Sudanese government cracks down on remaining southern sympathizers
This spring, as Sudan prepared for the secession of its southern region, the Sudan People鈥檚 Liberation Movement (SPLM) also prepared for a division. The main SPLM would continue as the ruling party in the new South Sudan, but the party鈥檚 northern supporters would also continue, as SPLM-N, to fight for their vision of a more pluralistic political climate in (North) Sudan. In March, expressed their hopes and ambitions for remaking Sudan, but also warned of the possibility of conflict, especially in the states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan, which would lie on the new border between Sudan and South Sudan.
Conflict, rather than pluralism, has been the outcome in Sudan. In May, a gubernatorial election in South Kordofan saw the , a member of Sudan鈥檚 ruling National Congress Party (NCP). The SPLM-N鈥檚 rejection of this result helped spark intermittent violence in the state, including a military deployment by the regime on the eve of Southern Sudanese independence. Matters deteriorated further with the outbreak of fighting in Blue Nile State, the only Northern state with an SPLM-N governor, Malik Agar. On Sept. 2, President and has since replaced him with a series of . On Sept. 16, the regime along with 16 other parties with alleged links to South Sudan. And just two days ago, three . SPLM-N leaders in both South Kordofan and Blue Nile are now effectively operating as rebels, and the .
The regime鈥檚 aggressive posture toward the SPLM-N suggests that leaders in Khartoum believe they must tighten their political control in order to maintain power and stop rebellions. The posture suggests fear, in other words. Suspending the SPLM-N seems like a mistake to me 鈥� the backlash could be worse for the regime than simply letting the party continue 鈥� but this move adds weight to what some analysts have been saying for a while now, namely that hardliners in Khartoum oppose giving any ground to internal political dissent in the wake of Southern independence. If that鈥檚 the case, the hardliners appear to be dictating policy in the border areas.
The extent of the backlash in the border areas bears directly on the question of the central government鈥檚 stability. It is not necessarily any single one of the problems that Khartoum faces, but rather the combination of all them, that has made analysts like up the odds of regime change in Khartoum. With , the economy suffering, and the border areas blowing up, Khartoum has a full plate.
鈥� Alex Thurston is a PhD student studying Islam in Africa at Northwestern University and blogs at .
