海角大神

As a Cuba policy analyst, I鈥檝e given a surprising amount of thought to our policy toward the politically isolated, resource-rich nation of Burma (Myanmar) half a world away. 聽

That鈥檚 because I used to work for Senator Max Baucus, who in 2003, working with Senators Mitch McConnell, Dianne Feinstein, and Chuck Grassley, helped pass smart sanctions against the Burmese Regime. 聽At the time, Congressional supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi wanted to punish the regime for its crackdown on Suu Kyi and her supporters, but Mr. Baucus and Mr. Grassley made sure that the sanctions would not be open-ended. 聽With this new sanctions model, Congress would continue to exercise real oversight over the impact of the sanctions and of the Executive鈥檚 efforts to bring other nations on board.聽 (Here's what Baucus when the sanctions were renewed in 2007.)

With the news that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will be making an historic trip to Burma, now might be an interesting time for Burma experts to debate whether it was US sanctions, or Chinese influence (too much of it), or any other combination of factors that have led to Burma鈥檚 leaders to take steps that have registered as "" with President Obama of late. 聽But more importantly, over at The Atlantic, Joshua Kurlantzick has offered up 鈥�,鈥� which could be helpful to the Obama administration in determining how far to engage the Burmese government. 聽After all, if the reforms continue and the administration wants to support them 鈥� and the leaders behind them 鈥� the president may wish to urge Congress to let the sanctions expire when they come up for renewal next summer. 聽And if not, he can urge their renewal.

Unlike the maze of Congressionally-mandated sanctions against Cuba enacted over the last several decades, the Burma sanctions were designed to expire unless proponents make a compelling case to renew them. 聽The sanctions only last a year, unless Congress passes a joint resolution to renew them another year. 聽Imminent expiration of the sanctions means that Congress actually monitors and evaluates the effectiveness of its policy toward Burma every year, instead of leaving the sanctions in place indefinitely at the whim of the single most interested member or members of Congress, as in the case of the Cuba embargo. 聽With US sanctions always just a vote away from expiration, the Burmese government has a clear picture of the levers at work in the US government and a real incentive to take steps that would encourage US policymakers to scrap them.

But because the Cuba sanctions are open-ended and lack meaningful oversight, Cuban officials insist they can have little confidence that the US will actually take significant steps to improve the relationship even if Cuba does.

A case in point: two years ago, President Obama to Cuba鈥檚 leaders via our Spanish allies:

鈥� . . . [W]e understand that change can't happen overnight, but down the road, when we look back at this time, it should be clear that now is when those changes began.鈥�

Few would argue over whether Raul Castro has since embarked on a campaign over the past two years not just of economic reform, but, as Cuban political scientist Rafael Hernandez argues, key political reforms 鈥� de-centralization, de-statization, de-bureaucratization, and enhancing the rule of law 鈥� that go hand in hand. 聽It鈥檚 not been speedy or perfect, and much remains to be done.

But when Raul Castro鈥檚 government released more than 50 political prisoners last year imprisoned in 2003 for their alleged cooperation with the United States (in fact, it released , all of its political prisoners according to Amnesty International, except those convicted of violent crimes), the Obama administration its significance. 聽Some may consider eased US restrictions on people-to-people and academic travel implemented this spring to have been some sort of response to Havana, but they certainly as such. 聽Instead, they were sold as a more effective way to get around the Cuban government, reinforcing Cuban officials鈥� perception that all the US government is interested in in Cuba is regime change 鈥� hardly an incentive to serious negotiation.

And as the Cuban government has begun implementing numerous economic reforms 鈥� some more consequential than others 鈥� including, importantly, steps to legitimize the private sector in Cuba; after increasing space for diverse opinions in the nation鈥檚 official media; and after Raul Castro鈥檚 public endorsement for term limits, all developments one could reasonable qualify as 鈥渇lickers of progress,鈥� President Obama has remained .

Considering how politically charged US (regime change) policy is in Cuba鈥檚 domestic politics, it may be for the best that we just sit on the sidelines at this critical juncture. 聽But when the time comes for the United States to meaningfully engage Cuba after more than half a century, our byzantine embargo will in many ways tie the president鈥檚, and lawmakers鈥� hands. 聽Maybe it鈥檚 time to apply the Burma sanctions model 鈥� defend it or lose it 鈥� to the Cuba embargo, where it鈥檚 sorely needed.

--- Anya Landau French blogs for , a project of the "US-Cuba Policy Initiative,鈥� directed by Ms. Landau French, at the /. This post originally appeared at .