海角大神

An irritable micromanager disliked by even the organization鈥檚 most loyal foot soldiers 鈥� it鈥檚 not the sort of description you鈥檇 expect to hear of the mastermind of a global terrorist network.

But that is precisely the description that intelligence analysts tend to give of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the new head of Al Qaeda.

Not only is he widely believed to be a less-than-effective manager, US officials say, Mr. Zawahiri does not have the sort of 鈥減eculiar charisma鈥� that Osama bin Laden did, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told reporters last week.

And that鈥檚 not all: Mr. bin Laden 鈥渨as much more operationally engaged than we have the sense Zawahiri has been,鈥� Mr. Gates noted.

Such comments seem to give the impression that US defense officials were privately high-fiving each other after hearing of Zawahiri鈥檚 ascension last week to Al Qaeda鈥檚 helm.

So, just how much does the Pentagon have to worry about the former Egyptian physician, now the de facto No. 1 archnemesis of the US military? Pentagon officials have made it clear they still take the threat of Zawahiri seriously.

鈥淚 think we should be mindful that this announcement by Al Qaeda reminds us that despite having suffered a huge loss with the killing of bin Laden and a number of others,鈥� Gates said, 鈥淎l Qaeda seeks to perpetuate itself, seeks to find replacements for those who have been killed, and remains committed to the agenda that bin Laden put before them.鈥�

The Pentagon has also emphasized that the new leader of Al Qaeda, believed (for what it鈥檚 worth, considering where bin Laden was found) to be hiding in the ungoverned tribal areas of Pakistan, should expect to be the target of a robust and ongoing manhunt.

鈥淚鈥檓 not sure it鈥檚 a position anybody should aspire to, under the circumstances,鈥� Gates said.

The conventional wisdom, however, is that it鈥檚 a position that the ambitious Zawahiri has long coveted.

鈥淗e has been sort of a climber, not only within Al Qaeda but in the larger jihadist movement,鈥� says Brian Fishman, terrorism research fellow at the New American Foundation. 鈥淗e鈥檚 attached himself to a rising star within the organization 鈥� bin Laden 鈥� and that鈥檚 how he鈥檚 seen, as somebody who isn鈥檛 always piously committed, but brings with him a sense of personal aggrandizement.鈥�

That kind of mercenary approach, however, can have practical advantages, Mr. Fishman says. In the internal debate about whether Al Qaeda should maintain a strict ideological litmus test for members, or 鈥済et as many people into the tent as possible,鈥� Zawahiri is a member of the latter camp, Fishman says, which could translate into more Al Qaeda followers.

鈥淗e鈥檚 still very ideologically rigid 鈥� I don鈥檛 want to give the impression that he鈥檚 some out-of-the-box thinker,鈥� Fishman says, 鈥渂ut he鈥檚 always been most concerned about creating political effect on the ground.鈥�

Yet Zawahiri鈥檚 desire to create these political effects could also cause a rift with the Taliban, analysts say. The interim commander of Al Qaeda, Saif al-Adel 鈥� who, like Zawahiri, is Egyptian 鈥� was viewed as having close ties to the Afghan Taliban. Zawahiri, on the other hand, has been interested in having Al Qaeda 鈥渟tep to the forefront and seize political power,鈥� Fishman says, and this could involve bypassing the Taliban.

One quality that has made Al Qaeda particularly resilient in the past, however, has been its willingness to cede political authority to the groups on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan 鈥渢hat have a much more organic social base,鈥� Fishman says.

The widely heralded defeat that the US military handed Al Qaeda in Iraq鈥檚 Anbar Province came about when the terrorist group 鈥渙verreached鈥� and got too ideological, he adds. Zawahiri for his part had argued that for political reasons, Al Qaeda would have been better off not enforcing its strict ideology and making accommodations with locals in the name of political harmony.

Any savvy leader will not want to make a similar mistake in Afghanistan. 鈥淢y gut says that Zawahiri wouldn鈥檛 really be stupid enough to challenge the Afghan Taliban directly in a place like Afghanistan or Pakistan,鈥� Fishman says.

But tensions between the two US enemies remain. The Afghan Taliban has long held that it is valid to fight the US in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 鈥渂ut they didn鈥檛 approve of 9/11, and they don鈥檛 want to take steps that might cause a political reaction in the United States鈥� that might inspire US leaders to push to extend its presence in Afghanistan longer than it already plans to, Fishman says.

The Taliban鈥檚 publicity shop, for its part, has played down any tensions, says Jeffrey Dressler, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War. 鈥淚f you鈥檙e going to be seen as an authentic Islamic extremist organization, you can鈥檛 break with a group like Al Qaeda,鈥� he adds.

Other defense analysts agree. 鈥淓verybody is quick to comment on how Zawahiri鈥檚 a polarizing figure, uncharismatic, disagreeable 鈥� people can鈥檛 stand him,鈥� Mr. Dressler says. 鈥淚f all of that was going to be an obstacle, however, he never would have been approved. He鈥檚 a very skilled military tactician and planner,鈥� he adds. Al Qaeda leaders 鈥渄iscussed this 鈥� and appointed him anyway.鈥�