海角大神

Many Mexicans will feel a deep sense of loss when folksy, charismatic, nationalistic聽President Andr茅s Manuel L贸pez Obrador聽leaves office on Monday 鈥� and that鈥檚 no surprise.

Mr. L贸pez Obrador himself has spent an inordinate amount of time talking about his own legacy 鈥撀燼nd his place in history 鈥撀爋ver his six-year term, something he brings up at almost every one of his marathonic聽daily 7 a.m. media briefings.

But what legacy will the rumpled, grinning Mr. L贸pez Obrador leave behind? It is perhaps the main question for a man who is obsessed with history, and one thing appears clear: he has changed the way politics is done in Mexico, perhaps forever.

Unlike decades of reserved and distant presidents, Mr. L贸pez Obrador has built a deep personal connection with many Mexicans. He has stripped the office of the thousands of presidential guards, limousines, and walled compounds that once characterized it, saying 鈥測ou can鈥檛 have a rich government with poor people.鈥�

鈥淗e is a politician who evokes familiarity, he reminds people of a father, an uncle, a grandfather,鈥� said Carlos P茅rez Ricart, a political analyst at Mexico鈥檚 Center for Economic Research and Teaching. That鈥檚 not a coincidence, either. Mr. L贸pez Obrador constantly praises the traditional family, and says it has saved the country.

鈥淗e does feel nostalgia for some of the social structures of the 1970s in Mexico and nostalgia for the family,鈥� said Mr. P茅rez Ricart.

Will his legacy be like that of United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose New Deal created lasting institutions like Social Security and home mortgage programs that resulted in an enormous, stable middle class?

The Mexican leader stakes his movement on cash social-benefit programs, he likes to compare himself to Roosevelt, and many Mexicans think of him with the same fondness that the more patrician FDR inspired in his day.

鈥淚 think he鈥檚 going to be remembered as a president who started big changes, who thought about the people,鈥� said Armando L贸pez, who works as a street cleaner.

Marina Fiesco, an office worker taking a break at a Mexico City park with her 11-year-old son, voiced similar feelings.

鈥淚 feel he does think about the people,鈥� said Ms. Fiesco. 鈥淚t鈥檚 not about left or right, a president has to look out for the people.鈥�

Part of that connection is that he talks more, and fields more questions, than probably any other leader in the world.

In his six years in office, he has held about 1,400 televised morning briefings that last an average of 2 1/2 hours each. He tells jokes, talks about his favorite foods,聽lashes out at critical journalists, makes fun of the opposition, and sometimes plays his favorite music videos. Most briefings end with him saying, 鈥淟et鈥檚 go get breakfast.鈥�

He frequently says things that are not true. He claims Mexico doesn鈥檛 produce fentanyl 鈥撀爐he deadly synthetic opioid that kills about 70,000 Americans every year 鈥撀爀ven though聽his own officials have contradicted him. When homicides spiked this year 鈥撀燿espite his claims to have achieved an 18% reduction 鈥撀爃e simply ignored the figures.

Many Mexicans seem willing to tolerate the untruths, in part because Mr. L贸pez Obrador, 70, has mastered a key Mexican folk saying: 鈥淗e who gets angry, loses.鈥� He brushes real contradictions and problems off with a chuckle, a stony refusal to discuss them, or his stock phrase, 鈥淚 have other data.鈥�

He鈥檚 probably the most skillful politician ever to rule Mexico, and seems to enjoy some unstoppable motivating force: in all of his thousands of hours of talking, never once has he sat down, taken one sip of water, or gone off to use the bathroom.

Influenced by Mexican presidents of the 20th century, Mr. L贸pez Obrador would have liked to make his mark with big infrastructure projects 鈥撀爃e is obsessed with聽railroads聽and oil聽refineries聽鈥撀燼nd big state-owned companies like the ones that dominated Mexico鈥檚 economy in the 1970s, his formative years.

But his building projects聽have been often ill-planned and will be subject to the withering trends of economic and energy transition. Unlike his heroes from the past, he hasn鈥檛 been able to nationalize any industry, and has only been able to fight a rear-guard action to defend the indebted, struggling, state-owned oil and electric power companies he inherited.

Nor has he been able to make much of a mark in foreign policy, apart from a few rather pointless, unresolved disputes with Spain, the Vatican, Ecuador, and Peru. In the face of U.S. pressure, he has used the 120,000-member national guard he created not to confront drug cartels, but聽to prevent migrants from reaching the U.S. border.

And his social programs 鈥撀爈ike the $150-per month payment to people over 65 鈥� can fade, be defunded, or eviscerated by inflation.

So could Mr. L贸pez Obrador turn out to be a figure like Argentina鈥檚 president in the 1940s and 50s, Juan Per贸n, who left behind an ideologically amorphous legacy that was fought over by disparate wings of his movement for decades?

鈥淚 think that what we are going to see is the 鈥榖alkanization鈥� of Obrador-ism,鈥� said Mr. P茅rez Ricart, 鈥渁 dispute between the left and the right to own the term, a bit like what happened with Peronism in Argentina.鈥�

Or he could go down in history as the person who, however briefly, revived the nearly century-old Mexican tradition of a 鈥渟tate party,鈥� like the old PRI, where Mr. L贸pez Obrador began his political career. The PRI ruled Mexico for 70 years, before corruption, internal disputes, and economic crises brought it down.

Some of Mr. L贸pez Obrador鈥檚 most devoted followers seem surprisingly willing to take the chance of another PRI.

鈥淚f after 70 years we鈥檝e found we made a mistake, well, that鈥檚 life,鈥� Ms. Fiesco said.

Mr. L贸pez Obrador may be part of a region-wide revival of old, populistic state-party models, both on the left and right.

For example, El Salvador鈥檚 President聽Nayib Bukele聽stresses that his administration 鈥撀爓hich won even greater margins of reelection than Mr. L贸pez Obrador鈥檚 Morena 鈥撀爄s a 鈥渉egemonic party, not a state party.鈥�

That鈥檚 almost exactly how Morena supporters describe their movement, but the instant any party starts to use the power of the government to keep itself in power, that distinction disappears.

Most people think it鈥檚 unlikely that Morena will last as long in power as the seven-decade run of the PRI.

鈥淭imes have changed, that鈥檚 not possible anymore,鈥� said Armando L贸pez, the street cleaner. 鈥淧eople will support him as long as they see something [in return]. They鈥檙e not going to follow him blindly.鈥�

The Morena party was cobbled together by Mr. L贸pez Obrador out of old PRI members like himself and people from more leftist backgrounds. Mr. L贸pez Obrador is Morena鈥檚 star, its guide, its moral authority. Once he鈥檚 gone, the tensions within the party 鈥撀燼lready palpable 鈥撀爓ill likely grow stronger.

Mr. L贸pez Obrador is very aware of that, and from the start, he has consciously built structures to guard his legacy, which he views as his own, not the party鈥檚. He has handed聽more economic and law-enforcement power聽over to the armed forces than any other Mexican president, because the army obeys him unquestioningly and he trusts them.

His longest-lasting legacy may be those structural changes: the militarization of law enforcement and large swaths of the economy,聽the elimination of all independent regulatory and oversight agencies, the frequent attacks on the media, and聽a judicial overhaul聽that critics say will weaken democratic checks and balances.

Mexico鈥檚 armed forces now run airports, trains, customs facilities 鈥撀燼nd even an airline.

鈥淭he truth is that there is one really important legacy, and that is the legacy of militarization,鈥� said Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, an associate professor at George Mason University.

This story was reported by The Associated Press.