Saigon and Kabul: A connection that will shape the US global role
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Ned Temko Correspondent
The stark images of America鈥檚 final dash for the exit in Afghanistan, with Taliban forces streaming into the capital, have made the comparisons inevitable: Kabul 2021, Saigon 1975. But there鈥檚 a deeper connection between these two long, finally abandoned, wars, with potentially major implications for the future role of the United States in the world.
The defeat in Vietnam marked the beginning of the end of America鈥檚 post-World War II national聽consensus about its political identity and place in the world: as an indispensable supporter and defender of democracy, uniquely placed to champion that cause politically, economically,聽diplomatically, and, if necessary, by force of arms.
In the intervening decades, successive presidents have made occasional efforts to revive it, most聽recently, and disastrously, in the invasion of Iraq in 2003.聽
Why We Wrote This
The searing images of the U.S. retreats from Saigon and Kabul inevitably spark comparisons. But a deeper connection between these wars may hold significant sway over how the U.S. addresses overseas commitments in the future.
Yet if Vietnam was the beginning of the end of the old unifying principle for U.S. foreign policy, the pullout from Afghanistan looks like its final punctuation mark. And more significantly, it seems to signal a new and different vision of America鈥檚 role in the world.聽The key shift: Barring a direct threat to homeland security, like a Pearl Harbor or a 9/11, the prospect of American 鈥渂oots on the ground鈥� overseas now appears increasingly remote.聽
Under former President Donald Trump, this new mindset was framed as 鈥淎merica First.鈥� President Joe Biden鈥檚 phrase of choice has become 鈥渁 foreign policy for the middle class.鈥� But the underlying assumption is broadly the same: America鈥檚 overseas commitments, especially military commitments, must ultimately benefit 鈥� and, for domestic political reasons, be shown to benefit 鈥� ordinary Americans.聽
Or, in the Afghanistan context: Less tangible, old-style achievements, such as the historic聽empowerment of girls and women, which is now under stark threat from the Taliban, are not sufficient grounds for a lasting U.S. commitment. If Afghanistan is going to protect those advances, it鈥檚 up to the Afghans.聽
Committing U.S. troops to go after the Taliban for hosting Al Qaeda might still pass muster, as it did in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Yet when it comes to promoting democracy, that鈥檚 a job for American diplomats, not soldiers.聽
The nature of the U.S. retreat聽聽
The nature of the retreat from Afghanistan has dramatized this shift for American allies.
Mr. Biden entered the White House pledging to reengage on the international stage, repairing key alliances which Mr. Trump had openly disdained. The message of 鈥淎merica is back鈥� was warmly welcomed by U.S. allies. But the message from Afghanistan is that it鈥檚 a different America that is back.
Mr. Biden is keen to emphasize real, and important differences from the Trump years:聽Washington is reengaging diplomatically with allies. It has moved to reclaim a聽leadership role on major international issues, especially climate change. And in one aspect of the聽old postwar consensus that does still seem to survive, Washington is again consistently raising聽its voice on human rights issues worldwide.聽
When it comes to the most difficult foreign-policy decision any government must聽make 鈥� committing military force 鈥� America鈥檚 political calculus has changed.
And with it, American allies will be reassessing the degree to which they can rely on their聽security ties with Washington going forward.
Until the final Afghan withdrawal, and the Taliban advances, the rumblings were largely private. European members of the NATO military alliance 鈥� especially Britain, which committed, and lost, more troops to the 20-year war than any other country except the U.S. 鈥� let it be known they were surprised, and disappointed, at being barely consulted over Mr. Biden鈥檚 decision to pull out all American forces within a matter of weeks.
But as the situation on the ground worsened, Britain鈥檚 secretary of defense took the extraordinary step of publicly denouncing the U.S. decision. Though careful to lay the ultimate blame with Mr. Trump, criticizing the 鈥渞otten deal鈥� he did with Taliban negotiators last year as part of an initial, even earlier withdrawal plan, Ben Wallace didn鈥檛 hide his displeasure at what Mr. Biden did with that inheritance.
鈥淚鈥檝e been pretty blunt about it publicly,鈥� he told a TV interviewer last weekend, 鈥渁nd that鈥檚聽quite a rare thing when it comes to United States decisions. But strategically, it causes a lot of聽problems. And as an international community, it鈥檚 very difficult for what we鈥檙e seeing today.鈥�
The key question now for U.S. allies is how the new test for overseas military commitment will affect other potential conflict areas in the world. That鈥檚 especially critical for smaller allies who could find themselves militarily threatened by Washington鈥檚 main geopolitical rivals: Ukraine, on Russia鈥檚 border; and the island democracy of Taiwan, which China has vowed ultimately to reabsorb into the mainland, by force if necessary.
Diplomatically, the Biden administration has been unequivocal in its support for both, and in聽warning against any encroachment on their territory. But how far would Washington be willing to commit militarily if these warnings are ignored or tested?
The answer is likely to become clearer over the months ahead. And one clue: the degree to which the Biden administration frames the challenges and pressures faced by Ukraine and Taiwan, especially given the importance of the U.S. rivalry with Moscow and Beijing, as a matter of ordinary Americans鈥� own national interest.
In other words, as an issue that chimes with a 鈥渇oreign policy for the middle class.鈥�
