Why has Venezuela's opposition struggled to spark change?
A version of this post ran on聽. The views expressed are the author's own.
It has been a year since the new members of the Venezuelan National Assembly took office. It was the first time, after almost two decades under聽chavismo, that the Venezuelan opposition coalition, the Democracy Unity Roundtable (known by its acronym in Spanish, MUD) won a qualified majority of 112 lawmakers, marking a radical political shift in the country.
One year later, the lack of legislative action to address the country鈥檚 spiraling economic and political crises is showing in Venezuelans鈥� declining support for the聽. While President Nicol谩s Maduro has been discredited by his inability to address the country鈥檚 multiple ills, Venezuelans are also disappointed by the role played by the opposition coalition, especially during the last quarter of 2016.
Mr. Maduro鈥檚 administration refuses to take any action that will alleviate the economic crisis; the regime has blocked any possibility of elections or referendums, having indefinitely postponed local elections and refused to accept petitions for a constitutionally protected recall referendum on the president; and it remains unclear who can channel popular discontent and translate it into real change.聽
The opposition coalition鈥檚 qualified majority in the National Assembly in 2016 was unable to make a difference. The day opposition leader Henry Ramos Allup took office as leader of the National Assembly, Jan. 5, 2016, he presented two proposals: a package of social reforms and a review on how to constitutionally shorten Maduro鈥檚 term. The reforms floundered.
The second proposal was not voted on until 10 months later, after all hopes for the recall referendum had been crushed, when lawmakers debated Maduro鈥檚 political responsibility for what was called 鈥渁 breakdown of the constitutional order.鈥� Before this, however, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, controlled by聽chavistas,聽disqualified three representatives from Amazonas state, costing the coalition its qualified majority; since then, the Court has continued to systematically issue decisions, requested by the executive branch, that override laws approved by the National Assembly.
If there was ever any doubt, in 2016聽chavismo聽showed its authoritarian side when it effectively closed off the path to elections.聽, a Venezuelan polling firm, confirmed that less than 20 percent of Venezuelans continue to support Hugo Ch谩vez鈥檚 political movement. That low level of popular approval was likely what prompted the聽肠丑补惫颈蝉迟补蝉听to avoid elections altogether in 2016. A report published by Venezuelan Jesuits in October 2016 argued that, without the escape valve of elections, Venezuela has become a聽.
The elections for regional governors, due to be held in December 2016, were suspended by the National Electoral Council (CNE) without clear explanation. More well known internationally was the CNE鈥檚 decision to delay and then to shut down the process for a constitutionally allowed聽聽against the president. Maduro himself has said that the new regional elections are scheduled to take place in 2018, sometime 鈥� with the argument that it鈥檚 not worthwhile to waste money on something that isn鈥檛 a national priority in the midst of an economic crisis.
So now聽chavismo聽is in the minority in the National Assembly聽and in public opinion, but it has still been able to leverage its power in other public institutions: the Supreme Court of Justice, the CNE, the State Prosecutor鈥檚 office, and the army. These are the four pillars that continue to support Maduro鈥檚 administration, in spite of the fact that more than 80 percent of Venezuelans think shortening the mandate of Ch谩vez鈥檚 handpicked successor is the best solution for聽the country.
What happened to the opposition? Today, at the beginning of 2017, the outlook isn鈥檛 good. The turning point was Sept. 2, 2016: the previous day a massive demonstration paralyzed Venezuela and made international news. Instead of encouraging the protests and coordinating a strategy to capitalize on the outpouring, the demonstrations overwhelmed the opposition, showing to the public its聽lack of a coherent roadmap as well as the internal chaos and divisions within聽the coalition.
Several weeks later, the coalition sat down to a Vatican-led dialogue with Maduro鈥檚 administration. A lot of people questioned their decision, but the mistake was not in sitting down to the聽聽itself, but the lack of a clear strategy, while,聽at the same time, pausing or deactivating their other political tools: the demonstrations, legislative pressure, and international lobbying.
In spite of the Vatican mediation, the dialogue failed. The regime predictably broke the agreements. This predictable paralysis of the talks hurt the opposition, causing the MUD to sink to a new聽聽in public opinion. There is聽a proposal to re-launch the Democratic Unity Roundtable in 2017, but it remains unknown whether this will happen, or聽what the new coalition鈥檚聽policy proposals to deal with the economic and political crises will be.
The forthcoming year will be a complicated one in Venezuela. 聽Many believe that the recent selection of opposition politician Julio Borges as the聽new leader of the National Assembly will do little to change anything. 聽And at the same time, the other branches of government, all still controlled by聽chavistas,聽will continue to do everything in their powers to limit the only toehold the opposition has in the national government.
Andr茅s Ca帽iz谩lez聽is a senior researcher at Universidad Cat贸lica Andr茅s Bello in Venezuela.聽His weekly analysis articles are published in five Venezuelan newspapers and a news portal. He cooperates with projects of the People in Need NGO in Venezuela.
