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When President Trump chose a Rose Garden press conference to blast away at Qatar as the guilty party in the Gulf Arab states鈥� sudden falling-out last week, it was a fresh example of the shoot-from-the-hip and mixed-messaging diplomacy that Americans 鈥� and the world 鈥� may have to accept as the new normal.

There may have been nothing unique about Mr. Trump taking a decidedly tougher and less diplomatic approach to Qatar than his top diplomat, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. Administrations use ambiguity and contradictions 鈥� carrots and sticks, good cop鈥揵ad cop 鈥� all the time to address complex crises and advance US goals.

Nor would it have been the first time a president used a foreign-policy matter to distract the public from the domestic news of the day, experts say, noting that the big news at home as the president skewered Qatar over terrorism financing was the congressional testimony of former FBI Director James Comey.

What stands out about Trump鈥檚 foreign-policy commentaries 鈥� whether of the Rose Garden variety or like the recent presidential tweets on missiles and trade that upended relations with South Korea 鈥� is how public, off-the-cuff, and seemingly disconnected from the consensus of the administration鈥檚 foreign-policy team those pronouncements are.

And while some degree of dissonance 鈥� some may call it 鈥渄isruption,鈥� others disarray 鈥� can serve a purpose, most foreign-policy experts say it can also cause unnecessary confusion and setbacks for US interests.

鈥淲hat鈥檚 especially different here is how President Trump uses social media, in his case Twitter, to change the subject,鈥� says Peter Feaver, an international relations expert specializing in civilian-military affairs at Duke University in Durham, N.C.

鈥淭he problem when you do that as president and in the foreign-policy arena [is that] it has real-world consequences that have to be dealt with. If you鈥檙e doing it merely for short-term news impact, without contemplation of the secondary and tertiary foreign-policy effects,鈥� he adds, 鈥測ou can get into trouble.鈥�

For others, the principal drawback of the 鈥渦nique鈥� pattern Trump is setting on foreign-policy making is how the president鈥檚 鈥� the boss鈥檚 鈥� stark and unvarnished pronouncements supersede the more nuanced and diplomatic approach of the administration鈥檚 foreign-policy team.

鈥淚鈥檝e never seen anything like this, where three or four different people, and one of them the president, say different things about the same issue,鈥� says Aaron David Miller, a Middle East expert at the Wilson Center in Washington who has worked in both Republican and Democratic administrations. 鈥淚t can鈥檛 be just that it鈥檚 a new administration. I鈥檝e witnessed six or seven administrations,鈥� he adds. 鈥淭his is unique in the way the foreign-policy apparatus and messaging are structured.鈥�

A short diplomatic bench

Another factor some see undermining the administration鈥檚 foreign-policy clarity is the fact that the 鈥渁pparatus鈥� Dr. Miller speaks of is still bare-bones more than four months into the Trump presidency.

鈥淲hat鈥檚 unusual here is that the Trump team is facing this significant diplomatic challenge before they鈥檝e got their roster on board,鈥� Dr. Feaver says. 鈥淚t鈥檚 like attempting to do a difficult synchronized swimming maneuver, with half the team not yet in their bathing suits and others not even named to the team yet.鈥�

The impact a short bench can have on keeping the diplomatic cogs turning was particularly salient to some analysts who noted that Mr. Tillerson was听experiencing the effects听of an incomplete 鈥渢eam roster鈥� even as he was testifying to Congress this week (a House committee Tuesday, a Senate committee Wednesday) on his plans to reorganize the State Department 鈥� and eliminate as many as 2,300 positions.

But in a cacophony of voices, of course it鈥檚 the president鈥檚 that will be most heeded. The problem Miller sees is that in the case of the Gulf-Qatar rupture, it鈥檚 the president鈥檚 unnuanced position that is the least helpful to resolving a rift among key US allies.

Trump鈥檚 comments on the crisis 鈥渞eflect a far too black-and-white vision of the region,鈥� he says, 鈥渁nd there are real risks to American credibility and policy in going down that road.鈥�

Qatar has been an outlier among the Gulf Arab states for decades. In response to Saudi Arabia, which treats it as little more than a Saudi province, its foreign policy seeks to get along with most everyone in the region. That includes the Iranians, but also the US, which has about 10,000 troops in Qatar 鈥� the US Central Command's forward operating base is at the huge al-Udeid Air Base, which is critical to both the fight against ISIS and the US effort in Afghanistan.

But Qatar has also served as a base for extremist Islamist political groups such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, while wealthy Qataris have funded Islamist opposition groups in Syria, including some thought to maintain ties to Al Qaeda. Qatar is also home to the Al Jazeera news network, a particular b锚te noire for the Saudi regime.

On June 5, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt broke off diplomatic ties with Qatar, citing its support of 鈥渆xtremists鈥� and Iran. The group imposed a de facto blockade on the tiny desert nation, which depends heavily on imports.

The 'MMT' team

Tillerson, Defense Secretary James Mattis, and the national security adviser, H.R. McMaster, quickly made it known that the United States would press for a rapid diplomatic resolution of the rupture 鈥� with State Department officials in particular noting that the US wished to avoid a scenario that pushed Qatar closer to Iran.

But that approach appeared to be contradicted by Trump, who accused Qatar of 鈥渉igh level鈥� sponsorship of terrorism and also suggested that his recent trip to Saudi Arabia had prompted the get-tough move against Qatar.

So, says the Wilson Center鈥檚 Miller, while Trump鈥檚 team was developing a nuanced approach to the crisis that would serve America鈥檚 varied interests in the region, the president was drowning out those efforts with a single-minded strategy based on Saudi Arabia. Not coincidentally, he adds, the Saudis had just given Trump the warmest reception of his recent five-country overseas trip.

鈥淲hat we鈥檙e seeing is that whatever the 鈥楳MT鈥� team may be recommending and promoting,鈥� says Miller, referring to听General McMaster, Mr. Mattis, and Tillerson, 鈥渢he fact is that so far it鈥檚 the president鈥檚 view that has prevailed.鈥�

Wednesday, Secretary Mattis signed a previously approved sale of F-15 fighter jets to Qatar for $12 billion. Qatar said the deal was for 36 warplanes.

What the Qatar crisis demonstrates is how US Middle East policy is becoming linked ever closer to Saudi Arabia. 鈥淧olicy is now driven by the president鈥檚 need to hang the American hat on the Saudi hook,鈥� Miller says. 鈥淏ut there are numerous reasons why that would an ill-advised regional strategy.鈥�

And while the Qatar crisis may be the stand-out of the day, experts say it鈥檚 not alone in illustrating Trump鈥檚 impulsive foreign-policy approach.

Advice versus intuition

Another example, Duke鈥檚 Feaver says, is how a Trump tweet threw off the careful diplomacy the administration was beginning to fashion with South Korea for dealing with the North Korea crisis.

鈥淭he administration did have a first-order strategy on North Korea that involved reassurance and compellence across the region and included the deployment of THAAD in South Korea,鈥� he says, referring to the anti-missile batteries the US has committed to deploying.

鈥淏ut then the president sets off a dispute with the South Koreans by way of a tweet that mixed together who would pay what part of the THAAD deployment 鈥� and the unrelated question of renegotiation of the Korean Free Trade Agreement,鈥� Feaver says. 鈥淭he result was that the president dominated the news cycle that day 鈥� but everyone else [on the foreign-policy team] is still dealing with the fallout from that one Twitter blast.鈥�

What鈥檚 new, Feaver says, is not that when the president speaks, people listen. Rather, it鈥檚 that Trump seems to disregard the counsel of his top foreign policy aides in favor of his own intuition.

鈥淓very president has always had a huge megaphone, of one form or another,鈥� he says. 鈥淲hat鈥檚 striking here is the degree to which Trump appears to be his own communications director 鈥� and how quickly an idea that occurs to him turns into a tweet, without the normal collaboration across the team to ascertain that it鈥檚 really what the administration wants to say.鈥�

[Editor's note: This article has been updated to correctly characterize the US military's presence in Qatar.]