海角大神

In little-noticed remarks this week, NATO鈥檚 supreme allied commander, US Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, said that for too long, the United States has 鈥渉ugged the bear鈥� of Russia. But now, he said, it鈥檚 time to get tough.

This toughness should come in the form of more US troops to Europe, he said, and more 鈥渉igh end鈥� training to prepare American forces for a potential battle against the former cold war foe.

The remarks, made while Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was visiting Europe this week, have struck some as a bit alarmist. True, Russia has invaded Crimea and used agents provocateurs, covert operations, and even some of its own Red Army forces in Ukraine.聽

Defense officials do not believe, however, that Russia is poised to run its tanks through the Fulda Gap 鈥� the lowland corridor in Germany where the US military was prepared to intercept a surprise attack from the Warsaw Pact during the 4-1/2 decades of the cold war.

Still, the comments of General Breedlove and others mark a shift in thinking, argues John Herbst, ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006 and former director of the Center for Complex Operations at National Defense University in Washington.

鈥淚 think it鈥檚 fair to say that six to eight months ago, if Breedlove had headed off in this direction he would have been walked back by the White House,鈥� and told to tone down his rhetoric. 鈥淏ut not now,鈥� says Mr. Herbst, who briefs US military commanders, 鈥渢here鈥檚 been an evolution in attitudes, among our military but within the administration as well.鈥�

Much of this is due to Russia's recent intervention in Syria, as well as its aggression in Crimea and Ukraine, in which it made use of undercover Russian soldiers in unmarked army fatigues, known as "little green men," to wreak destruction on the ground.聽

This marks a notable shift since the end of the cold war, when the US quickly began operating on the assumption that European security was solved.

鈥淲e thought we could check that box, focus on other things 鈥� that Europe would become a provider of security, rather than a consumer of it,鈥� says Jeffrey Mankoff, deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

The US view of Russia has changed dramatically 鈥� and quickly. 鈥淲e went from that to 鈥楻ussia is a defeated enemy,鈥� and not only that, but they鈥檙e in total collapse,鈥� says Christopher Harmer, who served on the Pentagon staff developing strategic plans for Europe, NATO, and Russia from 2005 to 2008.

鈥淲e thought we could love them into the NATO alliance, and hug them into being responsible state actors,鈥� adds Mr. Harmer, who is now a senior naval analyst at the Institute for the Study of War.

Even given Russian intervention in Crimea and Ukraine, as well as Syria, a move such as rolling Russian tanks into the Baltics would be 鈥渆xtremely risky鈥� and would be the kind of move on Russia鈥檚 part that would be 鈥渓ow probability,鈥� says Dr. Mankoff.聽

Yet the rhetorical arguments that Russian President Vladimir Putin used to justify Russian intervention in Ukraine 鈥渃ould apply equally well to the Baltic states,鈥� says Herbst, who is now director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council. The populations of Estonia and Latvia, for example, are roughly a quarter Russian, and that subset has in the past complained that those countries are treating them badly.聽

Russia might invade in the guise of protecting Russian citizens, or send undercover military personnel in civilian garb and begin some sort of hybrid war. 鈥淚 don鈥檛 think it鈥檚 likely, but I鈥檇 put it at a 5 to 15 percent possibility,鈥� Herbst adds. 聽

鈥淭he kinds of things you need to be more worried about are agents provocateurs 鈥� which are more likely but less escalatory 鈥� as well as different kinds of intelligence operations involving little green men,鈥� Mankoff says. 鈥淭hat鈥檚 where the challenge really lies.鈥�

The question is how to counter these moves, particularly those that appear to be remote possibilities. Breedlove has suggested that the answer lies in more US troops in Europe, lauding the recent decision by the Army to rotate a brigade-size unit to Europe.聽

This could contribute to good, old-fashioned deterrence, Mankoff says: 鈥淚 think the logic of deterrence that existed throughout the cold war is still relevant. We鈥檙e less likely to fight if Russia understands that we have the capability and willingness to fulfill our obligations to our NATO allies.鈥澛�

But troop resources in the US military are scarce and commanders fight over them, even if the Defense Department is the most lavishly funded in the US government.

鈥淏reedlove won鈥檛 say this publicly, but he really is engaged in a resource struggle with the other combatant commands,鈥� notes Harmer of the Institute for the Study of War. 鈥淎t the same time Europe wants more forces to counteract Russian shenanigans, I can guarantee you that Pacific Command is saying that, 鈥楢t least the Russians are predictable bad actors,鈥� 鈥� but the Pacific Command needs the forces because it has to grapple with a volatile North Korea.聽

Likewise US Central Command, which runs the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, would probably say, 鈥淭hat may be all well and good, but we鈥檙e fighting an ongoing war,鈥� Harmer says. 鈥淭hey are all patriotic enough not to have that fight publicly, but the fight is going on every day.鈥澛�

But Russia doesn鈥檛 simply present a military challenge, Mankoff says. 鈥淚t鈥檚 much broader than that.鈥� The potential solutions, too, go beyond the military, and involve 鈥減romoting resilience in potentially vulnerable countries, by making their networks more resilient to penetration, by shining light on dubious financial flows that are potentially undermining financial institutions in these countries, or by revealing parties or movements that may have hidden agendas.鈥澛�

What鈥檚 more, it鈥檚 important to keep in mind that the problems the US currently has with Russia are not necessarily long term, Herbst says.聽

鈥淚 think domestic problems in Russia are growing, and it鈥檒l lead to changes in their very aggressive foreign policy,鈥� he says. 鈥淓lites in Moscow are getting very unhappy鈥� with Mr. Putin鈥檚 policies, particularly as the domestic economy contracts, he adds.

In this case, 鈥淓ither the policies will change, or the leadership will.鈥�