What Trump鈥檚 handling of the Iran war has done to perceptions of US power
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Howard LaFranchi Staff writer
| Washington
Within hours of U.S. President Donald Trump鈥檚 April 7 announcement of a two-week ceasefire with Iran, Iranians poured into Tehran鈥檚 Revolution Square, cheering, honking horns, and waving Iran鈥檚 tricolored flag.
Some burned the Stars and Stripes amid angry chants.
The display of nationalism was undoubtedly not the scene Mr. Trump envisioned when, in late February, he called on Iranians to 鈥渞ise up鈥� and join the U.S.-Israeli effort he had just launched to bring the Islamic Republic to its knees 鈥� if not end it altogether.
Why We Wrote This
For decades, perceptions of U.S. power did not rely on the use of America鈥檚 unrivaled military might. In the Iran war, a militarily inferior adversary used asymmetric warfare to resist that might, and allies whom President Donald Trump did not consult are voicing concern over the state of U.S. strategic thinking and planning.
Following hard on the president鈥檚 threats to bomb Iran and , the scene was telling for America鈥檚 friends and foes alike.
It was one more exhibit in a mounting pile of evidence that, with this war, something had changed, that the global superpower was no longer the fearsome enforcer and unchallenged leader of an international order that had prevailed since World War II.
In the generations since that war, perceptions of America鈥檚 awesome military and economic power, and the diplomatic problem-solving that relied upon it, were established that did not depend on its use. It was an era of a confident and largely benevolent superpower 鈥� Ronald Reagan鈥檚 鈥�.鈥�
鈥淔or much of the post-World War II era, the United States largely acted as if it understood that powerful states benefit when they are perceived as mostly honest and reliable, even virtuous, and generally motivated by a desire to make the world better,鈥� says Stephen Walt, a professor of international relations at the Harvard Kennedy School.
鈥淭he United States has not been bashful about using its military power in the past,鈥� he says. 鈥淏ut this war has demonstrated how the superpower that has always tried to cloak its use of power with legitimacy and, as a last resort, has become a disruptive and crude rogue state.鈥�
The whiplash the world is now experiencing as a result of the Iran war appears certain to continue for weeks, if not months. After the United States and Iran failed to reach any agreement during one day of talks in Pakistan on April 11, President Trump ordered U.S. naval forces to impose a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
Gulliver vs. asymmetric warfare
No one is questioning America鈥檚 unrivaled military might or its ability to deploy unequaled capabilities to deliver awe-inspiring tactical results. Acknowledgement is universal that few other powers could have mounted missions like the January snatching of then-Venezuelan President Nicol谩s Maduro from his Caracas compound, or the rescue this month of a downed airman from a mountainside deep inside Iranian territory.
But perhaps just as stunning for the world is how Gulliver has been tied down by a Lilliputian 鈥� a militarily inferior but clever opponent whose ropes to restrain the behemoth were asymmetric warfare and the seizure of a key global economic choke point 鈥� the Strait of Hormuz. Even as Iran announced on April 17 that the passage was open to traffic for the remainder of the ceasefire, a U.S. blockade of Iranian ports continued.
Equally unsettling for U.S. allies and partners 鈥� not to mention instructive to adversaries 鈥� is what the war says about the state of U.S. strategic thinking and planning.
The Iran war was a 鈥渟tupid idea鈥� and a 鈥渇oolish mistake,鈥� French President Emmanuel Macron said during a visit to Seoul, South Korea, in early April. Comparing the latest U.S. war with past military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, he asked whether anyone now considers any of those wars 鈥渁 good idea.鈥�
The superpower that built its global reach and superiority with a constellation of alliances unequaled in history had launched a war without consulting those allies or providing an initial explanation of the war鈥檚 objectives.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio did offer key allies a report on the war鈥檚 aims at a March 27 meeting in Paris of foreign ministers from the Group of Seven countries, but it came a month after the start of hostilities. Listing objectives he claimed had been 鈥渃lear from the very first night the president announced鈥� the war, Mr. Rubio said, 鈥淲e鈥檙e going to destroy Iran鈥檚 navy, destroy their air force 鈥� basically destroy their ability to make missiles and drones in their factories.鈥�
The war would also 鈥渄ramatically reduce the number of missile launchers,鈥� he added, 鈥渟o that they cannot hide behind these things to build a nuclear weapon and threaten the world.鈥�
鈥淣o longer鈥� an 鈥渁nchor of stability鈥�
Yet the reliable guarantor of the norms and sea lanes of a stable and universally beneficial global economy had seemingly failed to take into account the far-reaching impact the war could have on that economy. Indeed, it is being felt from the kitchens of Bangladesh and schools and workplaces of Pakistan to the plastics molding plants of Texas and the wheat fields of North Dakota.
鈥淚 really think this war has demonstrated what we will look back on as an inflection point,鈥� says Rosemary Kelanic, director of the Middle East program at Defense Priorities, a Washington think tank that promotes restraint in U.S. foreign policy. 鈥淕oing forward, the world will have to figure out how to deal with a diminished and unpredictable great power that is no longer the reliable anchor of stability it has generally been.鈥�
President Trump has insisted that the U.S. is, in fact, acting on the world鈥檚 behalf by finally addressing a menace 鈥� Iran鈥檚 Islamic Republic 鈥� that he says has employed terrorism, threatened regional stability by its own actions and through proxies, and raised the notion of nuclear Armageddon with its uranium enrichment program.
Recognition is indeed practically universal that Iran has long been a bad actor that the world would ignore and leave unrestrained at its own peril. And U.S. presidents since Barack Obama have taken steps to set back Iran鈥檚 advancing nuclear program.
Before Mr. Obama secured a 2015 deal with Iran to constrain its program, formally called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), his administration acted in tandem with Israel to deploy 鈥溾�� to disable Iran鈥檚 uranium-enriching centrifuges. The cyberattacks, carried out in 2009 and 2010, were hailed for slowing Iran鈥檚 nuclear progress and extending the time for diplomacy to succeed 鈥� without recourse to war.
The war in Iran, notes Dr. Walt, is not the first act of Mr. Trump鈥檚 second term that suggests the unilateral use of force will take primacy over diplomacy. But it will be the most consequential for global perceptions of the American superpower.
鈥淭here鈥檚 no doubting anywhere that the United States has 鈥� an unrivaled capacity to blow things up,鈥� he says. 鈥淏ut what the war has also revealed is a superpower being led by a combination of impulsiveness and strategic incompetence that portends an unstable and untethered global order going forward.鈥�
Suez: The fall and rise of powers
To find a similar turning point in history when a global power revealed its own retrenchment through an ill-conceived conflict of its own making, some historians and analysts of great-power politics are looking back to the Suez Canal crisis of October 1956.
The crisis pitted World War II victors Britain and France against the brash nationalist president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Global colonial power Britain thought it could quickly reverse 鈥� through a show of military might 鈥� Mr. Nasser鈥檚 nationalization and then closing of the Suez Canal.
Instead, Britain was humiliated by its inability to compel Egypt to open the vital waterway. Mr. Nasser came out of the crisis as an anticolonial hero, while Britain retreated to second-tier power status behind the United States, which helped devise a diplomatic solution to the crisis.
鈥淏ritain and France concocted a scheme to control the canal, and it completely backfired,鈥� says Dr. Kelanic. 鈥淚t was a shoot-yourself-in-the-foot moment that revealed Britain to be weaker than people thought it was and no longer the global power it had once been.鈥�
Fast-forwarding to the Iran war, she says, 鈥淚 think it鈥檚 legitimate to consider if this is a similar moment that demonstrates to the world the weaknesses and questionable judgment of a great power.鈥�
Others say that, at least to some degree, both allies and adversaries have already decided that the U.S. is no longer going to be the predictable and consultative superpower they knew before.
鈥淭he rest of the world has already considered the unsteadiness of American statecraft and the prolonged period of political dysfunction and fierce political polarization in the United States,鈥� says Charles Kupchan, director of European studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. 鈥淭he Iran war simply confirms to our allies, especially, that Uncle Sam is not going to be there for you.鈥�
Even before the war, world leaders were recognizing the implications of this shift in America鈥檚 approach to the use of its power.
Perhaps the starkest example came from Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January. The rules-based world order enabled by 鈥淎merican hegemony,鈥� he declared, was experiencing a 鈥渞upture, not a transition鈥� in which 鈥済reat powers鈥� were henceforth using economic integration, tariffs, the international financial infrastructure, and global supply chains as 鈥渨eapons.鈥�
Mr. Carney called on 鈥渕iddle powers鈥� to band together to enhance their global heft, 鈥渂ecause if we鈥檙e not at the table, we鈥檙e on the menu.鈥� He received a standing ovation 鈥� a rare show of solidarity at a Davos conference.
Conventional vs. cheaper military power
When Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth deemed Operation Epic Fury an 鈥渙verwhelming victory鈥� at an April 8 Pentagon news conference and said of Iran, 鈥淲e own their skies,鈥� some military analysts winced.
By focusing almost exclusively on the military achievements wrought by conventional airpower, some now wonder, is the U.S. at risk of missing one of the key lessons coming out of this war? Is the U.S. slow to grasp the emergence of a new kind of warfare that challenges the supremacy of the heavy 鈥� and expensive 鈥� hardware the U.S. relies on?
鈥淭he Iran war underscores how some of the elements of modern military power have changed very dramatically, revealing a landscape where new technologies 鈥� just think of drones here 鈥� are favoring the defensive and weaker power in a major way,鈥� says Michael Desch, director of the O鈥橞rien Notre Dame International Security Center.
鈥淲e have belatedly come to that realization,鈥� he adds, 鈥渁nd that鈥檚 going to have huge implications in the Persian Gulf 鈥� and if ever there鈥檚 a shooting war around Taiwan.鈥�
Certainly, elements of conventional modern warfare, such as airpower, remain effective 鈥渋n the tactical sense,鈥� Dr. Desch says, adding that failing to learn the lessons of those elements鈥� limits won鈥檛 serve the U.S. well.
鈥淭he last time we were going to bomb an enemy 鈥榖ack to the Stone Ages鈥� it was North Vietnam,鈥� he says. 鈥淲hat I would have hoped we learned since then is that, while airpower does a lot of damage, at some point you鈥檙e just making rubble bounce without necessarily achieving your objectives.鈥�
With its use of drones and ballistic missiles, Iran was able to keep itself in the game against a much more formidable opponent, wreaking havoc in the region even as it was being pummeled hard at home.
Not just U.S. adversaries are taking lessons from what the Iran war says about shifts in hard power.
鈥淲e know that in military terms there is no equal to the United States,鈥� says Anna Maria Dyner, head of the International Security Program at the Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw. 鈥淏ut we also hope that in our partnership with the U.S., we can learn the lessons of these new technologies that we have seen Ukraine deploying effectively against Russia, and now Iran in this war.鈥�
Such a common purpose would be good for the U.S. and Europe, Ms. Dyner says, noting that while the transatlantic 鈥渕arriage鈥� is passing through 鈥渄ifficult times, we know we are stronger together.鈥�
That strength of common purpose was on display when the European powers joined the Obama administration in pressuring Iran to reach the international accord limiting its nuclear program. The JCPOA was hammered out over two years of intense negotiations largely between the U.S. and Iran, but with the diplomatic backing of Europe, Russia, and China. That buy-in gave the agreement international legitimacy 鈥� and sent Iran a critical message of global support for the deal.
In 2018, during his first term, President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, calling it a 鈥渉orrible, one-sided deal.鈥� But many nuclear experts counter that, though the deal was not perfect, it did subject Iran鈥檚 nuclear program to international oversight 鈥� whereas scuttling it freed Iran to pursue its nuclear ambitions.
Those experts also note that the Trump administration floated proposals in recent discussions with the Iranians 鈥� before the war and since the ceasefire 鈥� that would result in a deal resembling the JCPOA. One key difference, however, is that the two parties reportedly discussed a 鈥渟uspension鈥� of Iran鈥檚 nuclear activities for some determined period of time 鈥� a halt in the program the JCPOA never achieved.
The talks, whether ultimately successful or not, have spawned a debate pitting those who say the negotiations underscore diplomacy鈥檚 superiority over war as an instrument of statecraft against those who say the war was the necessary first step to compel Iran to return to the negotiating table.
Beyond the nuclear issue, the Polish Institute鈥檚 Ms. Dyner notes that the 鈥渄ifficult times鈥� roiling the transatlantic partnership have been exacerbated for some European partners by the violent rhetoric employed by the Trump administration. That includes Mr. Trump鈥檚 threat to destroy Iran鈥檚 civilization, and Secretary Hegseth鈥檚 pledge last year to deploy 鈥渕aximum lethality, not tepid legality鈥� to 鈥渧iolent effect, not politically correct.鈥�
But Ms. Dyner says she has a different take on the rhetoric from that of her offended European colleagues. 鈥淪ometimes, this kind of rhetoric is needed because it鈥檚 the only language some adversaries understand,鈥� she says. 鈥淐ertainly, we in Poland know that Russia only understands the language of power.鈥�
Trump鈥檚 new posture vs. Xi
When President Trump visits Xi Jinping in mid-May, he鈥檒l sit down with a Chinese leader who kept a close eye on the U.S. war in Iran, analysts say 鈥� and who apparently liked much of what he saw.
鈥淭rump is going to arrive in Beijing weakened 鈥� weakened by a war that did not go as he planned, weakened by the unpopularity of the war with the American public 鈥� and that means Xi will have the upper hand,鈥� says Dr. Kupchan of the Council on Foreign Relations.
China, like America鈥檚 other adversaries, 鈥渃an鈥檛 help but be satisfied with where the war leaves the U.S.,鈥� says the Kennedy School鈥檚 Dr. Walt.
鈥淲e鈥檝e spent a lot of money, we鈥檝e drawn down our armaments stockpiles, and we鈥檝e weakened our military partners, including our Asian allies,鈥� he says.
The war has had downsides for China as well, which might explain why President Xi nudged Iran to accept Pakistan鈥檚 invitation to peace talks. President Trump publicly acknowledged Mr. Xi鈥檚 role in getting Tehran to the table.
But more than anything, Beijing has happily sat back and watched the U.S. get bogged down by what it sees as another misguided use of its hard power, Dr. Walt says. Citing a line often attributed to Napoleon, he adds that Mr. Xi must have the same observation: 鈥淣ever interrupt your enemy when he鈥檚 making a mistake.鈥�
Napoleon鈥檚 quote has its limits. One good reason the world might have wanted to 鈥渋nterrupt鈥� the U.S. war in Iran would have been to at least limit the damage of a global economic crisis spawned by the war.
But for some political leaders and analysts, the world鈥檚 even more troubling takeaway from the war might be the realization that, for the foreseeable future, it must learn to grapple with a diminished but unpredictable and even aggressive superpower.
Citing the U.S. president鈥檚 threat to 鈥渆nd鈥� a civilization, British Liberal Democrats leader Ed Davey said in a House of Commons speech on April 14 that 鈥淭hese words are a stark reminder of how reckless, immoral, and completely outside the bounds of international law this president is.鈥� He went on to declare Mr. Trump 鈥渘o friend鈥� of the U.K. and 鈥渘o leader of the free world.鈥�
Notre Dame鈥檚 Dr. Desch says the world鈥檚 discomfort with increasingly partisan and unpredictable American global leadership precedes President Trump, but has reached a new level under him.
鈥淭he U.S. has been something of a rogue elephant for some time, but there鈥檚 no question we鈥檝e become more rogue recently,鈥� says Dr. Desch. 鈥淚f you鈥檙e a smaller animal in the forest, it can鈥檛 be reassuring to know you鈥檒l be living with this elephant.鈥�
