海角大神

鈥淵ou know me.鈥� It鈥檚 been a refrain all across Joe Biden鈥檚 half-century in public life. And the consistency of his core policy beliefs was on full show last week, in his first foreign policy address from the Oval Office.

His remarks were delivered remotely to an annual European security meeting he鈥檚 long attended in person. And they highlighted a new challenge: applying his enduring values and priorities to a world changed beyond recognition since his last time in national office, as Barack Obama鈥檚 vice president.

Some of the changes have been building for years, above all the increasingly assertive and emboldened stance of China and Russia. Yet others are newer, and could prove even more daunting: the geopolitical after-effects of former President Donald Trump鈥檚 reshaping of America鈥檚 approach to the world.

Mr. Biden鈥檚 abiding vision has been of an America leading alliances of like-minded democracies, standing strong against rivals where necessary, yet cooperating with them where possible. Those alliances, in his view, ultimately win the hearts and minds of the wider world 鈥渘ot by the example of their power, but the power of their example.鈥�

All of that, he made clear to the delegates, was what he still believed in.

But beyond the challenge of China and Russia, this year鈥檚 Munich Security Conference brought to the fore doubts over bedrock assumptions of a long line of U.S. leaders: the robustness of America鈥檚 alliances; the impact of its leadership role; and, for the rest of the world, the lure of democracy itself.

China and Russia, to be sure, pose tests for the new president.

A different world

When Mr. Biden spoke in Munich a dozen years ago, soon after he and President Obama had taken office, his focus was mostly on broad international challenges that read like today鈥檚 headlines: world economic crisis; climate change; cybersecurity; Iran鈥檚 nuclear program. Even the shared challenge of fighting 鈥渆ndemic disease.鈥�

But back then, he made only a glancing, largely conciliatory, reference to Russia. He didn鈥檛 mention China at all.

Appearing in Munich four years later, at the start of the Obama administration鈥檚 second term, he did cite differences with Russia. Yet he remained largely upbeat about cooperation. He spoke about China, too. But again 鈥� citing talks with the man who would become China鈥檚 leader, Xi Jinping 鈥� he voiced optimism that 鈥渉ealthy competition from a growing, emerging China鈥� would prove positive, and that the U.S. and China weren鈥檛 destined to be 鈥渆nemies.鈥�

Unsurprisingly, his tone toward both rivals at last week鈥檚 conference was far tougher. He still stressed the importance of seeking cooperation, citing a range of issues where he felt it was simply essential: the COVID-19 pandemic, arms control, climate change.

But referring to Russia鈥檚 leader only by his last name, he accused Putin of seeking to weaken democratic alliances, 鈥渂ully鈥� other states, and hack into vital European and U.S. computer networks.聽

On China, he said it was essential to 鈥減ush back鈥� against its 鈥渆conomic abuses and coercion,鈥� and shape new rules for future technology to ensure it is used to 鈥渓ift people up鈥� rather than 鈥減in them down.鈥�

Yet that brought Mr. Biden back to his yearslong belief in the core importance of America鈥檚 democratic alliances. Now more than ever, he said, the U.S. needed to 鈥渨ork in lockstep鈥� with them.

It was on that issue that Munich highlighted what may prove his trickiest diplomatic challenge.

A different United States

Despite the welcome for his overall message that 鈥淎merica is back,鈥� there were signs of continuing tremors from Mr. Trump鈥檚 downgrading of alliances in favor of bilateral 鈥淎merica first鈥� dealings with individual world leaders.

In their remarks to the conference, two of Europe鈥檚 most influential leaders signaled that truly rebuilding the trans-Atlantic partnership 鈥� certainly 鈥渋n lockstep鈥� 鈥� might not prove easy.

During the Trump years, both German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron publicly questioned whether Europe could still rely on America鈥檚 bedrock support.聽At the Munich conference, Mr. Macron聽did say he believed in NATO 鈥� the military alliance between the U.S. and Europe that, under President Trump, he鈥檇 pronounced no longer viable. But聽he reiterated a call for Europe to seek 鈥渟trategic autonomy鈥� from Washington. And Chancellor Merkel 鈥� whose country has important economic ties with both China and Russia 鈥撀爌aired her endorsement of Mr. Biden鈥檚 emphasis on the alliance鈥檚 鈥渟hared values鈥� with a practical caveat: 鈥淥ur聽interests will not always converge.鈥�

And there is a deeper source of聽European聽skepticism: over the staying power of Mr. Biden鈥檚 worldview, and whether a Trump-style nationalism might yet return in the future.

Mr. Biden was clearly aware of all this, speaking of the need 鈥渢o earn back our position of trusted leadership.鈥�

But his most emotive words were reserved for a far wider, longer-term challenge: the struggle for the very future of democratic governance against an argument being made by China, Russia, and a number of other countries that democracies simply aren鈥檛 up to the task of handling the economic, health, and security tasks of the 21st-century world. That 鈥渁utocracy is the best way forward,鈥� as Mr. Biden summed up their view.聽

That is wrong, Mr. Biden asserted. 鈥淚 believe with every ounce of my being that democracy will and must prevail,鈥� he told the conference.

Of all the long-held values he brought to his address, none better defines the worldview with which he has invested his presidency. Yet now his task, and clearly his hope, will be to bring America鈥檚 overseas allies along with him.