What constitutes victory in an 鈥榓symmetric鈥� war with Iran?
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Ned Temko Columnist
| London
鈥淕one鈥� was President Donald Trump鈥檚 verdict this week on the state of Iran鈥檚 navy, its air force, its anti-aircraft batteries, its radar installations 鈥� and 鈥減erhaps most importantly, its leaders.鈥�
And on all of the above, with just a bit of his trademark hyperbole, he was absolutely right.
Yet even with tit-for-tat attacks on energy facilities threatening to widen the conflict further, Mr. Trump has been making another, broader claim: 鈥淲e won.鈥�
Why We Wrote This
In the 鈥渁symmetric鈥� Iran war, victory looks different for each side: The U.S. and Israel must decisively win 鈥� or convincingly claim they have 鈥� while the Iranian regime only has to survive.
And that isn鈥檛 true. At least not yet.
Nearly three weeks into the conflict, he has come face-to-face with the sobering complexities of what security experts call 鈥渁symmetric war鈥� 鈥� an overwhelmingly powerful military force pitted against an ostensibly far weaker adversary.
On paper, it ought to be no contest.
In this case, the combined might of arguably the two most fearsome fighting forces in the world 鈥� the American and Israeli militaries 鈥� should surely be able to make Iran surrender, or simply implode.
But in an 鈥渁symmetric鈥� war, the definition of victory, for the weaker party, is very different.
Knowing it can鈥檛 win a conventional military contest, that party aims merely to survive.
And its path to survival? Widen the war on its terms. Draw it out. Deny the more powerful adversary a quick or easy triumph, while inexorably raising the economic and political cost of a protracted conflict.
Mr. Trump isn鈥檛 the first U.S. president to face the potential perils of assuming raw power would subdue an enemy that is fighting by different rules: Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon learned that lesson, at great political cost, during the Vietnam War six decades ago.
But America鈥檚 military commitment, and its final forced retreat in Vietnam, came over a period of years. By comparison, Mr. Trump鈥檚 Iran challenge is playing out at warp speed.
It began with an audacious daylight strike in late February that eliminated Iran鈥檚 leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In the days since, relentless U.S. and Israeli attacks have combined pinpoint intelligence, precision weaponry, and deadly force.
They鈥檝e killed other senior clerical, political, and military leaders in Iran. They鈥檝e targeted missile and drone forces, arms-manufacturing facilities, security police posts, and headquarters buildings.
They鈥檝e hobbled much of Iran鈥檚 conventional military power.
Yet the Iranians鈥� asymmetric response has been equally rapid, and it is already having an effect.
Iran has widened the conflict by targeting America鈥檚 wealthy Gulf Arab allies, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman.
It has also been barring all but its own, and ally China鈥檚, ships from passing through the Strait of Hormuz 鈥� the narrow Gulf choke point through which some 20% of the world鈥檚 oil supply ordinarily passes.
The overall result has been a major spike in the world price of oil, gas, jet fuel, and a range of other commodities including fertilizer 鈥� increases being felt, in Mr. Trump鈥檚 political backyard, by American motorists and farmers.
The stakes have been ratcheted up further in the past few days. An Israeli attack on Iran鈥檚 vast South Pars natural gas field on Wednesday prompted Iran to strike energy facilities in Arab Gulf states 鈥� including a facility in Qatar providing about one-fifth of the world鈥檚 liquid natural gas supply.
This asymmetric version of a stalemate has confronted the president with a stark decision: escalate further, or begin looking for a politically viable route to wind down the war and disengage.
So far, at least, he seems minded to escalate, hoping that the cumulative effect of the military battering Iran is enduring, and the Israelis鈥� systematic elimination of its senior leaders, will ultimately leave the Iranians unable to sustain their asymmetric fightback.
Mr. Trump, himself, seems aware that until that happens, any claim to 鈥渧ictory鈥� could ring hollow.
Even when telling a rally last week that America had already been victorious, he clearly recognized that point hadn鈥檛 yet arrived.
鈥淲e won,鈥� he said, arguing that with Ayatollah Khamenei鈥檚 elimination in the war鈥檚 first hour, 鈥渋t was over.鈥�
But he quickly added: 鈥淲e鈥檝e got to finish the job, right?鈥�
That may explain why some 2,500 U.S. Marines have been added to the initial attack force, as well as a new range of targets the Americans and Israelis began to strike on Wednesday this week: Israel鈥檚 attack on Iran鈥檚 natural gas processing facility; and U.S. forces鈥� firing of bunker-busting munitions at potential sources of Iranian missile attacks along the Strait of Hormuz.
The arrival of the Marines could open up two further options: seizing Iran鈥檚 main oil export facility on Kharg Island at the northern end of the Persian Gulf, or mounting a limited boots-on-the-ground operation to try to secure the strait.
Both, however, carry potential risks. Taking Kharg could mean removing Iranian exports from a world oil market already upended by the choking off of the Strait of Hormuz. And, especially if paired with a military move to take control of the strait, it could provoke Iran to expand missile and drone attacks on Arab oil and gas facilities.
Mr. Trump reminded his social media followers this week that he was 鈥淧resident of the United States of America, by far the Most Powerful Country Anywhere in the World鈥� 鈥� hardly the words of a leader reluctant to 鈥渇inish the job.鈥�
But unless he can virtually eliminate Iran鈥檚 missile and drone capacity, he鈥檒l have to reckon with another reality of war 鈥� summed up by Jim Mattis, Mr. Trump鈥檚 defense secretary during his first term in office.
鈥淣o war is over,鈥� he said, 鈥渦ntil the enemy says it鈥檚 over.鈥�
鈥淲e may think it over, we may declare it over, but in fact, the enemy gets a vote.鈥�
