Iran and North Korea ... and the art of the denuclearization deal
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Howard LaFranchi Staff writer
| WASHINGTON
It was no mere aside when President Trump used his statement Tuesday on withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal to announce that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was about to touch down in North Korea to lay the groundwork for the upcoming summit.
Instead, the leader who presents himself as a great dealmaker 鈥� and who disdains the kind of multilateralism the 2015 Iran deal represents 鈥� was making a point.
To his base, to the allies who had implored Mr. Trump to keep the United States inside the international agreement, and to the previous administration, the president was saying, 鈥淲atch how a real denuclearization deal is done.鈥�
Why We Wrote This
President Trump has consistently heaped scorn on the Iran deal achieved by his predecessor. But his announcement that the US was pulling out of the deal also presented an opportunity to tout his approach to talks with North Korea. Even as he defied critics and the advice of allies, he was saying: This is how to do a deal.
If such events had a soundtrack, this one鈥檚 would have been the 1995 anthem, 鈥淭his is how we do it.鈥�
Trump 鈥� who had vowed as a candidate to end President Barack Obama鈥檚 signature foreign-policy achievement 鈥� intends to tout his North Korea gambit as the template for how negotiations with rogue nations like Iran and North Korea should be carried out.
The showcasing of the North Korea model continued Wednesday, as the State Department trumpeted that not only had Secretary Pompeo met with Kim Jong-un, but he had also secured the release of three detained Americans 鈥渁nd is delighted to bring them home.鈥� Trump also tweeted Wednesday that the time and place of his meeting with Mr. Kim has been set, but he did not disclose details.
Of course the Trump model is not just about one-on-one sit-downs. Rather, instead of long negotiations involving diplomats from a half-dozen countries, it calls for the following: use brinkmanship coming directly from the American president, threaten obliteration by America鈥檚 unequaled firepower, and make talks a one-on-one affair between the deciders of each side.
That it is less about diplomatic prowess and more about imposing America鈥檚 might was made clear by Trump鈥檚 national security adviser, John Bolton, who told reporters at the White House Tuesday that the Iran deal鈥檚 fatal flaw was its failure to employ America鈥檚 positions of strength.
鈥淭he lesson that America learned, painfully, a long time ago, but that Dean Acheson once said, is we only negotiate from positions of strength,鈥� Mr. Bolton said. 鈥淚t was a lesson that the last administration did not follow.鈥�
How North Koreans read the move
He went on to link the president鈥檚 action on Iran to upcoming negotiations with North Korea. 鈥淎nother aspect of the withdrawal that was announced today is to establish positions of strength for the United States, and it will have implications not simply for Iran, but for the forthcoming meeting with Kim Jong-un of North Korea,鈥� he said. 鈥淚t sends a very clear signal that the United States will not accept inadequate deals.鈥�
Other experts, including some who were involved in negotiating the Iran deal and with past talks with North Korea, say Trump鈥檚 decision to withdraw from a deal the US negotiated alongside international partners and signed on to may have a different impact with the North Korean leadership.
Pulling out of a multilaterally negotiated accord 鈥渟ays the United States is not a reliable partner,鈥� says Wendy Sherman, the Obama administration鈥檚 lead negotiator on the Iran deal. She was earlier involved in talks with the North Koreans.
鈥淪ome analysts have said that North Korea may not care about鈥� the US leaving a multilateral deal, 鈥渢hat the president will say he鈥檚 going to make a better deal with North Korea. I鈥檓 not so sure of that, having negotiated with the North Koreans myself,鈥� she adds, 鈥渂ut I can tell you for sure that it will make South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia more wary of the United States as a negotiator.鈥�
Priority for Europeans
Bolton scoffs at such assertions, underscoring that he would be speaking as of Wednesday morning with his European counterparts about ways to now secure a comprehensive deal with Iran. For the Trump administration, the aim would be to address not just the current deal鈥檚 shortcomings (like its sunset clauses on nuclear activities) but Iran鈥檚 ballistic missile development and 鈥渕align activities鈥� in the region as well.
The Europeans will continue to talk with the US 鈥� there鈥檚 consensus on the other side of the Atlantic that nothing was gained by Europe鈥檚 bitter falling-out with the US in 2003 over Iraq. But core powers France, Britain, and Germany are making it clear that their top priority is going to be preserving the current deal and keeping Iran in compliance with it.
That priority is likely to mean that US allies will end up working more closely with Russia and China, also signatories of the Iran deal. And the US-Europe estrangement caused by the US withdrawal will only sharpen if re-imposed US sanctions end up hitting European companies trading with Iran as permitted under the nuclear deal.
More long-term, Trump鈥檚 withdrawal from the Iran deal and his prioritizing of a bilateral model of negotiations with North Korea is likely to cement the global perception that the world has to learn how to work with a less multilateral America putting hard power first.
Indeed, up until now, Trump鈥檚 major foreign-policy decisions could be seen as primarily reflections of an America-First approach. From pulling out of the Paris climate accords and nixing the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal to imposing tariffs on China and other trading partners and even threatening allies over inadequate defense spending, the aim could be seen as putting American workers and taxpayers first.
But the Iran deal exit is about America Alone 鈥� the US getting out of a multilateral arrangement that hamstrung American power 鈥� and Trump鈥檚 vision of a more muscular leadership where the US goes forward and others follow.
Setting too high a bar?
By spotlighting his North Korea efforts 鈥� the end goal of which is the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 鈥� even as he pulled the US out of the Iran deal, Trump was telling the world his approach would be superior and would never sign America on to a weak deal.
That will appeal to Trump鈥檚 supporters at home, but some experts with diplomatic experience worry the president is laying the groundwork for disappointment 鈥� whether with North Korea, or over prospects for getting a 鈥渂etter deal鈥� with Iran.
鈥淭he president is setting a standard for himself with any negotiations with North Korea that it will be almost impossible for him to meet,鈥� former deputy secretary of State Tony Blinken told reporters Tuesday.
鈥淚n decrying the substance of the Iran deal, he is saying that in any negotiations with North Korea he would have to get an agreement that surpasses it, and that means getting the North Koreans up front to dismantle the vast bulk of their nuclear program, as we achieved with Iran, and it would mean 鈥� the most intrusive inspections regime on the ground in North Korea in history,鈥� he says.
That is indeed what Trump is saying he believes he can get. But as Mr. Blinken says, 鈥淭hose will be very, very difficult bars to jump.鈥�
