Syria and Afghanistan: the withdrawal dilemma
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Ned Temko Correspondent
| London
When President Trump agrees with Sen. Elizabeth Warren, the Democratic Party adversary he most likes to bait and denigrate, it鈥檚 worth taking note. Especially on an issue of real policy significance.
In this case, it鈥檚 the belief that the US military presence in both Syria and Afghanistan is wrong, and that a main reason the troops are still there is a cozy consensus among America鈥檚 defense and foreign-policy 鈥渆stablishment.鈥� Mr. Trump is backing his words with action, ordering a pullout from Syria and signaling his determination to reduce troop levels in Afghanistan.
Yet with political debate likely to intensify as such pullouts proceed, it鈥檚 important to recognize that Part 2 of the Trump-Warren argument 鈥� the notion of a self-reinforcing, pro-war consensus among policy experts and professionals 鈥� is at the least an oversimplification.
Why We Wrote This
Donald Trump and Elizabeth Warren both say it: The US presence in Syria is wrong, and it鈥檚 the result of a self-reinforcing policy 鈥渆stablishment.鈥� But it鈥檚 not that simple.
There was indeed broad establishment consensus on the need to contain Soviet expansion during much of the cold war. The long, failed war in Vietnam also enjoyed such support at first. As David Halberstam revealed in his seminal 1972 book 鈥淭he Best and the Brightest,鈥� that war was in some ways the creation of a coterie of academics and intellectuals around President John F. Kennedy who, in Mr. Halberstam鈥檚 phrase, crafted 鈥渂rilliant policies that defied common sense.鈥� The same has been said about the neoconservatives around President George W. Bush in the 2003 Iraq War.
Yet in part because of the failures in Vietnam and Iraq, there has also been a countercurrent of skepticism in the policy establishment in recent years.
Resisting retreat
The military brass does seem instinctively inclined to resist any notion of retreat. But retired Army Gen. H.R. McMaster, Trump鈥檚 national security adviser until April last year, wrote a seminal book as well. Called 鈥淒ereliction of Duty,鈥� it criticized top members of the military for failing to challenge President Lyndon Johnson on his strategy as the Vietnam quagmire deepened. In the run-up to Iraq, it was Secretary of State Colin Powell, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who raised the central argument against the war: the challenges of a post-invasion Iraq. 鈥淵ou break it,鈥� he reportedly told the president, 鈥測ou own it.鈥�
In my years covering members of the so-called policy establishment as a foreign correspondent, I found that many viewed their main role as providing what Halberstam said was missing in Vietnam: common sense.
That鈥檚 certainly true of Afghanistan and Syria. When America first intervened, after the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, not just the experts but the country was in no mood to question. Eighteen years later, I don鈥檛 know a single policy-establishment figure who thinks the war is winnable. But some do raise a question a bit like the flip side of Mr. Powell鈥檚. With the Taliban in the ascendancy, and groups like Islamic State (ISIS) and Al Qaeda there, too, what might come next if the US withdraws?
In Syria, the US has only 2,200 special-forces troops, alongside a far larger contingent of Kurdish fighters against ISIS. Russia and Iran are the dominant forces. Yet the US presence has meant they haven鈥檛 had completely free rein. Nor has Turkey, which has vowed to attack the Americans鈥� Kurdish allies. Some policy experts are also concerned a withdrawal would leave Israeli military action, with the risk of wider conflict, as the only counterweight to an Iranian military 鈥渓and bridge鈥� from Tehran, through Iraq, to Lebanon on the Mediterranean.
None of that means withdrawals are necessarily wrong. Senator Warren has raised a question long frustrating the policy establishment itself. She said that those in the defense establishment who kept saying 鈥渘o, no, no, we can鈥檛 do that鈥� in response to calls for withdrawals needed 鈥渢o explain what they think winning in those wars looks like.鈥�
The problem in both conflicts is that conventional victory is not on offer. The reason for the 鈥渘o, no no鈥� 鈥� or 鈥渢hink carefully before acting鈥� 鈥� from some policy professionals is that in today鈥檚 world, America's main challenge is not rival armies, but militia or terror groups feeding on instability in failed or embattled states. In that context, they suggest, the question isn鈥檛 what winning looks like. It鈥檚 the potential costs to US security interests from pulling out altogether.
