With South Sudan's referendum, which US president gets the credit?
The credible and relatively peaceful referendum that took place last week in South Sudan would seem to vindicate the current US 补诲尘颈苍颈蝉迟谤补迟颈辞苍鈥檚 Sudan policy of the past two years. Yet members of President George W. Bush鈥檚 Africa team, who have steadily criticized President Barack Obama on Sudan since 2009, continue to raise concerns about the White House鈥檚 approach. At stake in this debate are the nature of US policy in Africa and the apportioning of credit in what is arguably the greatest American diplomatic triumph since the 1990s.
Bush and other architects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 (CPA), which ended decades of civil war in Sudan and laid plans for the referendum, initially envisioned a smooth transition to Obama with regard to Sudan. Immediately after Obama took office, one Bush appointee, former US Senator and Special Envoy to Sudan John Danforth , 鈥淭he Obama administration can help to finish the work we started. The US can help save the peace agreement.鈥�
But criticism of Obama on Sudan soon followed, portraying the President as disengaged and his appointees as disunited in the face of threats of renewed civil war in Sudan. , one of Bush鈥檚 Special Envoys to Sudan, wrote in 2009, 鈥淒isputes within the Obama administration are inhibiting US efforts to stop Sudan鈥檚 slide toward civil war at a time when unified American leadership is essential.鈥� Shortly before Sudan鈥檚 April 2010 presidential elections, Jendayi Frazer, assistant secretary of state for African affairs under Bush, told that the Obama administration had 鈥渨asted almost a whole year on a policy review, and yet they are still talking with many different voices.鈥� Richard Williamson, Bush鈥檚 final Special Envoy to Sudan, for not doing enough to enforce a court ruling concerning a north-south border dispute in the oil-rich Abyei region. Frazer and Williamson suggested that Gration鈥檚 friendliness and Obama鈥檚 disengagement were allowing Khartoum to act with impunity.
September 2010 was a turning point for Obama on Sudan: he attended a UN meeting on Sudan and for the full implementation of the CPA. dismissed Obama鈥檚 statement as 鈥減ublic relations,鈥� saying, 鈥淭he president needs to insert himself into the policy and be seen to actually care about it.鈥� Obama鈥檚 actions in the following months, which included increasing the US diplomatic presence in Sudan, earned some praise from Bush appointees. Still, Williamson , 鈥淭he naivet茅 of U.S. President Barack Obama and his advisors鈥� had helped make renewed civil war in Sudan a real possibility.
War has not broken out, but criticism has not ceased. In an interview last week, Frazer told me that the referendum was going well, and she credited the administration with diplomatic accomplishments in Sudan. However, she said past mistakes had ongoing repercussions: Had Obama pursued a more coherent diplomatic strategy from the beginning, she said, things in Sudan could be better. For example, 鈥淎byei might be having a referendum right now.鈥� Given that the deferral of Abyei鈥檚 referendum (originally scheduled to run concurrently with South Sudan鈥檚) and the tribal tensions there make the region a potential flashpoint for war, Frazer鈥檚 remark amounts to a stinging criticism of two years of diplomacy by team Obama.
That Bush appointees continue to criticize Obama on Sudan will surprise few observers, but the debate represents more than just partisans taking swipes at their opponents. It is a struggle over legacies. By the time Bush left office, many Americans rejected his foreign policy views. Obama鈥檚 early candidacy gained momentum in part because he offered a new direction for foreign policy 鈥� an end to the Iraq war, a recalibration in Afghanistan, a greater emphasis on diplomacy, and a tougher approach on Sudan. If officials from the Bush administration can claim that they successfully implemented 鈥� and that Obama nearly bungled 鈥� a diplomatic solution to Sudan鈥檚 conflicts, they will have undermined a core component of Obama鈥檚 foreign policy brand. And they will have partly rehabilitated Bush鈥檚 image as a doer and decider. The race to apportion credit for the referendum is on.
In assessing the value of each 补诲尘颈苍颈蝉迟谤补迟颈辞苍鈥檚 approach to Sudan, it鈥檚 important to remember, as Frazer told me, that the lion鈥檚 share of the credit must go to the South Sudanese themselves for their vision and persistence. While partisan differences (and a great deal of continuity, as Frazer acknowledged) affected Sudan policy in Washington, the US did not ever dictate what happened in Sudan. The US was merely an important partner in what may turn out as a great success story.
鈥� Alex Thurston is a PhD student studying Islam in Africa at Northwestern University and blogs at .
