Does Chavez challenger have a shot in Venezuela's presidential race?
鈥�听David Smilde is the moderator of WOLA's blog:听Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights.听The views expressed are the author's own.
[Three] weeks ago, both听听and Reuters released the results of Venezuelan polling firm听Datan谩lisis鈥� August听Omnibus听(fieldwork July 16 to August 9). As a client of Datan谩lisis I cannot legally confirm or disconfirm these numbers since it was not a public poll. However, I can dig down to the next layer of the听Omnibus听to look at some of the trends.
One of the most discussed issues in Venezuelan polling has been the number of undecided voters 鈥� with opposition supporters especially suggesting that a large number of undecided voters is simply impossible and must be an artifact of pollsters鈥� methods or a presumed 鈥渇ear factor鈥� (i.e. that people who plan to vote for Capriles are afraid to say so). 听However, if you remember that a presidential election is basically a choice between two candidates, not a projection of ideal preferences, it is easy to understand that a good percentage of the voters might have a pretty well formed critical opinion of both sides and not be sure which of two very different choices they will eventually support.听
Indeed Datan谩lisis鈥� polls have been showing a good deal of consistency with previous elections during the Ch谩vez period, in which the large number of undecided voters progressively diminishes as the election approaches. In the past four months they have steadily declined by 15-20 percent in each poll 听from 31.4 percent in May to 18.8 percent currently as more people decide who they will support. This is exactly the opposite of what one would expect if a 鈥渇ear factor鈥� were at work. In the latter case the number of undecided voters should increase as the election gets closer and the political climate gets hotter.
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The good news for Capriles is that Datan谩lisis shows the undecided vote breaking 4 to 1 towards Capriles between their last two polls. 81.4 percent of the undecided voters who decided, did so for Capriles, while 18.6 percent decided to support Ch谩vez. If we project the same 4 to 1 advantage in favor of Capriles onto the 18.8 percent that is still undecided, Capriles would gain 15.3 percent and Ch谩vez only 3.5 percent, leading to a statistical dead heat with Ch谩vez at 50.3 percent and Capriles at 49.6 percent.听
However, Datan谩lisis does not seem to think this is what will happen. When they project what they think the undecided will do they get Ch谩vez at 47.6 percent and Capriles at 37.8 percent. This is probably because their analysis of data from May suggested that the undecided voters largely mirrored the decided voters in their probable voting tendency. In addition, it is worth pointing out that this changes from month to month. The July Omnibus showed that undecided voters were breaking towards Capriles only 55 percent to 45 percent. Datan谩lisis probably thinks that after Capriles鈥檚 gains with undecided voters between July and August, the undecided voters who are left will tend towards Ch谩vez. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that Capriles has a theoretical path to victory through undecided voters.
However, some of the underlying numbers make an Capriles surge look unlikely. First, while Ch谩vez鈥檚 positive evaluation has dropped from its high of 65 percent in February, it is still at an enviable 55.8 percent. Datan谩lisis looks historically at elections in which Ch谩vez is a candidate or one of his proposals is at stake. They show that electoral support runs about even with job approval or only slightly behind. Using this as a basis they project a final electoral result of 55.8 percent for Ch谩vez against 44.2 percent for Capriles.
Even worse news for Capriles is that levels of 鈥渢rust鈥� in Ch谩vez look more like 2006 than 2010. Two years ago, before the 2010 parliamentary elections over 60 percent of respondents distrusted Ch谩vez. This distrust had steadily increased from the time of the closing of the very popular RCTV through 2010 as the economy was hit by the worldwide recession and Venezuela was suffering from an electricity crisis. Now levels of distrust have descended to 40 percent and trust is at 46 percent. These are levels that have not been seen since Ch谩vez鈥檚 landslide win in 2006. Perhaps even worse, distrust in Capriles is at 53.5 percent while trust runs 20 points behind at 31.3 percent. This shows that he has had a hard time gaining the confidence of average Venezuelans beyond his base.
Respondents鈥� perceptions of the situation of the country have dropped from 67 percent positive in May to 55.8 percent positive in July/August. But positive perception of personal situation remains around 80 percent and this is closely correlated with support for Ch谩vez (+.811 (a perfect correlation would be +1.0)).
Finally, the government鈥檚 party advantage is only increasing. 37.9 percent of respondents identify with the PSUV, while only 12.5 percent identify with one of the opposition parties. 鈥淧arty articulation鈥� (whether or not an intended voter is in contact with the party of the candidate they intend to support) for the government is at 97 percent while it is at 55.3 percent for the opposition.
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In sum, while a Capriles surge is theoretically possible, it does not seem likely. He has gained some ground, and has shown, at least for a month, the ability to win over the undecided votes with the strong majority he needs. But the underlying numbers make a last month surge look improbable. Ch谩vez has a strong advantage based on his job approval, levels of trust, and respondents鈥� positive assessment of their personal situation. Ch谩vez also appears to have a formidable advantage in party mobilization.
鈥� 听David Smilde is the moderator of WOLA's blog:听Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights.听
