US intelligence officials openly acknowledge that they upset some US military officials with overly 鈥減essimistic鈥� assessments of the war.
Mr. Clapper told lawmakers that some senior military officials 鈥渢ook issue鈥� with the DNI鈥檚 national intelligence estimate, which they 鈥済enerally felt鈥� was not positive enough. The commanders felt 鈥済enerally it was pessimistic about the situation in Afghanistan ... and the prospects for 2014,鈥� when most US forces are slated to leave the country.
For example, the assessment pointed to 鈥減ersistent qualitative challenges鈥� within the Afghan security forces that 鈥渃ontinue to impede their development into an independent, self-sustaining security apparatus.鈥� What鈥檚 more, it pointed out that the Afghan National Army鈥檚 reliance on NATO 鈥渇or many critical combat enabling functions underscores its inability to operate independently.鈥�
In what might be considered a hallmark of faint praise, the intelligence assessment pointed out that, 鈥渘evertheless, Afghanistan鈥檚 population generally favors the Army over the police鈥� 鈥� a force seen by many Afghans as corrupt.
In defending his seemingly dour assessments, Clapper shared with lawmakers his recollections of being an intelligence analyst in 1966 for Gen. William Westmoreland, commander of US forces in Vietnam war. The experience, he said, caused him to lose his 鈥渙perational innocence.鈥�
He also recalled serving as chief of intelligence during Operation Desert Storm. Gen. Norman Schwartzkopf 鈥減rotested long and loud鈥� about the accuracy of intelligence that 鈥渄idn鈥檛 comport with his view.鈥�
Intelligence officials tend to wrestle with 鈥済lass half empty鈥� scenarios, Clapper said. 鈥淚 don鈥檛 find it a bad thing.鈥�
