade earlier. Even before an August 29 bilateral ceasefire聽聽FARC-government violence almost completely, CERAC, the Colombian think-tank that most methodically tracks violence statistics,聽聽that Colombia鈥檚 conflict was in its least intense phase since it began 52 years ago. Overall, Colombia reported 12,262 homicides in 2016, a 25 percent drop from 2012, the year the FARC peace talks started.
Before 2012, intensified security operations had brought important drops in combat and violence. But battlefield progress slowed notably after about mid-2008. This made clear that a military victory over the FARC would take many more bloody years, while a peace accord might bring the conflict to a much more rapid end 鈥� as it did last year. After a several-year plateau, violence measures did not drop further until the FARC negotiations reached an advanced phase.
2) Demobilization momentum.聽Right now, the FARC guerrillas鈥� membership is gathering to demobilize and disarm. The United States must help Colombia to minimize dissidences and rearmament.聽As many as聽14,000聽FARC members and militias have arrived, or are on their way, to the village-sized sites where they will spend six months demobilizing, turning in their weapons to a UN mission, and entering either civilian life or trial for war crimes. Arrivals at the 26 zones聽聽by the end of January. While this process is behind schedule, the delays owe to聽logistical difficulties, not bad faith.
These security gains are remarkable, but they are fragile. FARC聽聽are emerging in several parts of the country 鈥� a normal phenomenon at this phase in post-conflict processes, but a worrying development. Organized crime groups and the smaller National Liberation Army guerrillas are poised to fill territorial power vacuums that the FARC leave behind, if Colombia鈥檚 state proves unable to fill them first. To keep these challenges under control, Colombia will need generous, determined, and active US support for increasing state presence and reintegrating ex-combatants, not criticism or opposition.
3) Sweeping away the mines.聽This is a historic opportunity to de-mine the world鈥檚 second most mine-affected country.聽Anti-personnel mines have killed or injured聽听颁辞濒辞尘产颈补苍蝉 since 1990. The overwhelming majority have been planted by guerrillas, and the threat of violence has impeded their removal. With the peace accord in place, Colombia has big plans to accelerate de-mining: With a 10,000-person force and international () support, it has set a goal of being聽. But for this to happen, mine-clearers need to do their work without fear of attack, and they need ex-guerrillas to tell them where the mines are. Both require the conflict to be definitively over, and the peace accord can guarantee that.
4) Reparations.聽It opens the way for reparations of millions of conflict victims, offering hope of breaking a generations-old cycle of violence.聽The Colombian government鈥檚 National Unit for Victims, which began work in late 2011, has approved the provision of reparations to聽聽people who suffered a lost relative, forced displacement, torture, sexual violence or another tragedy as a result of the conflict. As impressive as this sounds,聽聽are in fact registered with the Unit, and determined to be 鈥渟ubject to assistance and reparations.鈥� (The total number of registered victims exceeds 8.3 million, or one-sixth of the entire population.)
The signing of a peace accord offers hope that the reparations process might accelerate for this enormous population. It also holds out hope that FARC members 鈥� who carried out a minority of homicides and displacements but a majority of kidnappings, landmine use, and child recruitment 鈥� will, in compliance with their accord commitments, participate in reparations and tell victims the truth about what happened to them and their loved ones. The victims鈥� assistance process must go forward, and the US government should support it.
5) The return of government.聽It holds the hope of making vast regions governable and governed, which in turn would bring permanent reductions in cocaine production and other organized crime activity.聽Roughly one-fifth of Colombia鈥檚 counties (municipalities), comprising a smaller share of population but a larger share of land area, were zones of heavy FARC influence. They share in common a remarkable lack of government presence: One can travel for hours without seeing evidence of the Colombian state, which makes them attractive zones for narcotraffickers and other organized criminals.
Removing the FARC from the scene will make it far easier for Colombia to fill that vacuum and bring the benefits of citizenship to the people who live in these areas. The United States would benefit, too, because cocaine is not produced in territories that have a real state presence. (If it were otherwise, the plains surrounding Bogot谩, the capital, would be ideal for cultivating coca, the plant used to make cocaine. But there is virtually none within 100 miles of the city.)
The foreign policy and national security benefits of continued US support for Colombia鈥檚 peace accord, and its implementation, are strong, compelling, and obvious.聽This should be a 鈥渘o-brainer鈥� for the new administration. Nonetheless, some serious challenges face post-conflict Colombia and will require continued US accompaniment.
Challenges ahead
For one thing, Colombia must fill its big rural governance vacuum, but it has been slow out of the gate in the months since the peace accord was finalized. Big plans have been made, but accord implementation has barely begun. While vast territories are experiencing a moment of tranquility unlike anything known for decades, they aren鈥檛 seeing a palpable increase in government presence. The results are manifesting in alarming ways:
Coca cultivation is increasing dramatically.聽The peace accord foresees an ambitious program of curtailing coca through voluntary agreements with communities, but this program has not begun, while聽Colombia has reduced both assistance. The result is a troubling jump in coca growing.聽
Social leaders are in greater danger.聽Although the peace accord has brought important drops in violence nationwide, local-level participants in peasant organizations and peaceful left-of-center political movements聽听产测听聽around the country. These are happening mostly in poorly governed rural zones. These aggressions, most of them likely the work of organized crime-linked landowners and local political bosses, threaten the credibility of the peace accords, which were supposed to make political participation safe for all.
Organized crime is poised to fill the vacuum in many areas.聽If Colombia鈥檚 government is unwilling or unable to provide security and basic services in historically conflict-prone areas, other groups will quickly replace the FARC, taking over control of the coca fields, the illicit gold mines, and other violent criminal activity. Colombia will need help avoiding this outcome.
The Bogot谩 government has to work faster, and with more resources, to fend off these threats and seize this opportunity.
Other near-term challenges go beyond state presence. Because it was impossible to convince guerrilla leaders to turn in weapons and go immediately to jail, the peace accords鈥� transitional justice provisions foresee punishments that don鈥檛 match the severity of war crimes. They do require former guerrillas and soldiers to provide full truth about their deeds, and reparations to their victims, in order to get (in the guerrillas鈥� case) five to eight years of confinement to a village-sized zone. This is similar to what the government of ex-president 脕lvaro Uribe (2002-2010)聽聽for about 4,000 pro-government paramilitary members accused of war crimes, though these individuals served five to eight years in prisons, not village-sized zones.
Colombia鈥檚 Congress is currently debating and passing the laws necessary to implement this new transitional justice system, and the International Criminal Court is monitoring the process closely. Its prosecutor says that the peace accord 鈥渋s deserving of respect and total support as long as it offers an unequaled opportunity to implant a sustainable peace in Colombia,鈥� but has expressed聽聽about language in the accord concerning command responsibility for crimes, which was聽聽at the last moment at the behest of retired Colombian military officers.
Another near-term challenge is the accord鈥檚 price tag. Colombia鈥檚 post-conflict phase offers a historic opportunity to get government into vast areas that don鈥檛 have any, to establish rule of law, and to help rural dwellers develop a legal, viable way to make a living. These are all things that Colombia鈥檚 government should be doing anyway, but they are very expensive, compounded by the fact that Colombian revenues are depressed by low commodity prices, a flat economy, and a weak currency.
The United States' critical role
US assistance, then, has become more important than ever, and will directly influence US interests. Last year President Barack Obama proposed, and both Republican-majority houses of Congress approved, at least $450 million for 2017 鈥� but the 2017 foreign aid bill has not yet passed. When it does,聽this amount must be sustained or exceeded.聽Cutting it would do real harm to Colombia鈥檚 effort to implement the accords in a way that can bring permanent reductions in illegality and illicit drug production. A cut would also lead future Colombians to remember the United States for contributing over聽聽in times of war, then slashing assistance the very moment a peace accord was signed.
Another issue is the聽approximately 60聽outstanding for FARC members, most wanted to face charges of narcotrafficking, a few for kidnapping or killing US citizens in Colombia. If they have abandoned illegal behavior and are contributing to peace, FARC leaders wanted by US courts are not likely to be extradited. This is because, other than by forcing the FARC to surrender through years more fighting, there is no way to convince guerrilla leaders to turn in their weapons only to board a plane to a US prison.
Nonetheless, the moment an ex-FARC leader demonstrably violates the terms of the peace accord 鈥� by continuing to traffic drugs, by failing to declare all assets, by failing to provide reparations to victims 鈥� the situation changes. If he or she is wanted by US justice, a former guerrilla who violates the accord鈥檚 terms could be subject to extradition. However, if an ex-guerrilla is respecting accord commitments, has abandoned criminality, and is working in good faith to reconcile with and restore victims, it would be counterproductive for the US government to press Colombia to extradite that individual.
Colombia鈥檚 peace implementation process faces some looming complications and difficulties. But聽these are not reasons to withdraw or to lessen US support for the peace accords鈥� implementation. Instead, they are reasons to keep engaging, and to redouble and increase the US commitment to helping cement security and governance gains in Colombia. Even if implementing it will be difficult, the 2016 peace accord is the best available option for guaranteeing stability, strong democratic governance, and reduced drug production in Colombia. It deserves full US backing.
Adam Isacson joined the in 2010 after 14 years working on Latin American and Caribbean security issues with the Center for International Policy. At WOLA, his defense oversight program monitors security trends and US military cooperation with the Western Hemisphere.
