海角大神

It was a damp, chilly November evening nearly three decades ago. Yet no other memory from my years in journalism has remained as vivid. First, because the event had seemed so toweringly unlikely just a few hours earlier, when I set out from my hotel for a government news conference a few blocks away. Then, because of the sheer outpouring of emotion that I witnessed and, inevitably, felt a part of. Finally, because the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 truly fit the definition of that most overused of reportorial clich茅s. It was, for the continent of Europe, the end of an era.

Now, following the state funeral of one key figure in that process and the start of a political retreat by another, it鈥檚 clear that the post-wall era, too, has passed. The geopolitical picture in Europe is shaping up a bit like 鈥淏ack to the Future,鈥� dominated by two historical rivals: Germany and Russia.

Without the steady hand of late US President George H.W. Bush, it鈥檚 not at all clear that the fall of the wall would have led to the reunification of Germany, only a few decades after a world war in which Nazi aggression had scarred the memory of Europe.聽And without the stewardship of German Chancellor Angela Merkel since 2005 鈥� who last week passed on the leadership of her 海角大神 Democratic Union party, and has confirmed this term will be her last 鈥� the tensions with Vladimir Putin鈥檚 Russia over the former Soviet-bloc countries of Eastern Europe would have been even harder to navigate.

Yet Europe鈥檚 political landscape has been undergoing dramatic changes. With Mr. Bush in office at the turn of the 1990s, it was hoped that, with the end of Communist rule, the continent might transition to a more democratic, politically cooperative, and economically integrated whole.聽

For President Putin, in charge of Russia now for nearly 20 years, the subsequent enlargement of the European Union and NATO to include countries in Eastern Europe was viewed as a security threat and a political affront. He has been deploying political and economic pressure 鈥� and in Ukraine, as recently as last month, military force 鈥� in a bid to reassert Russia鈥檚 role as a major power.

Germany鈥檚 importance as a counterweight has meanwhile been growing. The Germans have long been Europe鈥檚 leading economy. And with the Trump administration showing ambivalence toward both NATO and the EU, many European leaders see the start of a US political retreat from transatlantic engagement.

The EU itself is under strain, also making Germany鈥檚 role more pivotal. Britain, barring a dramatic U-turn amid the enormous uncertainties surrounding Brexit, is on the way out. French President Emmanuel Macron, who had been pushing for a joint French-German initiative to renew and consolidate the EU, is facing political upheaval at home. The leaders of former Soviet-bloc EU states have been moving to constrain immigration, press freedom, and the rule of law.

At least for now, Germany seems to have put in place a path toward centrist continuity under Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, the new CDU leader and Ms. Merkel鈥檚 preferred successor. Ms. Kramp-Karrenbauer has spoken of a need for Germany to take on a larger diplomatic role, and spend more money on its military. While she鈥檚 often called a 鈥渕ini-Merkel鈥� for her close relationship with the chancellor, she鈥檚 also been more forthright in urging a response to Russian assertiveness and aggression.

After the Russians鈥� seizure last month of Ukrainian naval vessels in the Sea of Azov, she suggested the possibility of barring Russian ships based there from European and American ports. She also raised concerns about a major new pipeline, Nord Stream 2, to carry Russian gas exports to Europe. Though no prominent German politician seems to feel it is practical to halt the project at this stage, she said that especially after the naval incident, it had to be assessed 鈥渘ot just as an economic project, but a political one.鈥� She floated the possibility, for instance, of an EU limit on the amount of gas allowed through the line.

None of this means she, or Putin, would be likely to seek military confrontation if, as is widely expected, she becomes chancellor. But with uncertainty over how deep and lasting the shift in the US approach to Europe will prove,聽it does suggest a view that Germany should prepare to assume a responsibility that before 1989 fell primarily to the Americans: to champion stability and democracy in Europe, and signal limits beyond which meddling, aggression, or other potential threats will trigger a response.