海角大神

A week ago Larry Summers, the former Clinton Treasury secretary and Obama economic adviser, came out that proposed a way of 鈥渆nding presidents鈥� second term curse.鈥� By curse, Summers鈥� refers to a recurring pattern of both legislative gridlock and political scandal that he believes characterizes the second term of presidents dating back at least to FDR鈥檚 presidency. As he summarizes: 鈥淪econd presidential terms are almost without exception very difficult for the president and his team, for the government and for the country.鈥� To break this pattern, Summers argues that we should consider a single presidential term of perhaps six years: 鈥淲ould the U.S. government function better if presidents were limited to one term, perhaps of six years? The unfortunate, bipartisan experience with second terms suggests the issue is worthy of debate. The historical record helps makes the case for change.鈥�

To be sure, Summers acknowledges that one reason second terms are problematic is that 聽 essentially relegates presidents who win reelection to four years of lame-duck status. Restricting a president to a single-term without the possibility of reelection would only mean the president becomes a lameduck that much earlier. For Summers, however, the 鈥減roblems caused by lame-duck effects are much smaller than those caused by a toxic combination of hubris and exhaustion after the extraordinary effort that a president and his team must exert to achieve reelection.鈥�

What are we to make of Summers鈥� proposal? To begin, as Andy Rudalevige there鈥檚 nothing particularly novel about Summers鈥� recommendation. In fact, delegates to the 1787 constitutional convention charged with drawing up a framework for the presidency initially one seven-year presidential term. Since then amendments to this effect have been proposed in Congress on at least 160 different occasions, dating back at least to 1826. Of perhaps greater significance, have endorsed a single presidential term. Clearly Summers鈥� proposal has a long and impressive pedigree.:

So why hasn鈥檛 it been implemented? To begin, not everyone agrees with Summers鈥� diagnosis, never mind his proposed solution. As Jonathan Bernstein , the roots of some of the second-term scandals and policy fiascos, such as Watergate or Bush鈥檚 Iraq debacle, actually trace back to a president鈥檚 first term. Moreover, it鈥檚 not clear that the imposition of formal term limits via the 22nd Amendment significantly weakened a presidency whose previous occupants almost always adhered to the two-term limit by tradition. To this I would add that one reason second terms seem less productive is that most of the low-hanging legislative fruit is typically picked early during the president鈥檚 time in office, leaving the problems that lack either a ready solution or political support 鈥� or both 鈥� for the second term. In short, the lack of legislative productivity may be more a function of dwindling opportunities for success, and not a president鈥檚 weakened political state. More generally, James Hedtke that second-term presidents are weaker as a result of their ineligibility to run again.

Nonetheless, in an argument that foreshadows Summers鈥�, second terms do seem to present their own problems, usually in the form of policy overreach or scandal. The explanation seems rooted in part, I think, by a decline in presidents鈥� and their aides鈥� political sensitivity combined with a heightened focus on their historical legacy as their time in office winds down. The result is a greater tendency toward risk taking during a second term. If this diagnosis is true, however, it is not clear that a single six or seven-year term will obviate the problem, since presidents who are ineligible to run again would lack any incentive to remain sensitive to constituents鈥� concerns. This reformers , thus effectively returning to the Founders鈥� original constitutional framework that allowed presidents unlimited eligibility to seek reelection.

Before embracing that proposal, however, it is worth looking more closely at why the 22nd Amendment was passed. Analysts often assume it was Republican payback for the Democratic Franklin Roosevelt鈥檚 long tenure as president. But, as Michael Korzi鈥檚 reveals, while partisan payback was part of the impetus for the 22nd Amendment, the debate in 1947 over the proposed reform was far more nuanced, and in many respects reprised the arguments for and against presidential term limits that were aired during the Constitutional Convention. Essentially, the debate pitted the Republican/Whig 鈥渃onstitutionalists鈥� 鈥� concern to limit executive power against the Democrats鈥� 鈥減lebiscitary鈥� model of leadership that sees a popularly elected president as, in Korzi鈥檚 words, 鈥渢he engine of the U.S. political system, with the president deriving power from a strong connection with the American people.鈥�

In assessing these competing visions, both sides too often forget that we have one empirical case in which to assess a president who broke the two-term limit: Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In assessing the Roosevelt case, supporters of unlimited reelection often cite how the nation benefited from FDR鈥檚 willingness to serve a third term on the eve of World War II. They argue that had the 22nd Amendment been in place, we would have been prevented from drawing on his experience, with potentially catastrophic consequences.

However, rather than FDR鈥檚 decision to run for a third term in 1940, the more telling case for me is FDR鈥檚 decision to pursue a fourth term in 1944 despite obvious health issues. My concern here is not that FDR hid his failing health from the public 鈥� we have doing just that at all times in office. Instead, the more worrisome aspect of his decision to run again is that FDR, and his aides, seemed not to fully grasp the implications of his failing health. As Korzi writes, 鈥淭he impression one is left with is that FDR and advisers engaged in self-delusion on a rather large scale.鈥� Despite FDR鈥檚 haggard appearance, not to mention his cardiologist鈥檚 diagnosis in March 1944 that FDR had serious heart disease, Korzi argues that the 鈥渁rtificial atmosphere鈥� associated with FDR鈥檚 long tenure as president 鈥減romotes arrogance and even self-deception, as if the normal rule 鈥� in this case, the simple laws of physiology 鈥� are not applicable to the president.鈥� One consequence of that arrogance is that FDR didn鈥檛 seem to pay much attention in 1944 to who his vice president was going to be, and after Truman was chosen, FDR failed to include him in any discussions of the major issues with which the president was grappling.

In , Richard Neustadt notes approvingly, 鈥淩oosevelt had a love affair with power in that place.鈥� Roosevelt, Neustadt writes, viewed the White House as 鈥渁lmost a family seat 鈥� and he regarded the whole country as almost a family property.鈥� That conception of his place as president made FDR acutely sensitive, Neustadt argues, to protecting his sources of power in any decision he made. But there is a potential risk in this type of love affair 鈥� one exemplified, I think, by FDR鈥檚 decision to seek a fourth term. It is that presidents, and their advisers, may delude themselves into thinking they have become indispensable to the well-being of the nation. For most of our nation鈥檚 history, that temptation was held in check by virtue of the two-term tradition. As the plebiscitary mode of leadership has gained prominence, however, can we trust tradition alone to prevent presidents from seeking a third term? I, for one, am not willing to take that risk. If the 22nd Amendment serves any purpose, then, it is to protect the nation against the arrogance of power associated with long tenure in office.

Matthew Dickinson publishes his Presidential Power blog at .