How to pick a pathway to peace in Ukraine?
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Ned Temko Columnist
| London
All eyes this week were on Moscow, where Russian President Vladimir Putin presided over a Victory Day parade on Monday with no Ukraine victory to celebrate.
But if America and its Western allies are eventually going to find a way to end the war in Ukraine 鈥� in effect talking Mr. Putin down from a ledge of his own making 鈥� their attention will be focused not so much on Moscow, or even Kyiv. Rather, they will be mindful of two other points on the map of Europe where events left a fateful imprint.
One of them made its mark more than a century ago, in June 1919. It鈥檚 the grand ch芒teau of Versailles, just outside Paris, where the treaty ending World War I was signed. That document declared Germany鈥檚 war guilt, disarmed the country, and prescribed heavy financial reparations. Adolf Hitler portrayed it as a national humiliation, a refrain for the Nazis鈥� rise to power in the 1930s.
Why We Wrote This
When it comes time to make peace in Ukraine, Western allies will have two historic models to learn from 鈥� and avoid.
The other is the Black Sea resort of Yalta. In February 1945, the town hosted a summit that brought together U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, Britain鈥檚 Winston Churchill, and Soviet dictator Josef Stalin to chart the shape of Europe after World War II.
It paved the way for the Soviets鈥� postwar dominance of Eastern Europe 鈥� a dominance that, to Mr. Putin鈥檚 burning frustration, ended with the collapse of the USSR.
The West鈥檚 dauntingly delicate challenge, whenever the Ukraine war offers the chance for a negotiated peace, may well be to trace a middle path between Versailles and Yalta.
The attraction of a 鈥淰ersailles II鈥� is likely to grow as the war goes on, with each new Russian artillery strike on the civilian population, and each new allegation of war crimes. At a minimum, Ukraine and its allies seem sure to insist that any settlement places the blame for the war squarely on the Russian invaders, that Moscow be made to help foot the bill for reconstruction, and that war crimes be investigated and prosecuted.
But Washington and its NATO partners also know they鈥檒l have to find some postwar modus vivendi with Russia, and are likely to see a cautionary tale in Versailles: the prospect of a settlement so punitive that Mr. Putin would either reject it out of hand, or use the refrain of 鈥渉umiliation鈥� as fuel for rearmament, further repression, and future aggression.
Yalta, however, offers a cautionary tale of its own.
There鈥檚 no prospect of its providing a direct model for Ukraine. When the summiteers met there three-quarters of a century ago, Stalin had huge leverage. At the cost of millions of lives, the Soviets had beaten back Hitler鈥檚 invasion force. His army controlled much of Eastern Europe and was closing in on Berlin.
Mr. Putin, by contrast, if not losing the war in Ukraine, certainly shows no sign yet of winning it.
Still, for the Russian leader, Yalta holds great importance, and not only because memories of the summit feed his nostalgia for the old Soviet Union鈥檚 weight on the world stage.
As his Victory Day speech made clear earlier this week, Mr. Putin鈥檚 ultimate purpose in invading Ukraine was to recoup some of what Moscow lost with the demise of the Soviet Union, to secure a new European security settlement with the Americans and NATO that would give Russia the kind of superpower sway it enjoyed until 1991.聽In 1945, for example.聽
But the Western allies are not going to be inclined to treat Mr. Putin like Stalin: that would be to validate, if not reward, the invasion of Ukraine.
Steering a course between Versailles and Yalta is likely to prove no easy task.
The exact shape of negotiating terms will depend on the course of the war: how long, and how brutally, the Russian forces keep fighting, whether they make major advances or are pushed back by the highly motivated and increasingly well-armed Ukrainians.
As things now stand, opinion in Washington seems to lean toward Versailles. Senior officials have made clear their view that Mr. Putin must pay a price for the invasion, not just in economic terms, but through limitations on Moscow鈥檚 capacity to launch further attacks on its neighbors.
Still, President Joe Biden has also said he鈥檚 determined to avoid American and NATO forces getting directly involved, warning that such a step would raise the peril of 鈥淲orld War III.鈥� More broadly, U.S. officials are concerned a 鈥渃ornered鈥� Mr. Putin might lash out and escalate, even perhaps eventually by using a tactical nuclear weapon.
The implication is that a full-on Versailles strategy would be best avoided. And the corollary: Even if nothing resembling Yalta in 1945 is in the cards, some form of diplomatically respectful nod to Russia鈥檚 national self-image and security concerns could be in order.
Yet, as things now look, such an approach would carry a heavy, and tragic, dose of irony. The central 鈥渃oncession鈥� to Moscow would likely be that NATO would rule out formal membership for Ukraine.
And as any honest Western diplomat will tell you, such membership was never more than a very remote prospect anyway.
