US foreign policy: Who is in charge?
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Howard LaFranchi Staff writer
| Washington
The North Korean nuclear crisis has challenged the Trump administration and its formation of coherent and effective foreign policy like no other.
And like no other international issue, North Korea has demonstrated why nearly eight months into Donald Trump鈥檚 presidency, many are still wondering who is in charge of US foreign policy 鈥� and what its guiding vision is in the era of a president elected on a slogan of 鈥淎merica First.鈥�
After President Trump鈥檚 promise of 鈥渇ire and fury鈥� over the North鈥檚 ever-more threatening long-range missile tests, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was forced to glumly reassure Americans that they could 鈥渟leep well.鈥�
After the US ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, hailed unanimous approval in the Security Council of what she said were the toughest sanctions ever on North Korea, Trump this week contradicted his New York envoy, dismissing the diplomatic victory as 鈥渘ot a big deal鈥� and adding that 鈥渢hose sanctions are nothing compared to what ultimately will have to happen.鈥�
Many factors are contributing to a lingering sense of an ad hoc and chaotic foreign policy process, say diplomats, experts, and longtime observers of US foreign policy.
Among the factors are the upheaval 鈥� even in the administration鈥檚 short existence 鈥� in the foreign-policy team, and a secretary of State who has often seemed absent and who has shown no interest in using his high office to be the voice of American foreign policy.
Also important, say former diplomats in particular, is the administration鈥檚 perspective that the nation鈥檚 corps of diplomats and foreign-service officers, far from being the civilian counterparts of those defending the nation鈥檚 security in the military, instead constitute a 鈥渟wamp鈥� to be drained.
Not a chart, but a vortex
But above everything else, what explains the image of a scattered foreign policy with no clear guidelines directing it, these experts say, is that the man ultimately in charge is mercurial, runs hot and cold on issues, and doesn鈥檛 appear to have a set vision guiding his foreign-policy pronouncements.
鈥淲e鈥檙e dealing with something we haven鈥檛 seen before 鈥� a far less structured administration, out of which can come all sorts of things that are unfathomable, because it鈥檚 the chief executive who is the least disciplined of the group,鈥� says Wayne White, a retired diplomat and specialist in Middle East intelligence who is now an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington.
鈥淵ou get the sense,鈥� he adds, 鈥渢hat rather than an administrative chart, what you have in this administration鈥檚 foreign-policy team is a vortex.鈥�
The fault lies with the Oval Office and with the president鈥檚 lack of a 鈥渨orldview鈥� to guide the administration鈥檚 policymaking, says Danielle Pletka, vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington.
鈥淭he question of foreign policy is a straightforward one. Most presidents 鈥� like them or not 鈥� have a guiding vision, what it is they stand for, and that signals to foreign countries what we will and won鈥檛 do and it forms the framework that guides the national security adviser and the secretary of State and others in the policymaking process,鈥� Ms. Pletka says. 鈥淏ut I didn鈥檛 see any worldview after the first 100 days of this White House, and I don鈥檛 think there is one now.鈥�
Some of Trump鈥檚 top advisers, notably Mr. Tillerson, have insisted to allies, for example, that 鈥� 鈥楢merica First鈥� does not mean 鈥楢merica alone.鈥� 鈥� But then why would the president choose the height of tensions with North Korea to savage South Korea鈥檚 trade deal with the US and threaten to nix it?
Or why make a point of traveling to Poland, a NATO ally on the frontlines of Europe鈥檚 tensions with Russia, to make a speech that asked if the West has the 鈥渨ill to survive鈥� even as it downplayed the threat of Russian interference in Western elections, including in the US, as Trump did in July?
鈥淧oland is about the last place you鈥檇 want to make that kind of statement, given the deep fear there of Russia,鈥� says Mr. White. 鈥淏ut it leads to all kinds of doubts and insecurity and confusion about what US policy really is in places well beyond Poland.鈥�
Other diplomatic experts say they do see the makings of an effective foreign-policymaking team in the Trump administration 鈥� as long as that team is not constantly blindsided by the president.
鈥淚 don鈥檛 agree with those who say there is no normalcy whatsoever鈥� in the foreign-policy structure, says Peter Feaver, a professor of political science and public policy at Duke University in Durham, N.C.
'Super-powered' team
What he sees taking shape is a 鈥渟uper-powered national security team鈥� 鈥� comprised of Tillerson, Defense Secretary James Mattis, and national security adviser H.R. McMaster 鈥� that he says has already demonstrated effective policymaking.
The Trump national security team is even showing better coordination and unity than did the Powell-Rumsfeld-Rice team that served President George W. Bush, says Dr. Feaver, who served as a special adviser on national security strategy in the Bush White House.
The team works well as long as the three are allowed to 鈥渂e in charge and run things,鈥� he says. Where things go awry, Feaver adds, is when Trump doesn鈥檛 like what the three come up with 鈥� or when he makes a spontaneous statement that contradicts the policy the three have crafted.
鈥淭he risk is that when the three powerhouses come up with a policy the president isn鈥檛 comfortable with 鈥� the best example to date is probably Afghanistan 鈥� it misfires,鈥� says Feaver. He notes that an Afghanistan plan was first presented to Trump in March 鈥� but then was hashed out for another five months over the president鈥檚 distaste for the plan.
The other wild card the national security team has to deal with is Trump鈥檚 habit of tweeting or making off-the-cuff remarks in public that veer away from discussed policy. 鈥淭hings can seem settled, and then a new unscripted statement from the president can drive policy in a new direction,鈥� Feaver says.
But for many foreign policy experts, the picture of a strong three-man national security team obscures the problem they see of a weak secretary of State who has willingly ceded his role as voice to the world of US foreign policy.
Division of labor?
Tillerson鈥檚 focus on State Department reform 鈥� really a hefty downsizing 鈥� has won him suspicions among the department鈥檚 domestic and overseas staff and critics on Capitol Hill. Indeed, Congress seems unlikely to allow the reform plan, which was to be unveiled Friday, to ever fully see the light of day.
Tillerson鈥檚 absence from the public stage has opened the way for Ambassador Haley, a polished politician and former governor of South Carolina, to emerge as the administration鈥檚 strong voice on issues like North Korea. Some say it鈥檚 simply a neat division of labor between Tillerson and Haley given each one鈥檚 talents, but others say the US is not well-served by a secretary of State who does not have a strong global presence.
鈥淐ertainly it matters that we have a secretary of State who is perceived by friends and enemies alike as the chief representative of US foreign policy and who is capable of multitasking in his own job,鈥� says Pletka.
Tillerson鈥檚 low profile and incessant rumors about a distant relationship with the president have many in the foreign policy community and the media waiting for the former ExxonMobil chief鈥檚 departure.
'Waiting for Godot'
But Feaver says that expectation fits a pattern of many diplomats and others in the foreign policy community waiting for the administration鈥檚 rocky initial months to settle down and yield a more conventional presidency, including a more traditional foreign-policymaking process.
鈥淚t鈥檚 something of a 鈥榃aiting for Godot鈥� kind of scenario,鈥� he says, ticking off the many moments over the Trump campaign and then presidency when pundits and others predicted a shift to more normal operations.
鈥淭here鈥檚 a lot of talk and expectation, but what they鈥檙e waiting for never arrives.鈥�
