海角大神

A tempest in Iraq over a military operation鈥檚 name might have been a small thing, but to some regional experts, it offers a measure of the deepening divide between the country鈥檚 Shiite and Sunni Muslim communities.

On Wednesday, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi officially renamed the military offensive that was launched to retake Anbar province from Islamic State (IS) militants 鈥淟ubbayk ya Iraq,鈥� or 鈥淎t your service, Iraq.鈥� The operation was originally dubbed 鈥淟ubbayk ya Hussein鈥� 鈥� chosen by the Shiite militias leading the battle to honor a revered figure in Shiite Islam.

The switch to a less sectarian name was seen as a positive gesture toward Iraq鈥檚 marginalized Sunni population 鈥� something bestowing an air of nationalism and unity on the operation.

But much, much more than Wednesday鈥檚 name change will be needed if the alienation of Iraq鈥檚 Sunnis, which allowed Anbar to fall, is to be reversed and IS is to be pushed out of Iraq.

鈥淭he new name is much better. It tries to say this battle for al-Anbar is for the whole of Iraq, which is a good thing,鈥� says Radwan Masmoudi, president of the Washington-based Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy. But in many ways, the damage was already done by the first name, which 鈥渟ounded like a declaration of war against the Sunnis,鈥� he adds.

鈥淭he whole thing suggests just how far the Iraqi government is from understanding what it鈥檚 really going to take to defeat ISIS,鈥� says Mr. Masmoudi, using an alternative name for IS.

Two examples of what Iraq needs to address the Sunni-Shiite divide are genuine political power sharing and an equitable division of the country鈥檚 economic pie. To attain such goals, some Iraq experts say, other nations including the United States will have to put pressure on the Shiite-dominated government. Some also say the US may have to support Sunni tribes directly 鈥� perhaps harking back to a 2006 strategy that was instrumental in the near destruction of Al Qaeda in Iraq, the precursor to IS.

The Sunni-Shiite divide has hardened as Shiites have consolidated and monopolized power 鈥� creating the conditions for IS to seize earlier this month Ramadi, the capital of Anbar and of Iraq鈥檚 Sunni Arab heartland.

Calling the divide 鈥渁 very old debate鈥� that many Muslim scholars once thought was nearly forgotten, Masmoudi says sectarian tensions won鈥檛 abate until regional powers stop stoking them. Those regional powers are primarily Shiite Iran, he says, but also Iran鈥檚 rival, Sunni Arab Saudi Arabia.

The Syrian conflict will deepen the divide, Masmoudi adds, as long as the Shiite Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad continues to annihilate Syria鈥檚 Sunni-majority population.

As for Iraq, nothing short of genuine political inclusion and fair treatment for the country鈥檚 Sunnis 鈥� a leveling of the sectarian playing field 鈥� will make pushing IS out of Iraq possible, Iraq experts say.

鈥淚raq will not succeed in retaking most of its territory without a deal that cuts the Sunni Arabs and Sunni tribes into the national pie,鈥� says Wayne White, a former State Department specialist on Iraq who is now a scholar at Washington鈥檚 Middle East Institute.

The problem that Mr. White sees is that Mr. Abadi, the prime minister, has so far offered only 鈥渂land promises鈥� to Iraq鈥檚 Sunnis, when 鈥渉ard guarantees that are put into law and practice鈥� are needed.

As a result, he says, it鈥檚 up to external powers like the US and the coalition formed to defeat IS to pressure Abadi and his Shiite government to close the schism with Iraq鈥檚 Sunnis.

鈥淭he US can鈥檛 do it alone 鈥� it has already tried and failed 鈥� so now it鈥檚 something the whole anti-Daesh community needs to do,鈥� he says, using the Arabic name for IS.

Neighboring Arab countries that have close links to Iraq鈥檚 Sunni tribes should press Baghdad for a genuine opening to the country鈥檚 Sunnis, White says, but he adds that America鈥檚 European partners in the anti-IS effort should also be involved.

Secretary of State John Kerry is to meet next week in Paris with the coalition formed to 鈥渄egrade and destroy鈥� IS, and some experts say a campaign to pressure Abadi to take concrete steps to bridge Iraq鈥檚 sectarian divide should be taken up there. A State Department statement on Secretary Kerry鈥檚 travel says the Paris meeting will affirm 鈥渙ur support for Prime Minister Abadi and the Iraqi campaign against ISIL,鈥� the acronym the US government uses for IS.

The US should be exercising its influence in Baghdad to encourage 鈥渁 dialogue that can lead to some solutions,鈥� says Masmoudi. But, he adds, the US remains suspect in the eyes of many Sunnis because it was the US invasion that toppled the old Sunni-led political order.

鈥淲e can say that Iraq has to find a system that treats all Iraqis as equal citizens, but that鈥檚 not the system we put into place,鈥� he says. 鈥淲e turned over all the power to the Shias, and the Sunnis remember that.鈥�

Moreover, in the eyes of some experts, the Abadi government is already a lost cause 鈥� Abadi being either unwilling or politically unable to offer real power sharing 鈥� so they say it is time for the US in particular to act alone.

鈥淩ather than wait for Baghdad, the United States should begin supporting Sunni tribes directly, offering Baghdad the potential to run [US] support through the Iraqi government if and when the government makes supporting the Sunni tribes a priority,鈥� says Paul Scharre, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington. 鈥淎merica鈥檚 approach to defeating ISIS cannot be held hostage by Baghdad鈥檚 dysfunctional sectarian politics any longer.鈥�

That prescription for US action mirrors the US strategy of empowering Iraq鈥檚 Sunni tribes that led to a Sunni Arab awakening in 2006. Between 2006 and 2008, the US provided weapons and money to Sunni tribes that delivered two key elements: about 100,000 fighters to help defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq, and Sunni buy-in to the new Iraq.

The Sunni awakening in Anbar province 鈥渙ffers the one clear historical example of what can happen if the Sunnis feel empowered instead of marginalized,鈥� says the Middle East Institute鈥檚 White. The US, he continues, should seek to replicate the awakening through blunt pressure on the Abadi government.

鈥淭he power divide was narrowed once before,鈥� he says, 鈥渟o now we need to restart that narrowing by going to [Abadi] and saying, 鈥楾his is again your option. Do it.鈥� 鈥�

White says it will be 鈥渉arder this time鈥� to win over the Sunnis because of 鈥渓ost trust鈥� as a result of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki鈥檚 war on Sunni empowerment and Abadi鈥檚 inability to reverse that course and begin bridging the sectarian divide.

鈥淭he Sunni tribes can still be brought in to defeat ISIS and help keep it out, but it鈥檚 not going to happen without a sea change in Iraq鈥檚 nasty sectarian campaign and a genuine political and economic deal to the Sunni community,鈥� White says. 鈥淲ithout that 鈥� and without presenting it to the Iraqi government just that starkly 鈥� we could end up with a sputtering war with static positions for years to come.鈥�