When it was clear that Ayman al-Zawahiri would take the helm of Al Qaeda after the death of Mr. bin Laden, US officials reported that they were pleased 鈥� elated, some emphasized 鈥� about the choice. He was an irritable micromanager without the 鈥減eculiar charisma鈥� of bin Laden, as defense officials described him. What鈥檚 more, bin Laden was 鈥渕ore operationally engaged鈥� than Mr. Zawahiri had ever shown any interest in being.
Robert Cardillo, deputy director for intelligence integration with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, said this week that Zawahiri does not have the charisma to appeal to new recruits. Even his own fighters complain that he simply attached himself to a rising star within the organization and rode his coattails to the top, US intelligence officials add.
But that sort of mercenary approach can have practical advantages. In the internal debate about whether Al Qaeda should maintain a strict, ideological litmus test for members or bring as many fighters into the tent as possible, Zawahiri is a firm member of the later camp, which could ultimately translate into more followers, analysts note.
鈥淗e may not be bin Laden in his operational expertise, but the affiliates have all sworn allegiance to him,鈥� says Seth Jones, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corp. and author of "Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of Al Qa鈥檌da Since 9/11."
And though Zawahiri lacks the 鈥渟uave鈥� operating style bin Laden is universally acknowledged to have possessed, he was instrumental in the 鈥渕ergers and acquisition strategy鈥� to bring Al Shabaab, the Somali terrorist group, officially under the Al Qaeda affiliate umbrella in February, Mr. Jones notes.
Most important, 鈥淗e has survived 鈥� and has been surviving for decades,鈥� he adds. 鈥淚 think it鈥檚 definitely an open question whether we鈥檙e in danger of underestimating him.
