Why Central American aid cuts could mean more migration, not less
| Mexico City
Can you stop migration by stopping aid?
That鈥檚 a central question following President Donald Trump鈥檚 announcement last week that he would cut $450 million in aid to Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras 鈥� the home countries of tens of thousands of migrants and asylum-seekers arriving at the U.S. southern border.
It鈥檚 a dramatic move meant to hold governments responsible for the growing tally of families, unaccompanied minors, and others leaving the Northern Triangle, as this part of Central America is known. Central American governments should pull their weight in slowing the outflow of citizens, the White House announcement suggests 鈥� and if not, why 鈥渞eward鈥� them with aid? 鈥淭hey haven鈥檛 done a thing for us,鈥� Mr. Trump said Friday.聽
Why We Wrote This
International aid can seem like a gift, or even a 'reward.' But it's also a key tool for long-term development to benefit the donor country, complicating decisions about when and why to cut assistance.
Development assistance is hardly a perfect system, analysts say. But the cuts are expected to mostly affect nongovernmental organizations, charities, and churches addressing some of the root causes of migration 鈥� not the governments themselves. That raises the question of whether reducing assistance successfully can pressure governments to halt migration, or lead to more.
The U.S. system is at a 鈥渂reaking point,鈥� as migrants and asylum-seekers arrive in large groups at the southern border, the head of Customs and Border Protection said last month. Between October and February, 136,150 people traveling in families were arrested by U.S. border agents. That exceeds the total for the entire fiscal year that ended in September 2018, which was 107,212. Many believe Central Americans see Trump鈥檚 鈥渮ero tolerance鈥� migration policies as a 鈥渘ow or never鈥� moment to ask for asylum in the United States before the doors are shut entirely.聽
鈥淚t鈥檚 a bit Orwellian to ask governments to stop people from leaving,鈥� says Andrew Selee, president of the Migration Policy Institute. 鈥淲ith the 鈥榮tick,鈥� it鈥檚 hard to see what exactly the Central American governments can do that would be legal that would help them turn around the number of people exiting their countries.鈥�
鈥淲e can work with governments to change conditions on the ground,鈥� he adds, 鈥渂ut that requires development aid鈥� 鈥� and time.
It鈥檚 a lesson learned, in part, right at the southern border. For decades, the bulk of migrants attempting to cross into the U.S. there were Mexican. But starting in the late aughts, the number of Mexicans crossing without documentation fell dramatically, reaching a point of in 2012.
A number of factors played a role, from the end of Mexico鈥檚 single-party rule in 2000, to both countries鈥� shifting economies. But the U.S. did contribute to the decrease by incentivizing Mexico鈥檚 economic development, observers say. The North American Free Trade Agreement, implemented in 1994, was sold by consecutive U.S. administrations as a program to halt Mexican migration by way of creating more formal employment at home and plugging Mexico into the global economy.
But NAFTA was a piece 鈥渙f the larger puzzle of Mexico鈥檚 development,鈥� says Mr. Selee. 鈥淲hat Bush and Clinton didn鈥檛 mention was that it was going to take almost 15 years鈥� for the agreement to create the kinds of opportunities that 鈥済ive migrants hope to remain at home.鈥澛�
Subbing in for the state
Congress has given overwhelming bipartisan support to development aid in the Northern Triangle over the past several years, and is expected to contest Trump鈥檚 cuts.
The biggest portion of aid in the region has gone toward violence prevention and improving security and justice systems, according to the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a human rights organization that has since 2016.
The packages contain almost no direct aid to governments, according to Adriana Beltr谩n, director of citizen security at WOLA. The closest they come to government hands is in security assistance for police forces, for example, or helping a finance ministry improve its budget management system.
鈥淪ince 2016, you鈥檝e had bipartisan consensus that you need to address the factors that are driving irregular migration from the region,鈥� says Ms. Beltr谩n. 鈥淭his decision [to cut aid] is going to undermine all those efforts and worsen the situation.鈥� She says she鈥檚 never seen development aid used to punish or pressure regional governments.
The Northern Triangle is plagued with violence, insecurity, and poverty. A 2015 investigation by Honduras鈥檚 La Prensa newspaper found that Salvadorans, Hondurans, and Guatemalans pay roughly $390 million, $200 million, and $61 million, respectively, in yearly聽 in order to do anything from walk to school, take a certain bus route, or operate a small business. All three countries regularly rank as some of the most dangerous in the world not at war.
The kinds of civil society-run programs funded by U.S. development aid essentially do the work of the Northern Triangle鈥檚 weak public institutions, says Ursula Rold谩n, director of a migration research institute at Rafael Land铆var University in Guatemala City.
鈥淲e鈥檝e seen a complete deterioration of government institutions,鈥� Dr. Roldan says, and that directly affects citizens. 鈥淭ake agriculture. If you lose one harvest, you essentially have to leave. There鈥檚 no government support.鈥�
But she still hasn鈥檛 seen aid packages deliver the dramatic changes that would offer more Guatemalans opportunities to remain at home.
鈥淎merican aid to Central America has a lot of problems,鈥� write regional experts and Haverford College professors Anita Isaacs and Anne Preston in this week. 鈥淚ts total amounts are paltry, and it is mostly distributed inefficiently in large blocks by foreign contractors.鈥� But it has shown results in places like El Salvador, they note, where violence-prevention programming has been credited with helping lower the homicide rate. Salvadoran migration to the U.S.聽 between 2016 and 2018, according to U.S. statistics on border apprehensions.
鈥淭he moment to get tough is not because people are leaving, but because democracy [in the region] is backsliding,鈥� says Mr. Selee, citing the Guatemalan and Honduran governments鈥� pushback against corruption-monitoring commissions. The Guatemalan government has repeatedly attempted, most recently in January, to remove CICIG, an internationally-backed body investigating top-level politicians, business people, and security officials.
鈥淚t was a missed opportunity [to intervene] and now we鈥檙e dealing with the symptoms,鈥� he says.
