海角大神

When Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi visited the White House this month, he was given the treatment generally reserved for America鈥檚 closest allies.

Mr. Sisi stayed at Blair House, the guest house across from the White House and a perk reserved for most-honored guests.

In the Oval Office, President Donald Trump praised him unequivocally as a 鈥済reat president鈥� despite withering criticisms from human rights groups, democracy advocates, and some members of Congress that the Egyptian leader is overseeing a steep erosion of civil liberties and consolidating power in the image of other emerging authoritarian leaders.

And when asked specifically how he views the effort engineered by Mr. Sisi to reverse many of the democratic gains won in Egypt鈥檚 Arab Spring revolution eight years ago 鈥� an effort culminating today, the final day in a three-day referendum that is all but certain to confirm the return of strongman rule to Egypt 鈥� Mr. Trump said he didn鈥檛 know about it.

What he did know, he added, is that Mr. Sisi is 鈥渄oing a great job.鈥�

In the referendum, which Human Rights Watch has said was being conducted in a 鈥済rossly unfree, rights-abusive environment,鈥� Egyptians are voting on constitutional changes that would extend Mr. Sisi鈥檚 current term until 2024, allow him to run for another six-year term after that, strengthen his control over the judiciary, and enhance the military鈥檚 power.

Mr. Trump鈥檚 embrace of Mr. Sisi in the midst of what many analysts are calling a 鈥減ower grab鈥� is just one of a growing number of signs of the Trump administration鈥檚 disenchantment with policies of democracy promotion and increasing preference for authoritarian rule for stabilizing a volatile Middle East.

The shift from pro-democracy policies that reached their zenith under President George W. Bush 鈥� when removing Saddam Hussein from power in Baghdad in 2003 was envisioned as the spark that would ignite democracy鈥檚 spread across the region 鈥� has been on display in various forms in recent weeks.

Support for Libya鈥檚 Haftar

The United States has shown little interest in and offered little public encouragement for the massive and largely youth-led demonstrations that over recent weeks have driven longtime autocratic rulers from power in Algeria and Sudan.

More pointedly, Mr. Trump displayed his preference for authoritarian rule as the answer for Arab countries when he issued a statement Friday endorsing the military campaign of Libyan militia leader and would-be strongman Khalifa Haftar in his efforts to defeat the country鈥檚 embattled United Nations-supported government.

Mr. Trump鈥檚 move not only shocked members of the international community working to help stabilize Libya and shore up its government, but it appeared to reverse U.S. policy that just days earlier had been to condemn the Haftar militia鈥檚 offensive, as laid out in a statement by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

鈥淲hat we鈥檙e seeing from this administration is a harsh repudiation of the Bush 43 strategy [which was] really the apex of believing in the innate desire for democracy among broad populations and the idea that democracy鈥檚 spread would help fight extremism across the Middle East,鈥� says Jon Alterman, director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington and a former State Department Middle East policy planner.

Ahmed Jadallah/Reuters

Protesters attend a demonstration to demand an end to Khalifa Haftar's offensive against Tripoli, Libya, in Martyrs' Square in central Tripoli April 19.

Moreover, the shift is a break with the longtime U.S. practice of putting its values front and center in its international policies, he adds.

鈥淚ncorporating an American values proposition has been consistently an element of our approach to international affairs since the Cold War, when we argued we were advancing the forces of freedom, and inconsistently since as far back as Woodrow Wilson鈥檚 14 points 100 years ago,鈥� Mr. Alterman says. 鈥淪o now turning away sharply from an American values proposition is a strong departure from the way the U.S. has operated in the world for many many years. You could argue,鈥� he adds, 鈥渢his is the resurgence of realists.鈥�

Limited influence

Indeed, 鈥渞ealism鈥� is a big part of what some regional experts see in the shifting U.S. outlook on Egypt, a key Middle East ally the U.S. has turned to (and supported with billions of dollars in annual aid) to further regional stability.

鈥淭here is now a much more realistic appreciation of the limits of American and Western influence in sponsoring change across the region,鈥� says James Phillips, a senior research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs at the Heritage Foundation in Washington.

And recent U.S. experience with Egypt, he adds, has only confirmed how well-meaning but misguided policy does not produce the ends sought, such as democratic rule.

鈥淭he Obama administration鈥檚 push for a rapid democratic transition in Egypt empowered the Muslim Brotherhood, which quickly subverted democracy,鈥� Mr. Phillips says. 鈥淧ushing for elections in places where there is a lack of economic freedom, press freedom, an independent judiciary, adequate protection for property rights, and respect for the rule of law does not result in stable democracies.鈥�

If anything, 鈥渢he overly optimistic initial reactions to the 2011 鈥楢rab Spring鈥� protests led to the NATO intervention in Libya, which produced only temporary stability,鈥� he says. 鈥淓lsewhere, the 鈥楢rab Spring鈥� devolved into an 鈥業slamist winter鈥� and triggered civil wars that still rage on in Syria and Yemen.鈥�

Mr. Alterman sees a direct line between the 鈥渄isgust with how Iraq has turned out鈥� in the aftermath of US-engineered regime change and the lack of any protest from the current administration 鈥渨ith how Egypt has returned to authoritarian rule.鈥�

It鈥檚 a perspective with which Mr. Phillips largely agrees. 鈥淎fter the overly ambitious U.S. nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq,鈥� he says, 鈥渢he Trump administration has scaled back U.S. goals in the volatile Middle East region and reduced the U.S. military footprint.鈥�

Taking a back seat

The U.S. pullback from Middle East engagement and shift away from values-led policies have opened the way to what Nicholas Heras of Washington鈥檚 Center for a New American Security (CNAS) calls a 鈥渘ew Middle East cold war鈥� in which the U.S. takes a back seat to regional blocs.

鈥淭he U.S. and Western powers have learned often the hard way of the limited ability they have to impact change in the region,鈥� says Mr. Heras, a fellow in CNAS鈥檚 Middle East Security Program. 鈥淎nd so there is a shift to an approach that will allow regional actors to sort out their region.鈥�

Essentially two major blocs of countries are now battling in this 鈥渃old war鈥� to reshape the region in their image, he says, with one bloc comprised mainly of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt and the other led by Turkey and Qatar. In addition, he says, Iran is involved as a third powerful actor outside the two main blocs.

In this scenario, Mr. Heras says, a U.S. discouraged by failed idealistic interventions and unending military engagements is motivated instead by stability in a key region for the global economy 鈥� and stability it now sees as best-served by authoritarian (and non-Islamist) rulers.

Instead of a dominant power intervening militarily and otherwise to change governments and enhance individual rights, the U.S. is likely to continue playing a more peripheral role that 鈥渞ecognizes the region will be shaped by the cold-war competition between regional blocs,鈥� he says.

It鈥檚 not a recipe for significant change in the region.

The social and economic factors such as joblessness and stymied social mobility that led to the Arab Spring or that had a hand in the more recent upheavals in Sudan and Algeria may be as present today as ever. But for Mr. Heras, the regional dynamics and the new U.S. and Western approach to them 鈥渄oes not tend to bolster the agency of people in the region to shape the kind of society they will live in.鈥�