海角大神

Pundits across the political spectrum are criticizing the Obama administration鈥檚 decision to bomb Islamic State (IS) targets without seeking congressional approval. For example,聽聽compares Obama鈥檚 actions to those of his predecessor, George W. Bush,聽聽the president鈥檚 decision a 鈥渄angerous executive power-grab.鈥�

As someone who favors a strong legislative branch, I agree with Sullivan鈥檚 normative point. Obama聽蝉丑辞耻濒诲听seek Congress鈥檚 approval. But I鈥檓 more interested in聽飞丑测听he hasn鈥檛.

Here鈥檚 my position on the balance of power between the legislative and executive branch: If you don鈥檛 like presidential 鈥減ower grabs,鈥� blame Congress.聽 Granted, this argument isn鈥檛 entirely mine. See two excellent pieces by Jonathan Bernstein () and Doug Mataconis (here) making the same basic point. Nonetheless, I鈥檇 like to add a few additional points to this important discussion.

Let鈥檚 start with the broader institutional landscape before focusing on the specifics of this case. Regarding the broader dynamics, it鈥檚 important to keep in mind that what we鈥檙e talking about is a systemic transfer of power between branches dating back almost a hundred years. And in each instance, much of the blame lies with Congress itself.

For example, we could draw upon the so-called 鈥淭wo Presidencies鈥� thesis.聽 Fifty years ago, Aaron Wildavsky published an influential article arguing that the 鈥渇oreign policy president鈥� has greater authority compared to the 鈥渄omestic policy president.鈥澛� At the heart of Wildavsky鈥檚 argument is his view that, while presidents have more formal power in foreign policy, Congress (in both World War II and the cold war) ceded much of its power over foreign policy (adding to the disparity) rather than the president exercising a naked power grab.

Scholars have made similar claims about the Congresses聽of聽1960s and '70s.聽 In 鈥淐ongress, the Constitution, and the Crisis of Legitimation,鈥� Larry Dodd argued that Congress鈥檚 decentralized structure (where, in this period, committee chairmen reigned supreme) hurt the institution in a series of power struggles with the president. Simply put, with a decentralized framework, Congress undermined its own legitimacy and the belief that it should act.

If we fast forward, we can see that the modern Congress has the exact opposite problem. While Congress is a highly centralized body today (where party leaders reign supreme), the institution is hamstrung by polarization and, ultimately, gridlock. In the 鈥淏roken Branch,鈥� Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein contend that representatives and senators lack 鈥渋nstitutional patriotism.鈥� Rather than defend the institution they serve in from executive encroachments, lawmakers identify as partisans first and foremost and do little to enhance the legislature鈥檚 institutional capacity. As an example, consider the so-called 鈥渘uclear option鈥� (both instances, in 2005 and 2013) where partisan goals clearly trumped institutional norms.

So in sum, the simple point is that executive 鈥減ower grabs鈥� are not unique to Obama or modern-day presidents. Political scientists have noted that Congress has gradually abdicated its own authority in every decade since at least the 1940s.

On the specifics of this controversy, there are a number of things to keep in mind, too. For starters, the president鈥檚 justification for bombing IS targets comes from prior authorizations passed in 2001 and 2003. Furthermore, and as Tim Kaine noted in his New York Times聽, Congress worded these authorizations broadly, without temporal or geographic restrictions. So in this respect, the Obama administration鈥檚 鈥渁uthority鈥� came from Congress (not some unfounded power grab).

Is Congress powerless in this respect? No. Congress can simply revoke the president鈥檚 authority. How? By passing a law! In a more general sense, Congress could defund the war effort or impeach the president. Will lawmakers do any of this? Of course not. Less than a month ago, Congress voted overwhelmingly to approve Obama鈥檚 proposal to arm moderate Syrian rebels. Just 22 senators and 156 representatives voted no (with an even balance of Democrats and Republicans in opposition). In my mind, that鈥檚 a sufficient proxy for how a vote on bombing IS, otherwise known as ISIS or ISIL, would turn out.

So, it鈥檚 not that Congress is 鈥渋ncapable鈥� or 鈥減owerless鈥� against a tyrannical president. Rather, lawmakers on both sides of the aisle are simply 鈥渦nwilling鈥� to act. On this issue, retiring Rep. Jack Kingston (R) of Georgia聽听辫别谤蹿别肠迟濒测:

A lot of people would like to stay on the sideline and say, 鈥楯ust bomb the place and tell us about it later.鈥� It鈥檚 an election year. A lot of Democrats don鈥檛 know how it would play in their party, and Republicans don鈥檛 want to change anything. We like the path we鈥檙e on now. We can denounce it if it goes bad, and praise it if it goes well and ask what took him so long.

A final counterargument is that the president should force Congress back from its recess (see, for example, Eugene Robinson in the Washington Post聽). First of all, there鈥檚 nothing stopping the聽Congress聽from calling聽itself聽back into session. But second, and more importantly, the president鈥檚 power to call Congress back into session is a very powerful tool. As such, it should be used sparingly. In fact, since the passage of the 20^th Amendment (which moved the start of Congress鈥檚 session from March 4 to Jan. 3), there have only been four instances where the president called Congress back into session. Since 1950, there have been none!

So while the president certainly聽肠辞耻濒诲听call Congress back, that power should be reserved for national emergencies. Besides, if the president called Congress back for an emergency session, that would be yet another instance of the executive branch exercising its constitutional authority over the legislative branch. If you鈥檙e opposed to presidential 鈥減ower grabs,鈥� is that really what you want? As a proponent of a strong legislative branch, I鈥檇 much rather Congress call itself back and exert its own constitutional powers. I don鈥檛 blame the president, I blame Congress.

Jordan Ragusa publishes his Rule 22 blog at http://rule22.wordpress.com/.