海角大神

The American military must become better at operating in a 鈥済ray zone鈥� of war, one that sometimes calls for using 鈥渄eception, infiltration, and persistent denial,鈥� the Pentagon鈥檚 No. 2 official said in a little-noticed speech this week.

These are the sort of tactics that Russia has been using in Crimea and Ukraine, Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work noted Wednesday in remarks at a strategy conference at the United States Army War College in Carlisle, Pa.

America鈥檚 adversaries today use 鈥渁gents, paramilitaries, deception, infiltration, and persistent denial 鈥� staying within that so-called 鈥榞ray zone,鈥� 鈥� he told assembled officers. 鈥淭hat鈥檚 a zone in which we don鈥檛 typically operate, but one in which we must become more proficient.鈥�

Is America鈥檚 second most senior civilian in the Pentagon suggesting that the country should 鈥� play dirty? Is Russia really a model for what the kind of military action the United States wants to take?

Perhaps not, say several military analysts. Rather, his comments point to the evolving nature of war and America's need to change with it.

For the foreseeable future, America鈥檚 wars will be fought in the gray zone, and it should seek to be as good in this realm as it is in conventional warfare. That means knowing how to use militias as deftly as Russia and Iran do, how to use social media propaganda as effectively as the Islamic State, as well as how to cope with improvised explosive devices and cyber attacks.

鈥淭he whole concept of 'asymmetric' warfare just means that someone is not being stupid,鈥� says Paul Scharre, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security. 鈥淲hy should you assume that our enemies won鈥檛 be smart?鈥�

In his remarks at the War College, Work outlined the ways in which he believes this warfare is advancing, from asymmetric attacks to a blend of low and high-tech tactics known as hybrid warfare.

鈥淚f the streets of Baghdad and the valleys of Afghanistan were a laboratory of irregular war, I believe that what we will increasingly see in the future is hybrid wars,鈥� he said.

The US caught a particular glimpse of this in the 2006 Lebanon War, when the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) battled Hezbollah.

鈥淗ezbollah had gone to school on the IDF, transforming from a guerrilla force to a formidable quasi-conventional fighting force that was able to fight the IDF to a standstill.鈥�

The 鈥渘ext level up,鈥� says Work, is what the US military has observed in Crimea and Ukraine. 鈥淚n both places, the Russians have unleashed what their chief of the general staff called 鈥榥on-linear warfare.鈥� 鈥�

It resembles 鈥淗ezbollah on steroids鈥� and in it, Work added, 鈥淚 really believe we鈥檙e seeing a laboratory of future 21st century land warfare.鈥�

The battles in Crimea and Ukraine, for example, have included everything from 鈥渃overt action by special operations forces to sustained unconventional warfare waged under an umbrella of denial, then ultimately escalating to force-on-force proxy combat,鈥� he said.

鈥淚t鈥檚 when this type of conflict moves from the shadowy actions of 鈥榝ifth columns鈥� and 鈥榣ittle green men鈥� to force-on-force conflict that it will prove the most challenging.鈥�

Is Work advocating that the US military respond in kind? Mr. Scharre doesn鈥檛 see it this way.聽

鈥淛ust because Russia鈥檚 doing something, that doesn鈥檛 mean we want to do the same thing they鈥檙e doing.鈥�

But the Pentagon needs 鈥渢o be aware of those things, and not treat them as unimportant.鈥�

And while the US may not necessarily need to respond in kind, it will want to respond.聽

This might include, for example, strengthening the US military鈥檚 ability to respond to proxies and hardening the systems of the US and its allies against cyberattacks, says Scharre, who served as a Special Operations reconnaissance team leader in Iraq and Afghanistan, and later worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2008 to 2013 helping to develop emerging weapons technologies.

鈥淚 don鈥檛 see anything alarming in the speech 鈥� it鈥檚 more a call to open our eyes to what鈥檚 happening,鈥� he adds. 鈥淲e need to be more flexible.鈥�

This flexibility might mean using proxies, says Andrew Krepinevich, president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. The US military has done it before, and may need to do it again, he adds.

Just as US adversaries including Iran 鈥渁re using Hezbollah and the Mahdi Army, we may have to look for opportunities, especially if we want to keep a small footprint,鈥� says Dr. Krepinevich, who served in the Army for 21 years and also worked in the Office of Net Assessment, the Pentagon鈥檚 internal think tank.

The US military can enable resistance groups to wage hybrid warfare against its own enemies, too, he adds. One of the trickiest dangers in this, however, is empowering the wrong people.

鈥淭here鈥檚 a presumption that your interests are the same as those you鈥檙e supporting.鈥� Yet less than four years after US forces left Vietnam, China was invading. 鈥淭heir [North Vietnamese] clients that were waging war against us became adversaries.鈥�

And of course some of the Mujahideen fighters that the Pentagon supported during the Soviet War in Afghanistan went on to form the seeds for Al Qaeda.

鈥淓ven though you may have a common interest in defeating a common enemy, you have to realize that you and the group you鈥檙e sponsoring and giving the capabilities to wage hybrid warfare may have common interests that are enduring once that particular obstacle is removed,鈥� Krepinevich says.

鈥淥nce the Soviets left Afghanistan, we and the Mujahideen turned out to have very different long-term interests.鈥�

In these situations, it is helpful to provide resources to proxies that 鈥渃an be turned off鈥� once the conflict is over.

The shoulder-fired stinger anti-aircraft missiles 鈥渋s a capability you can turn off fairly quickly鈥� since once the missiles are gone, the launcher is useless, Krepinevich says.

On the other hand, tanks and combat aircraft can last a lot longer. 鈥淭he Iranians were still flying F-14s long after the Shah had been deposed.鈥�