At UN, clues Trump is gearing up for new diplomatic drive on China
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Ned Temko Columnist
| London
There was sound and fury aplenty, and a startling policy U-turn, during President Donald Trump鈥檚 trip to New York this week for the U.N General Assembly.
But the most important clue to his long-term foreign policy intentions could turn out to be what Sherlock Holmes memorably called the 鈥渄og that didn鈥檛 bark.鈥�
The People鈥檚 Republic of China.
Why We Wrote This
President Donald Trump was rude to almost every country that attended the U.N. General Assembly this week. Except one. Could his diplomatic silence about China suggest his next diplomatic initiative?
The U.S. president鈥檚 campaign-style performance at the United Nations manifested his standard approach to other countries 鈥� shunning the strategizing and engagement of past U.S. administrations and changing 鈥減olicy鈥� with each speech, social media post, or remark to the media. But there are signs he is reverting to more traditional diplomacy toward Beijing.
Despite his long-standing refrain about how well he gets along with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, this doesn鈥檛 mean the two men are likely to become best buddies.
The mode of U.S.-China relations remains competitive. A tough line toward Beijing is one of few policies for which there is still bipartisan support on Capitol Hill.
Yet, since earlier this year, when he dramatically escalated his first-term tariffs on Beijing, Mr. Trump has been looking for ways to build a more stable, sustainable, and respectful relationship.
The latest sign came before the General Assembly, on Friday, when the two leaders spoke by phone for the first time since June.
They agreed to meet in person during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in South Korea at the end of October. Mr. Trump said he had agreed to visit Beijing early next year, and that Mr. Xi would 鈥渃ome to the United States at an appropriate time.鈥�
Issues of substance continue to block the way to anything resembling a real rapprochement, despite what China called the 鈥減ragmatic, positive and constructive鈥� call.
Most immediately on the agenda is the future of the Chinese-owned social media platform TikTok. Congress has mandated that its U.S. operation will have to be put under majority U.S. ownership or shut down.
U.S. tariffs on Chinese exports also remain an issue 鈥� down from their maximum of 145% in April, but still at around 30%.
China wants the White House to ease export restrictions on high-tech items, and Beijing does not want Mr. Trump listening to advisers urging him to take a hard line on Taiwan, the island democracy Mr. Xi has vowed to 鈥渞eunify鈥� with the mainland.
For Washington, outstanding grievances include China鈥檚 production of the precursor chemicals for fentanyl. U.S. officials are also unhappy at the way in which Beijing is helping to cushion the impact of Western sanctions against Moscow, by purchasing its crude oil and selling it goods and materials.
Still, Mr. Trump鈥檚 patience in talks with China, and his social media restraint as his negotiators have sought common ground, are in sharp contrast with his approach to the rest of the world.
That President Trump told West European allies from the U.N. podium that their countries were 鈥済oing to hell.鈥�
And he used his social media platform to make a U-turn on Ukraine. After repeatedly denigrating Kyiv鈥檚 prospects in the war, he declared 鈥� out of the blue 鈥� that Ukraine could, with NATO support, defeat Russia outright. He added insult to injury, mocking Russian leader Vladimir Putin for his failure to win the war after three years.
The U.S. president has avoided aiming such barbs at Mr. Xi.
In recent months, he has overridden Congress by unilaterally delaying TikTok鈥檚 shutdown order, most recently last week with a moratorium until mid-December.
He has slightly eased export restrictions on microchip sales to China.
When he used tariffs to crack down on countries buying Russian oil, he targeted India with an additional 25% levy. He left untouched Mr. Putin鈥檚 largest single oil customer: China.
And, in June, the White House told Taiwan鈥檚 president he should not make a planned stopover in New York.
Mr. Trump鈥檚 transactional view of world politics means that a change of direction in the coming weeks cannot be ruled out.
But he appears unlikely to impose on China the kind of policy seesaw he applied to Russia and Ukraine this week.
Part of the reason that Mr. Trump initially wooed Mr. Putin with a Russia-friendly plan for ending the war in Ukraine was to pave the way for an end to U.S. sanctions, for a new economic and investment partnership, and for a bid to pry Russia away from its alliance with Beijing.
Diplomats called it a 鈥渞everse Nixon,鈥� an allusion to Washington鈥檚 1970s opening to China, weakening Moscow鈥檚 hand during the Cold War.
Yet, even if Mr. Trump again changes tack on Ukraine in the coming weeks, he seems increasingly to have recognized that Russia, despite its size and fossil-fuel reserves, is a minor player on the world economic stage.
China, on the other hand, is unarguably a major economic power. And it is not without leverage.
When Mr. Trump agreed to an interim deal lowering the sky-high April tariffs, he was not just trying to make nice.
The move came on the heels of a Chinese announcement that it was halting exports of rare earth products and high-end magnets, on which advanced U.S. civilian and military industries rely.
In other words, Mr. Trump鈥檚 more malleable approach to China might bear out a core tenet of traditional diplomacy: that even countries that might not be minded to make friends with each other, sometimes need each other.
