NATO has united the West for 75 years. Here鈥檚 why it still matters.
| WASHINGTON; IMATRA, Finland; TALLINN, Estonia; KORZENIEWO, Poland; and STOCKHOLM
Fighter jets scrambled low and loud, prepared to quash enemy fire, as military vessels quickly ferried tanks across Poland鈥檚 longest river, the Vistula.
The exercise, NATO鈥檚 largest since the Cold War, was part of a five-day, 32-country show of strength in early March involving 90,000 troops. The operation tested just how quickly the alliance could speed reinforcements to Poland鈥檚 eastern border should Russia invade a member nation.
鈥淲e need to be ready 鈥� and we are ready 鈥� to fight tonight,鈥� says U.S. Maj. Gen. Randolph Staudenraus, a NATO operations specialist, surveying the scene.聽
Why We Wrote This
A story focused onFor 75 years, NATO has brought peace and prosperity to Europe, the United States, and their allies. Now a grueling war in Ukraine heralds severe tests ahead for the alliance.
But there was another reason for the impressive display of trans-Atlantic coordination and unity: to demonstrate that the military alliance born of the ashes of World War II remains just as relevant today to a newly destabilized Europe.
Indeed, as NATO marks its 75th anniversary on April 4, leaders of the alliance鈥檚 32 member states on both sides of the Atlantic are celebrating what is widely considered the greatest and most effective military alliance in history.
Originally comprising 12 countries led by the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization set out to secure a ruined and unstable Europe prone to devastating wars. Its success promoted decades of remarkable economic prosperity.
The alliance was part of the postwar architecture of multilateral organizations 鈥� largely designed by the U.S. 鈥� whose aim was preventing a third world war and building global economic stability. Yet it was also at the visionary forefront of reaching for those goals from a foundation of core principles: democratic governance, universal human rights, and the rule of law.
To that list of values, the alliance added trust, which derived from each member鈥檚 pledge under the treaty鈥檚 Article 5 to come to the defense of any fellow member that came under attack. Superpower America鈥檚 promise of defense provided the bedrock for that trust to flourish.
NATO succeeded in halting the grim succession of wars in Europe, triumphed in the Cold War with the Soviet Union, and then, in an ambitious expansion wave a聽decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, helped build a united and prosperous Europe by welcoming many former Soviet republics into the club.
鈥淭he fundamental reason鈥� for the alliance鈥檚 unparalleled success is that 鈥渢he leaders in Europe and America 鈥� having lived through two world wars 鈥� realized that the best and most practical way to prevent a third was not for America just to join in addressing a war once one started, but for America to be in Europe to prevent a war from ever starting,鈥� says Ivo Daalder, U.S. ambassador to NATO under President Barack Obama.
鈥淎t the very core of this success is trust,鈥� he says. 鈥淣ATO is not just a treaty or a legal obligation. It鈥檚 the confidence each member has in the highly elusive and difficult-to-define element of trust.鈥� There鈥檚 trust in fellow members, he adds, 鈥渂ut also a trust that America would do something quite abnormal for a country to do, which is to defend them even when American territory is not directly affected or directly threatened.鈥澛�
An anniversary summit in Washington in July is sure to trumpet a nearly eight-decade record of success. Yet many trans-Atlantic security analysts and diplomats caution that the celebrations in April and July must be tempered by recognition of the significant challenges the alliance faces, some of which may be self-inflicted.
First among them are Russia鈥檚 war in Ukraine and NATO鈥檚 failure at one of its core purposes, which was to prevent the return of war to Europe. Other stark challenges loom: growing disenchantment with multilateral management of global affairs, generally, and with the U.S.-led postwar architecture; and rising nationalist 鈥淎merica First鈥� sentiments in the U.S. embodied by former President Donald Trump.
鈥淭he fact that the alliance has new members Finland and Sweden coming in and others aspiring to join is indicative of its enduring value,鈥� says Ian Lesser, vice president of the German Marshall Fund and executive director of its Brussels office. 鈥淏ut at the same time, it鈥檚 fair to say that NATO was very seldom tested during the Cold War as seriously as it鈥檚 being tested today.鈥�
Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine has united NATO and given it a renewed sense of purpose, he says, 鈥渂ut that does not alter the reality of some big looming questions鈥� that will define the future of trans-Atlantic security agreements.
Chief among those questions, Dr. Lesser says, is 鈥渢he fundamentally shifting political atmosphere in the United States concerning alliances and the U.S. role in the world.鈥� Perhaps of equal importance, he adds, is the 鈥渄ismantling of the broader security
infrastructure that was part of NATO鈥檚 strength,鈥� including arms control and strategic dialogues with adversaries, 鈥渢o a point where it is virtually absent today.鈥澛�
The hand-wringing over signs of weakening U.S. support for NATO 鈥� and for the U.S. maintaining its leadership role 鈥� intensified in February when Mr. Trump, at a campaign rally in South Carolina, cast doubt on whether, if reelected president, he would honor Article 5.
On the contrary, he boasted, he would 鈥渆ncourage鈥� Russia 鈥渢o do whatever the hell they want鈥� to any member not reaching the NATO target of spending 2% of gross domestic product on defense. His remarks were reminiscent of when he was president-elect and called NATO 鈥渙bsolete.鈥�
In response, NATO officials point out that European members collectively do hit the 2% spending target. Moreover, Europe鈥檚 defense-spending trajectory is sharply upward. This year 18 members will spend the recommended 2% on defense, they say, compared with only three in 2014 when Russia annexed Ukraine鈥檚 Crimean Peninsula.
Mr. Trump received hoots and applause when he threatened to abandon European allies. But others point out that his remarks actually belie continuing strong support among Americans for NATO and for America鈥檚 global leadership role more broadly. A Gallup poll in February showed that a plurality of Americans, 47%, support the current commitment to NATO 鈥� that includes 20% who would support the U.S. increasing its commitment to the alliance.
One key factor in that continuing support is Russian President Vladimir Putin鈥檚 growing belligerence toward the West, extending to threats of nuclear war. His full-scale invasion in 2022 of an increasingly Western-oriented Ukraine with aspirations for NATO membership has also kindled support for the alliance across Europe, including in its newest members, Finland and Sweden.
In the years before Moscow鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine, the chief of defense command for the Finnish Defence Forces, Lt. Gen. Vesa Virtanen, enjoyed taking visitors to his nation鈥檚 border with Russia.
鈥淚鈥檇 say, 鈥楬ey, look at that 鈥� no fences, nothing.鈥欌��
Finnish authorities simply painted tree trunks yellow as a mild warning to any wanderers in the dense, lake-dotted woodlands.
Today, fences are being erected and official crossings are currently closed.
Beneath a canopy of snow-dusted birch and spruce outside the border city of Imatra, Jussi Vainikka, captain of Finland鈥檚 border police for the country鈥檚 southeast, nods聽toward Moscow. He notes that this land is no longer just the line of demarcation between Finland and Russia: It is NATO鈥檚 newest frontier 鈥� 832 miles at its longest 鈥� with an increasingly unpredictable adversary.
NATO leaders have warned that the border is a target for Russian attacks, and last year Captain Vainikka bore witness to one of them. At the time, he saw it as an unusual 鈥減henomenon鈥� 鈥� waves of immigrants attempting to cross into Finland on bicycles, through the snow.
Alliance officials call it hybrid warfare 鈥� Russia attempting to weaponize immigrants by flooding the border and creating confusion. 鈥淭his,鈥� Lieutenant General Virtanen says, 鈥渨as organized by Moscow.鈥� The Kremlin has also made use of cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.
Against this backdrop, the Article 5 pledge to come to the aid of embattled allies is reassuring 鈥� and was the driving impetus for Finland鈥檚 2022 decision to join NATO, says retired Gen. Jarmo Lindberg, Finland鈥檚 chief of defense until 2019. For Finns, 鈥渢he feeling is that [we are] now under the protection of NATO and Article 5,鈥� he says, adding that national media often point out that 鈥淩ussia has never attacked a NATO member nation.鈥�
This trust in security through the alliance is a new development for Finnish citizens. Prior to Russia鈥檚 2022 invasion of Ukraine, support for NATO membership hovered at 20%. Days afterward, it skyrocketed to 76%.
Soile Hellsten, whose home is just a few hundred yards from the border, experienced this evolution in thinking herself. Since Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine, the possibility of war 鈥渋s more in my head,鈥� she says. 鈥淚t鈥檚 a worry.鈥� Joining NATO offers reassurance and a clear pathway to greater security, she says.
The closing of the border has negatively affected her gas station and cafe; Russians once made up about half of all customers for the region鈥檚 spas, cross-country ski resorts, and karaoke clubs. But Ms. Hellsten says she nonetheless supports Finland鈥檚 decision to join NATO and close the border for the time being.
Her reduced income is a small price to pay, she says, for the trust and enhanced confidence she now has in her family鈥檚 safety 鈥� and for the security of 鈥渁ll the people鈥� of the alliance.
Some of the highest support for NATO among its members is found in former states of the defunct Soviet Union.
Since joining NATO, the Baltic states and countries of Eastern Europe have lived in peace and prospered. And they have exchanged the yoke of the Soviet Union鈥檚 communism for the freedoms and governing principles that come with alliance membership.
Estonia, the northernmost of the Baltic states, is a poster child for the benefits of membership.
鈥淲e鈥檙e a laboratory example that if you believe in these values, if you do the right things 鈥� freedom, free press, anti-corruption 鈥� then you get to security and prosperity,鈥� says Kusti Salm, permanent secretary of the Estonian Ministry of Defense. Moreover, since Estonia gained its independence in 1991 (and joined NATO in 2004), its GDP has increased fortyfold.
鈥淲e鈥檙e 40 times richer than we were,鈥� he says.
And if NATO membership comes at a price, most Estonians will tell visitors it鈥檚 well worth paying.
At the Victims of Communism Memorial in Tallinn, the country鈥檚 seaside capital, Maj. Gen. Veiko-Vello Palm, commander of the Estonian Defence Forces, traces his fingers along a firing squad鈥檚 bullet holes.
鈥淭his is what happens when we are hesitant,鈥� says Major General Palm, 鈥渁nd don鈥檛 fight back.鈥�
Since the Soviet Union鈥檚 collapse, Estonia has lived in the shadow of a looming Russian threat.
鈥淭here hasn鈥檛 been a single day when Russia hasn鈥檛 been either patronizing us 鈥� that鈥檚 the positive scenario 鈥� or bluntly, aggressively saying that these are Russian lands and [they] need to take them back. It鈥檚 absolutely clear that we have just one existential threat,鈥� he adds, 鈥渁nd it鈥檚 Russia.鈥�
The Estonian military has evolved considerably in the face of this threat. A member of the first class of conscripts in 1992, Major General Palm recalls sharing seven rifles among 300 soldiers and wearing civilian clothes to train because there was no money for uniforms.
Yet even as NATO membership has greatly enhanced a sense of security, the country has never allowed that to weaken an abiding belief in self-reliance. Indeed, despite all the talk at the moment about Article 5 and the principle of collective defense, the general says the Estonian military puts equal stock in Article 3, which outlines each member鈥檚 obligation for self-defense.
Out of a population of 1.37 million, roughly 220,000 are registered to serve and have received at least one year of military training. Every year, Estonia organizes snap exercises. When the government puts out the call to muster, reservists are expected to drop everything 鈥� and they do.
Indeed, given the Article 3 obligations, Mr. Salm of the Defense Ministry says there is some truth to Mr. Trump鈥檚 complaint that some NATO members aren鈥檛 paying their fair share.
鈥淭o be honest, when it comes to ... this key criticism, we totally agree,鈥� he says. 鈥淭he way you create military credibility is through defense investments 鈥� that鈥檚 how it works.鈥�
Regarding Ukraine, he says it is only by NATO standing strong with Kyiv that it will be able to effectively confront Russia and 鈥渟end the message I think everyone wants to hear: that you don鈥檛 impose your will militarily on other countries.鈥�
Underlying all of this, Mr. Salm says, is how clear it鈥檚 become that Mr. Putin鈥檚 efforts to torpedo the alliance have backfired. 鈥淩ussia鈥檚 strategic goal is to break us apart and to create great internal frictions,鈥� he says. Instead, 鈥渨e have ended up stronger and more united.鈥�
At the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society, which supports disarmament and democratization, membership has more than doubled 鈥� from 6,000 to more than 14,000 鈥� since Sweden applied to join NATO in 2022.
Parents have been calling the organization鈥檚 central office in Stockholm, concerned their children could be conscripted to fight for NATO. At the same time, the society鈥檚 youth branch has been growing in the face of apprehensions about historically neutral Sweden 鈥� long a leader in the nonproliferation movement 鈥� joining a nuclear alliance.
Standing beneath signs that read 鈥淣o Tanks鈥� and 鈥淵es Peace,鈥� Kerstin Berge氓, the organization鈥檚 president, bemoans what she says was the undemocratic manner in which her country decided to apply for NATO membership. It 鈥渨as a very hasty process,鈥� she says. 鈥淭here wasn鈥檛 any debate, really, with the Swedish public 鈥� and we鈥檙e used to being consulted.鈥�
Yet Sweden鈥檚 accession to NATO 鈥� made possible when Hungary finally approved the membership bid in February 鈥� has garnered growing majorities of support among Swedes ever since Russia invaded Ukraine. Polls show most believe their country, long a NATO partner, will be more secure and better able to defend against an aggressive Russia from inside the NATO tent.
Indeed, for many Swedes, the alliance鈥檚 central appeal is trust that the U.S. would come to their aid in the event of an attack, says Hampus Ledberg, as he walks behind his bundled-up toddler on a rainy Stockholm street.
Militarily, 鈥渢he only guys who matter are the United States,鈥� he says. He expresses confidence that the U.S. would indeed come to Sweden鈥檚 defense, despite Mr. Trump鈥檚 recent comments, and says for that reason alone Sweden is right to join. 鈥淚t鈥檚 long overdue,鈥� he says.
Still, as the NATO skeptics at the Peace and Arbitration Society suggest, not everyone is enthusiastic about membership.
For some, it commits Sweden to spending too much on defense at the expense of domestic priorities. For others, it means their country is turning its back on its traditional role as a neutral promoter of global peace 鈥� and in particular, of nuclear disarmament.
鈥淲e have a broader perspective on what鈥檚 making the world a safer and more secure place in the long term,鈥� Ms. Berge氓 says.
She points to steps the government is taking that go against her sense of Sweden鈥檚 role in the world.
The military budget doubled to $12 billion between 2020 and 2024. And as the state has increased spending on weapons, she says, it has cut back on education, health care, and programs targeting Sweden鈥檚 growing gang problem.
Moreover, some worry that NATO鈥檚 latest expansion will only further incite Russia and lead not to greater security but to heightened instability. Indeed, Mr. Putin wasted little time in responding to the approval of Sweden鈥檚 membership, announcing Russia would 鈥渟ignificantly strengthen鈥� its military in western Russia to counter what he said are NATO鈥檚 intensifying preparations to strike his country.
While the Swedish government has touted the benefits of NATO鈥檚 mutual defense treaty, critics say the obligations it likewise imposes haven鈥檛 been as well explained. For example, the government recently agreed to host U.S. troops at 17 of its military bases.
鈥淲e鈥檝e obviously been presented with NATO membership in terms of what we will be getting,鈥� Ms. Berge氓 says. 鈥淏ut what are we expected to give?鈥澛�
Such concerns are at the heart of why Sweden stayed nonaligned throughout the Cold War, says Magnus Petersson, head of Stockholm University鈥檚 department of economic history and international relations. 鈥淚f you鈥檙e in an alliance,鈥� he says, 鈥測ou鈥檙e automatically dragged into the war if someone attacks your ally.鈥澛�
Ms. Berge氓 underscores Sweden鈥檚 shifting nuclear policy as evidence of how membership might make the world less safe.
At a 2022 nonproliferation conference, officials announced that as a NATO applicant, Sweden, long an ambassador for disarmament, could no longer endorse the position that nuclear weapons should never be used again under any circumstances.
鈥淧roof,鈥� Ms. Berge氓 says, 鈥渢hat we are going the wrong way.鈥�
Indeed, for some critics, one needn鈥檛 be a peacenik, or Donald Trump, to argue that NATO has not only outlived its useful purpose, but is actually a threat to European peace and even U.S. security interests.
鈥淚 was wrong to think at one time that NATO is obsolete, because it鈥檚 actually worse than obsolete: It鈥檚 become a cause of global insecurity,鈥� says Michael Desch, founding director of the University of Notre Dame鈥檚 International Security Center in Indiana. 鈥淭he biggest war in Europe since World War II was caused by NATO expansion,鈥� he says, referring to Russia鈥檚 war in Ukraine. 鈥淭here鈥檚 just no way to get around that.鈥�
NATO accomplished what it was created to do, he says, which was to defend Europe and the U.S. against the Soviet Union. But instead of celebrating a 鈥渕ission accomplished鈥� and turning out the lights, Dr. Desch says, the alliance disregarded warnings and 鈥渄ecided to go big by going east.鈥�
It鈥檚 NATO鈥檚 expansion to Russia鈥檚 borders that has triggered 鈥渨hat Russia was making very clear all along this was going to lead to,鈥� he says 鈥� namely, the 鈥渄estabilization鈥� of Europe. 鈥淪o now we鈥檙e in a place where the newest members of NATO, the front-line states, are advocating jihad against Russia,鈥� he adds. 鈥淣ATO has created the problem which is now its purpose.鈥�
Dr. Desch acknowledges with a chuckle that he is unlikely to be invited to speak at NATO鈥檚 Washington summit. But he also insists his views are not as far out of the mainstream as some might think.
鈥淣o doubt the foreign policy establishment would consider this kind of thinking ... a minority position,鈥� he says. 鈥淏ut ... it resonates outside the elites in important ways,鈥� he adds, referring for example to the head winds that additional military aid to Ukraine has faced in Congress.
鈥淭he world has changed a lot since 1989, especially with the rise of China to great-power status,鈥� Dr. Desch says. 鈥淚 have no problem with building alliances and bilateral relationships,鈥� he adds, 鈥渂ut today that needs to be with Southeast Asia and partners in the Indo-Pacific.鈥澛�
Even for NATO鈥檚 most ardent supporters, the worst thing it could do to mark its 75th anniversary would be to limit the summer鈥檚 summit to a celebratory bash featuring self-congratulatory speeches about a strengthened and united alliance.
Because NATO has work to do.
As Mr. Daalder, the former ambassador, says, you don鈥檛 have to be in the
鈥渙bsolete鈥� camp to understand that the trans-Atlantic relationship has to change in significant ways as the U.S. and Europe confront today鈥檚 world.
Perhaps most critically, he says, Europe must in short order be able to take on more of its own security needs.
Calling himself the 鈥渆mbodiment of the trans-Atlantic alliance,鈥� Mr. Daalder 鈥� now CEO of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs 鈥� notes that his mother survived the Holocaust, while his father survived a winter of starvation in occupied northern Holland. Both were beneficiaries of America鈥檚 entry into WWII.
Born in the Netherlands, Mr. Daalder left as a teenager to study in the U.S. 鈥� eventually writing his doctoral dissertation on NATO nuclear policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1989.
Two decades later, he became the U.S. ambassador to NATO. 鈥淚magine what it meant,鈥� he says, for a boy born in Holland 鈥渢o become the American president鈥檚 representative on everything about European and trans-Atlantic security.鈥�
Still, he says the writing is on the wall portending a different trans-Atlantic relationship from the one he鈥檚 known.
鈥淛oe Biden is very probably the last American president with European security on his brain,鈥� he says. That changing of the guard was underscored by Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell鈥檚 announcement that he would step down from Senate leadership at the end of the year.聽
Senator McConnell said he had come to realize that his own foreign policy views 鈥� inspired by Ronald Reagan and his conception of America鈥檚 role as a global champion of freedom and universal values 鈥� are increasingly at odds with the Republican Party. 聽 聽
To be viewed as a success, the Washington summit will have to deliver 鈥渃larity鈥� on Ukraine鈥檚 path to joining NATO, Mr. Daalder says. Moreover, if additional U.S. military assistance to Ukraine has not come through by then, it will cast a pall over the gathering, he adds.聽
But for the alliance鈥檚 long-term viability, even more critical will be the laying of a foundation for a more self-sufficient 鈥淓uropean defense pillar鈥� within NATO.
鈥淒oing so will make it more likely the United States stays engaged in Europe,鈥� he says, 鈥渞ather than turning away.鈥�
Editor鈥檚 note: This article has been updated to clarify Lt. Gen. Vesa Virtanen鈥檚 title. He is the chief of defense command for the Finnish Defence Forces.
