Biden鈥檚 soft-power policy faces reality of Xi-Putin big-power world
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Howard LaFranchi Staff writer
President Joe Biden pledged an 鈥淎merica is back鈥� foreign policy that would get the United States out of forever wars, renew U.S. moral authority through closer relations with allies and support for democracy, and revive economic leadership.
In many ways, it was a soft-power vision of foreign policy.
But over President Biden鈥檚 first year in office, China鈥檚 Xi Jinping and more recently Russia鈥檚 Vladimir Putin have been busy reminding the U.S. that the 21st-century world is one of big-power competition.
Why We Wrote This
The language of President Joe Biden鈥檚 foreign policy orientation 鈥� alliances, democracy, moral authority 鈥� is suggestive of values and evocative of soft power. But can it adapt to the world as it is?
After a post-Cold War era of globalization, China鈥檚 ratcheted-up pressure on Taiwan and Russia鈥檚 moves against Ukraine and efforts to reconstitute in some form the security blanket of the Soviet Union are reviving 19th-century big-power notions like 鈥渟pheres of influence鈥� 鈥� once thought by some to have been relegated to history.
The questions now are whether Mr. Biden鈥檚 soft-power foreign policy can adapt to the realities of the world as it is, and whether the tools his administration has largely turned to so far for dealing with Russia and China 鈥� like sanctions 鈥� are the right ones.
鈥淏ig-power politics is back in a big way. It鈥檚 not a reality President Biden can wish away or ignore,鈥� says Michael Desch, a professor of international relations at the University of Notre Dame and founding director of the university鈥檚 International Security Center. 鈥淏ut a year into his presidency and as he confronts these two very difficult and fraught situations, I see both ways in which his administration is acknowledging this big-power world they鈥檝e entered 鈥� and ways they still have not.鈥�
For some foreign policy experts, Mr. Biden鈥檚 ban on U.S. diplomats attending the upcoming Beijing Olympics over China鈥檚 human rights abuses, or his threat of devastating economic sanctions against Moscow while excluding a military response to any Russian invasion of Ukraine, has demonstrated little resolve, lacked clarity, and even invited more provocative actions from America鈥檚 adversaries.
鈥淏y and large, the kinds of actions Biden and his team are taking or are threatening to take do not meet this moment very well, whether we鈥檙e talking about the challenges from Russia or those posed by China,鈥� says Simon Miles, a Russia expert and assistant professor of Slavic and Eurasian studies at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina.
鈥淚 don鈥檛 think the Chinese care at all if American diplomats show up for the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics,鈥� he says. As for the Russians, he says Mr. Biden鈥檚 priorities like democracy and human rights are 鈥渘ot what they care about.鈥�
Some regional experts say one key objective of Mr. Putin鈥檚 recent actions 鈥� amassing more than 100,000 troops on Ukraine鈥檚 borders, warning NATO to formally end prospects of eastern expansion or risk conflict, and intervening in friendly neighbors including Kazakhstan and Belarus 鈥� is to convince the U.S. to deal with Russia as the great-power competitor that the Russian leader sees it to be.
And there are signs the Russians believe they are making headway. At the end of a week of inconclusive diplomacy across Europe addressing the Ukraine crisis, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Friday that if nothing else, 鈥渢hey are taking us seriously now.鈥�
Indeed, the State Department announced Tuesday that Secretary of State Antony Blinken will conclude visits to Ukraine and Germany this week with a stop in Geneva to meet with Mr. Lavrov.
Secretary Blinken spoke with Mr. Lavrov Tuesday, reiterating the U.S. commitment to Ukraine鈥檚 鈥渟overeignty and territorial integrity,鈥� while a senior State Department official characterized Friday鈥檚 meeting in Geneva as evidence 鈥� contrary to what Russian diplomats said last week 鈥� that 鈥渄iplomacy is not dead.鈥�
Secretary Blinken is 鈥渃ommitted to seeing if there is a diplomatic off-ramp here,鈥� the official said, and exploring with Mr. Lavrov 鈥渨here there might be an opportunity for the U.S. and Russia to find common ground.鈥�
Accommodating Russia
As if to remind the U.S. that great-power Russia has as much a right to a sphere of influence in its neighborhood as the U.S. does in its own, Mr. Putin took his conflict with the U.S. to a global level last week by warning that without a satisfactory resolution, Russia could act to move nuclear weapons closer to the U.S. or send troops or other military assets to Western Hemisphere locations like Venezuela or Cuba.
Is Mr. Putin bluffing? That question has emerged as a central factor of the Ukraine crisis. Perhaps even the Russian leader doesn鈥檛 know yet whether he will invade Ukraine beyond the Donbass region that his troops already occupy, some analysts say. But in the meantime, he is busy keeping the West 鈥� the U.S. and Europeans 鈥� guessing and off balance, sending in undercover teams to foment instability to provide an excuse for an invasion, American intelligence says, and thinning out Russia鈥檚 diplomatic presence at its embassy in Kyiv.
But for some foreign policy experts, including Dr. Desch, the U.S. may have to bow to the realities of the new big-power era and change long-standing policy 鈥� including at NATO 鈥� to formally accommodate Russia鈥檚 security concerns.
And that will be especially true, some add, if Mr. Biden wants to remove Russia from his list of daily worries so that the U.S. can turn its attention to what the administration says is America鈥檚 foremost 21st-century big-power challenge, China.
鈥溾�楽pheres of influence鈥� has a distasteful aroma about it, but that鈥檚 generally how big-power peace has been kept throughout much of history,鈥� Dr. Desch says. And in light of that, he says, the U.S. and European powers may very well have to revise what he calls the 鈥渙riginal sin鈥� of NATO 鈥� promising membership to all qualifying comers from Europe鈥檚 East, no matter how close geographically they are to Russia.
鈥淔inland had a decent life during the Cold War being neutral, and I think we could trade as a quid pro quo certain guarantees about Ukrainian independence in return for taking NATO membership off the table,鈥� he says. 鈥淚t may require a kind of Nixon-goes-to-China moment,鈥� Dr. Desch adds, 鈥渂ut if you really think China is the unequaled geostrategic challenge of the 21st century, you should want to settle our differences with Russia to get that distraction out of the way.鈥�
For others, the real problem is that the U.S. does not seem to know exactly what it wants from a resolution of the Ukraine crisis, while Mr. Putin has a very clear strategy and is tying up the U.S. and the Europeans in deploying it.
鈥淔or me the big problem is that it鈥檚 not clear what the Biden administration endgame is here,鈥� says Duke鈥檚 Dr. Miles. 鈥淚s it to put Putin in his place? Guarantee that Ukraine is never threatened again? It鈥檚 not at all clear.鈥�
From the perspective of some in Europe,聽a concession on Ukraine would not be such a bitter pill to swallow, since Ukraine is not seen to be anywhere near meeting the requirements for NATO membership anyway.
鈥淣ATO membership for Ukraine is not on the horizon at this point, so with that being the reality, some arrangement guaranteeing political independence and other freedoms of a sovereign state鈥� could be worked out, says Sven Biscop, director of the Europe and the World Program at Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels.
Europe focused on multilateralism
What matters most for Europeans is settling differences with Russia diplomatically 鈥� and ensuring that Europe is part of any regional negotiations and not left on the sidelines by big powers Russia and the U.S., he says.
President Biden taking any military response to Russia off the table was a 鈥渞elief鈥� to most Europeans, Dr. Biscop says, since any big-power military confrontation would come at Europe鈥檚 expense.
鈥淲hat Europeans want most is that any talks [over Ukraine and Eastern Europe] be trilateral, something Russia tries constantly to make problematic by dividing Europe and feeding internal tensions,鈥� he says. 鈥淏ut no Europeans were expecting the U.S. to go to war for Ukraine, since no European state is thinking of going to war for Ukraine.鈥�
More broadly, Dr. Biscop says, Europeans 鈥� who remain focused on multilateralism as the 21st century鈥檚 best option for 鈥渁ddressing tensions among great powers鈥� 鈥� are worried that in an era of big-power competition, President Biden is shifting the U.S. toward what he calls a 鈥渕ore classic鈥� vision of multilateralism.
鈥淲hat I see is the U.S. returning to an interpretation of multilateralism that is closer to how the Chinese have always seen it, which is as an arrangement providing places where powers meet and talk,鈥� he says. 鈥淚t鈥檚 more just a forum, but not the level at which big powers do their decision-making.鈥�
Europeans 鈥渃an feel that the U.S. agenda is driven much more by Asia, and for the most part people understand that,鈥� Dr. Biscop says.
鈥淲e see that resolving tensions in Europe would free up bandwidth and allow the U.S. to focus on China and Taiwan,鈥� he adds. 鈥淪ome fear that the U.S. might give in too much to Russia to turn its attention鈥� to the Pacific, 鈥渂ut generally we don鈥檛 want that resolution to happen without us at the table.鈥�
