海角大神

The horrendous terrorist attack in Manchester this week gave a tragic assist to President Trump鈥檚 hopes of escaping, with a nine-day overseas trip, Washington鈥檚 focus on all things Russian.

But at a deeper level, some longtime experts on Western security say, allowing Mr. Trump to downplay the Russian challenge and instead divert the focus at the NATO meeting to hard power for battling Islamist extremism underscored a broader Western weakness.

In these experts鈥� view, the diversion represents a failure to recognize that Vladimir Putin鈥檚 Russia and groups like the Islamic State are both adversaries of the Western liberal order 鈥� two peas in the same anti-Western pod, so to speak.

And in that vein, they say, it dangerously puts off the day when the US and Europe realize they must fight an information war and deploy the same type of 21st-century warfare that their 鈥渋lliberal鈥� adversaries employ.

In a brief speech to America鈥檚 European allies assembled at NATO headquarters Thursday, Trump called for a moment of silence for the Manchester victims and cited the attack as a display of the 鈥渆vil鈥� the 28-nation transatlantic Alliance must do more to confront through a stepped-up counterterrorism effort.

He then issued a stern rebuke to his stone-faced colleagues for not paying their 鈥渇air share鈥� and relying on US taxpayers to provide their defense 鈥� thus segueing abruptly from Manchester to his preferred dual themes for his NATO debut: counterterrorism and burden-sharing.

Russia, on the other hand, got only one mention, falling behind 鈥渢errorism and immigration鈥� on Trump鈥檚 list of the defense challenges the Alliance must give 鈥済reat focus鈥� in coming years.

Trump鈥檚 scolding of America鈥檚 European allies over insufficient defense spending may have been what grabbed quick headlines, both in Europe and the US. But in the end it may be the near-absence of Russia from Trump鈥檚 contribution to the NATO leaders鈥� meeting that more deeply marks US-Europe relations in the future.

The downplaying of Russian mischief may have been music to Mr. Putin鈥檚 ears, but it was disquieting first and foremost to NATO鈥檚 eastern members, including the Baltic states 鈥� some of whom noted their concerns, albeit in diplomatic terms, after the meeting.

It was troubling as well to other European leaders who worry about Russian efforts to undermine the West鈥檚 democratic institutions and keep a roiled West distracted.

Questions left unanswered

And it left unanswered lingering questions in Europe about Trump鈥檚 approach to Russia and how firmly he intends to confront Russian aggressions, both covert and blatant, as in eastern Ukraine.

European leaders came into their meeting with Trump Thursday 鈥渨anting to know how much will this administration be distracted by domestic issues at home,鈥� including probes into Russian influence in the US election, says Julianne Smith, director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security in Washington.

They wanted to know not just how much Trump resents weak European defense budgets 鈥� a complaint Europeans have heard from a long line of US administrations (President Obama called them 鈥渇ree-riders鈥�) 鈥� but 鈥渨hen is [Trump] going to start his engine and get to work鈥� on the issues on the transatlantic agenda, Ms. Smith says.

The Europeans had 鈥渢remendous insecurity and doubt鈥� about American leadership and commitment to the partnership going into Trump鈥檚 European trip, she says. But she adds that the doubts were only likely to deepen at Friday鈥檚 G7 meeting in Sicily, where US partners will be kept guessing about US policy on issues ranging from climate change and trade to international sanctions on Russia 鈥� all issues that senior administration officials say the president will deliberate after his trip.

For some in Europe, the awakening to the challenges posed by Russia has been slow 鈥� but has accelerated recently as Russia appears to have shifted its focus from expanding its influence in its near-neighborhood to undermining Western political institutions.

鈥淛ust a few years ago Russia characterized its activism as primarily focused on safeguarding Russian-speakers in its surrounding areas, and that gave many Europeans the sense that they were off the hook,鈥� says Alexander Mattelaer, director of the European Affairs program at the Egmont Royal Institute in Brussels. 鈥淏ut its more recent aggressive actions and especially the way it seemingly acted to influence the domestic political outcome in the United States has completely changed that.鈥�

Restoring alliance's relevance

The unintended consequence of Russia鈥檚 actions is that it may have done more than anyone else to give NATO new relevance across Europe.

鈥淚n many ways, Russia through its various actions has contributed to the revival and reinvigoration of the Alliance,鈥� Dr. Mattelaer says. 鈥淣o one asks anymore, 鈥榃hat is NATO鈥檚 purpose in a post-cold-war Europe?鈥� 鈥� he adds.

Indeed, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg underscored to journalists Thursday that NATO鈥檚 European members have halted a long-term slide in military spending and registered an overall increase in defense budgets last year.

Renewed Russian aggression has had a significant impact among NATO鈥檚 easternmost members in particular 鈥� former Soviet states that share a border with Russia 鈥� motivating them to bolster military budgets. Some have reached, or next year will reach, the NATO target of spending 2 percent of GDP on the military that Trump made his mantra in NATO discussions.

鈥淚f you go to the Eastern European countries, it鈥檚 the threat posed by Russia that is at the top of the agenda,鈥� Mattelaer says. But he adds that Russia鈥檚 aggression in its various forms has also managed to take the wind out of the sails of Europeans who long assailed the North Atlantic Alliance as a tool of American hegemony and militarism.

Indeed, some say Russia in its new Putin-driven form is the impetus behind just about everything the Alliance does, including in its defense of open and democratic societies.

鈥淭he defense issues, the discussions of how different kinds of contributions count, and the burden-sharing debate, it鈥檚 really all about Russia,鈥� says Ian Lesser, executive director of the German Marshall Fund鈥檚 Transatlantic Center in Brussels. 鈥淭he question about spending more on hardware 鈥� again, it鈥檚 ultimately all about Russia.鈥�

Some leaders may have been put off by Trump鈥檚 foot-stomping on European defense spending 鈥� what Mr. Stoltenberg diplomatically referred to as the US president鈥檚 鈥渃lear blunt message鈥� 鈥� but it may be that kind of stark plain-speaking that ultimately pushes NATO to develop stronger responses to challenges, including Russia, Dr. Lesser says.

鈥淵ou could argue that the rhetorical style of the new president is not the most agreeable for European ears,鈥� he says. 鈥淏ut Trump鈥檚 style has placed the issues of burden-sharing and counterterrorism at the top of NATO鈥檚 agenda in a way that is different and maybe more compelling.鈥�

Analog defense in a digital age

The problem some experts see is that while higher military spending, new hardware, and additional troops for NATO missions are all well and good, they may be false reassurances in an age of cyber-threats and internet manipulation.

鈥淲e鈥檙e still stuck with an analog concept of defense in a highly digital age,鈥� says Julian Lindley-French, a senior fellow at the Institute for Statecraft and vice president of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Brussels.

The Europeans may have only recently awakened from decades of sleepy dependence on the US military, but Dr. Lindley-French says NATO 鈥� the West鈥檚 defense alliance 鈥� has to awaken to the fact that it is losing battles on the 21st-century battlefield.

鈥淭his is an issue that is relevant to both Manchester 鈥� the terrorist threat 鈥� and to Russia and the threats it poses,鈥� he says.

Describing ISIS and Russia as 鈥渋lliberal actors鈥� that view Western liberal societies as their adversary, Lindley-French says both have become expert at an 鈥渁rtificial form of soft power鈥� 鈥� use of social media, propaganda, false information, and manipulation of information 鈥� that will become increasingly influential.

Citing evidence of Russia鈥檚 鈥渟uccess鈥� at 鈥渒eeping us off balance at a low cost to them,鈥� Lindley-French says the US and Europe would do well to settle the differences causing friction within the Alliance so they can unite to confront the new-era challenges already rattling their societies.

鈥淲e are now in a kind of continuous warfare,鈥� he says, warning that Russia is 鈥渇ast mastering the escalation of this new warfare.鈥�