What Trump鈥檚 view of US military power could mean for Iran-US talks
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Ned Temko Columnist
| London
The negotiations continue in Geneva, at least for now. Yet the sheer scale of the American buildup in the Middle East 鈥� the largest since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 鈥� certainly makes it look as if President Donald Trump is preparing for war with Iran.
What we鈥檙e seeing, however, isn鈥檛 necessarily what we鈥檒l get.
And that鈥檚 not just because Mr. Trump has been weighing a range of options, diplomatic and military; nor due to from his top general over the potential perils and pitfalls in a full-scale war.
Why We Wrote This
President Donald Trump has rewritten how the United States uses its military power. The new strategy may help explain his approach to Iran as the U.S. builds up firepower in the Middle East.
It鈥檚 because of President Trump鈥檚 fundamentally redrawn vision of United States military power: his dramatic break with his predecessors over how to wield that power 鈥� and what it鈥檚 for.
While his often bellicose rhetoric might seem to point toward all-out war, a deeper look into this 鈥淭rump Doctrine,鈥� and how it鈥檚 been deployed since he returned to the White House a year ago, suggests a more complex picture.
Yes, all-out war could still happen.
But if it does, it鈥檚 more likely to be down to miscalculation than intention: the result of an ill-managed, or unmanageable, escalatory spiral between the U.S. and Iran, rather than Mr. Trump鈥檚 deliberate choice.
The belligerent tone has been unmistakable. Mr. Trump has rhapsodized about America鈥檚 military might. He鈥檚 renamed the Department of Defense as the 鈥淒epartment of War.鈥� His secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth, has stressed the need for a 鈥渨arrior ethos鈥� in the U.S. military.
Mr. Trump has taken particular delight in celebrating the most powerful and cutting-edge weapons in America鈥檚 arsenal: the bunker-busting munitions dropped by U.S. warplanes on Iran鈥檚 nuclear facilities last June, or the electronic countermeasures that helped special forces arrest and abduct Venezuelan President Nicol谩s Maduro last month.
But that鈥檚 been part of a political message he clearly views as a key function of U.S. military power. He has used it to drive home his insistence that today鈥檚 world belongs to those nations which, to use his phrase of choice, have the most 鈥渃ards to play.鈥�
And that militarily, no one holds more aces than America.
Still, despite his muscularly worded messaging after the bunker-buster and Maduro attacks 鈥� and the large-scale buildup of forces beforehand 鈥� both were deliberately limited.
They were sharp, short operations with a finite aim.
And even as U.S.-Iran tensions escalated in recent weeks, the administration offered a timely insight into why that more limited model could appeal to Mr. Trump if he does opt for force.
The insight came in the four-yearly , or NDS, issued late last month by Secretary Hegseth.
It pledged to 鈥渞estore鈥� a 鈥渨arrior ethos.鈥� It said the 鈥渃ore, irreplaceable goal鈥� of the armed forces would be to win wars 鈥渄ecisively.鈥�
But the document also outlined what kind of wars it envisaged 鈥� implying a strong reluctance to risk full-scale conflict with Iran, in favor of the kind of more limited attack mounted last summer.
And despite Mr. Trump鈥檚 social media messages voicing sympathy with anti-government protesters, or musing about the overthrow of Iran鈥檚 leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, it was explicit in rejecting such politically motivated military operations.
The NDS almost sneeringly dismissed past presidents鈥� attempts at 鈥済randiose nation-building,鈥� and their defense of 鈥渃loud-castle abstractions like the rules-based international order.鈥�
鈥淣o longer will the Department be distracted by interventionism, endless war, regime change, and nation building,鈥� the document declared.
How Mr. Trump applies that lens to deciding when, and whether, to use force against Iran remains to be seen.
The NDS鈥� survey of security concerns did portray Iran as a continuing worry, highlighting its conventional weapons, its apparent determination to keep open the possibility of reviving its nuclear weapons program, and its ties to proxy forces like Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Yet the NDS pointedly omitted any references to the regime鈥檚 human rights abuses or its brutal crackdown on protesters.
The NDS also cited the proven willingness and ability of 鈥渕odel ally鈥� Israel to defend itself, with 鈥渃ritical but limited support from the United States.鈥�
And it extolled the success of last year鈥檚 joint attack on Iran, culminating in the U.S. airstrike on the bunker-protected nuclear sites 鈥� even repeating Mr. Trump鈥檚 claim at the time that they had 鈥渙bliterated Iran鈥檚 nuclear program.鈥�
Yet perhaps the most relevant guidepost that the NDS offers is in its concluding section.
In it, Mr. Hegseth portrays America鈥檚 war-making, and war-winning, prowess as a way of achieving 鈥減eace鈥� terms that secure the 鈥渞easonably conceived interests鈥� of the U.S. and its allies. He adds, in a formula likely to be tested in this week鈥檚 latest Geneva talks with Iranian officials, that such terms ought to be compatible with 鈥渢he interests of our potential opponents, if they keep their demands reasonable and cabined.鈥�
If not? Then, the U.S. military will 鈥渟tand ready to fight and win the nation鈥檚 wars.鈥�
Still, the NDS adds an important rider: not just any war at all.
Only 鈥渘ecessary wars鈥� qualify, 鈥渋n ways that make sense for Americans.鈥�
That may prove to be the bedrock test President Trump applies as he decides what to do with the enormous array of American firepower now massed on Iran鈥檚 doorstep.
