海角大神

A version of this post first appeared on the author's blog, . The views expressed are the author's own.听

As US Africa Command (AFRICOM) prepares to transition from the leadership of General Carter Ham to that of General David Rodriguez, it faces some critical decisions on how to develop a more robust posture to conduct crisis response operations while also bracing itself for the impact of .

This fundamental tension was apparent during General Ham鈥檚 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) last week regarding the programs and budget needed to meet the command鈥檚 current and future requirements. (Watch an archived webcast of the hearing听 and read听.)

Here are some of the salient points:听

At times,听the testimony felt like another round of inquiry about what happened during the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, and what assets were or could have been nearby to help save the lives of the four Americans that were killed. But I think the takeaway 鈥� not just from this hearing, but from the political fallout from the attack more generally 鈥� is that there is a clear demand for AFRICOM to have a more robust crisis response posture so that it is better able to protect US citizens and US interests on the continent. Accordingly, Ham highlighted several ways in which AFRICOM was building a theater response capability to improve the Command鈥檚 ability to respond to crises across North, East, and West Africa. These included:

鈥�a rapid response (CIF) based in Fort Carson, CO with has a rotational element forward deployed in Europe;

鈥�a (SP-MAGTF) that would be specifically tailored for crisis response operations and presumably based in Europe; and

鈥�an Army based in Fort Riley, KS that could be activated for crisis response with the permission of the Secretary of Defense. (However, the day-to-day purpose of the regionally-aligned brigade would be to deploy in small teams across the continent to train African security forces.)

Of course, all the discussion of a more robust posture for crisis response operations begged the question of how the Department of Defense will be able to resource these requirements.

When asked how AFRICOM could increase听response time while maintaining a relatively small footprint, Ham responded that we are much better at prevention than response. He further stated that听prevention is much cheaper, but necessitates a better understanding of the operating environment听鈥� hence the preoccupation with increasing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

Earlier in the hearing, Ham had been asked about听reductions in flight hours that have already resulted from sequestration, and have听impacted the Command's ISR听capabilities.听In his response, he mentioned that听most operations are funded by the services 鈥� Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Special Operations 鈥� and that the Air Force and Navy components have had to constrain their flight operations due to funding challenges. General Ham further explained that he'd asked the Air Force commander to maintain the component's transport aircraft in听a heightened alert posture so that they could move crisis response forces more readily. This, however, requires that the component sustain flight crews on a heightened alert posture, which cuts into normal training and sustainment flights. As a result, the component was having trouble funding both requirements. Similarly, the Navy has had to decrease the frequency of some of its operational reconnaissance flights 鈥� again because of the inability to fund its normal flight operations.听

As the hearing suggested, the issue of how AFRICOM plans to improve readiness to respond to crises as we simultaneously enter sequestration means that the incoming commander, General Rodriguez, certainly has his work cut out for him.

Lesley Anne Warner blogs about African security and occasional travel tales at听. Follow Lesley on Twitter .