海角大神

An old adage is that lawmakers win reelection by 鈥渞unning against Washington.鈥� According to a recent , just 14 percent of Americans approve of Congress鈥檚 job performance. So while there鈥檚 something absurd about incumbents and major party candidates running against themselves, it鈥檚 a winning strategy for sure.

In some ways Congress鈥檚 remarkably low approval is undeserved. We know, for example, that congressional approval fluctuates along with macroeconomic conditions. We also have an arrangement where both parties are sharing power, so everyone has a reason to hate at least half of Congress. Research even shows that the passage of legislation has a negative effect on approval (you know, when Congress actually does its job).

Nonetheless, in running against Washington, lawmakers regularly promise to 鈥渇ix Congress,鈥� work 鈥渃ollaboratively鈥� with the other side, and 鈥渂reak the logjam鈥� of legislation. Unfortunately, research suggests that none of these problems will be solved based on tonight鈥檚 midterm outcome. In fact, there are good reasons why some problems will get worse, not better.

Polarization

Let鈥檚 start with polarization, which is part and parcel to Congress鈥檚 dysfunction. For starters, polarization is a process whereby lawmakers in both parties move to the ideological extremes (leftward for Democrats, rightward for Republicans). And as a theoretical matter, that process can happen in two ways: either (1) new members enter Congress to the left or right of the lawmaker they replaced or (2) continuing members drift to the left or right over the course of their career.

Based on numerous studies, No. 1 is the larger cause of polarization. In other words, it鈥檚 the replacement of old members with new members that has caused Congress鈥檚 movement to the extremes.

In an old post (see ), I wrote about why the logic of 鈥渢hrowing the bums鈥� out is wrong. If you read that article, the exact same logic applies here: If polarization is the 鈥減roblem,鈥� electing a large volume of 鈥渘ew lawmakers鈥� will make things worse, not better.

Gridlock

Gridlock is defined as the inability of Congress to pass legislation. We can tackle the question of whether today鈥檚 midterm results can alleviate gridlock from multiple angles. I鈥檓 assuming that the House will remain in Republican hands (and extremely safe assumption), so the real question is what happens in the Senate (where current projections give anywhere from a chance to a chance).

For starters, it鈥檚 often assumed that 鈥渘ew members鈥� will 鈥渂reak the logjam鈥� and usher in a new era of collaboration and compromise. Unfortunately, the lessons of polarization apply here too: At best the volume of new members is unrelated to the passage of legislation and, at worst, new lawmakers make passing legislation harder. For those details, see . But see the chart above comparing the percentage of new lawmakers elected (x-axis) and the number of landmark laws passed (y-axis).

Second, the fact that the House and Senate are controlled by rival parties is often cited as a reason for the current Congress鈥檚 gridlock. It is certainly logical that if Republicans win the Senate tonight, gridlock should go down. However this, too, is wrong.

Control of the Senate is what鈥檚 known as a 鈥渘ecessary but not sufficient鈥� condition for breaking gridlock. While Republicans will indeed be better able to coordinate the passage of legislation across chambers, Democrats will retain two very powerful weapons that promote gridlock.

First, baring an upset of epic proportions, Democrats will maintain the ability to filibuster Republican proposals. Second, remember that President Obama has the power to veto any laws that survive a Democratic filibuster. I know that鈥檚 painfully obvious, but Republicans could circumvent the filibuster in two important ways: (1) by using a procedure known as 鈥溾�� or (2) by altogether. Both are very real possibilities, making Mr. Obama鈥檚 veto power that much more consequential. And according to , there have been 2,564 vetoes dating back to George Washington鈥檚 presidency. Among these, only 110 have been overridden by Congress, a success rate of just 4 percent.

But also, there is empirical research exploring these very questions. In a paper published in the American Political Science Review, Sarah Binder tests the effect of 鈥渜uasi-divided government鈥� (defined as when the parties share control of Congress) on the occurrence of gridlock. She finds that periods of quasi-divided government have absolutely no effect on the volume of important legislation Congress passes. In sum, Professor Binder鈥檚 research suggests that tonight鈥檚 outcome in the battle for control of the Senate won鈥檛 have much of an effect on the passage of legislation in the next Congress. What does matter, according to Binder鈥檚 results? 鈥淧ure divided government鈥� (when the president opposes Congress, so see above), polarization (also see above), and the ideological distance between the House and Senate. While the final one could be alleviated by tonight鈥檚 outcome, the result of a race or two won鈥檛 move the location of the median senator enough to make a sizable difference on the occurrence of gridlock.

Conclusions

Politicians are not 鈥渂ad鈥� for running against Congress and for over promising to 鈥渇ix鈥� Washington鈥檚 dysfunction. And the public isn鈥檛 鈥渟tupid鈥� for buying into these promises. But we tend to have unrealistic expectations in even numbered years, focusing myopically on the idea that a single election is the antidote legislative paralysis and hyper partisanship. Washington wasn鈥檛 broken over night, and it won鈥檛 be fixed this evening.

Jordan Ragusa publishes his Rule 22 blog at .