Saying 鈥榳e won鈥� the Iran war is easy. Now鈥檚 the hard part.
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Ned Temko Columnist
| London
鈥淲e鈥檝e got to finish the job, right?鈥�
When U.S. President Donald Trump made that remark at a rally in Kentucky back in March, the Iran war had barely begun. And with huge firepower at his command, he exuded confidence that the endgame would be a mere formality. The war, he told the crowd of supporters, had already been 鈥渨on.鈥�
Yet 2 1/2 months on, Mr. Trump鈥檚 definition of 鈥渇inishing the job鈥� has fundamentally changed.
Why We Wrote This
As the United States and Iran move toward a peace deal, with the thorny nuclear issue apparently still unresolved, the 鈥渁symmetric nature鈥� of the conflict is coming into sharper focus, our columnist notes.
Despite this week鈥檚 familiar dissonance between hints of an imminent peace deal and a resumption of U.S. military strikes in Iran, the focus is no longer on achieving a definitive battlefield victory.
It鈥檚 about getting to a political arrangement that the president can sell to his supporters, winding down a war that is broadly unpopular with voters, and 鈥� by reopening the Strait of Hormuz 鈥� at least beginning to halt soaring oil and gas prices before November鈥檚 midterm elections.
The outline of an agreement with Iran, as envisaged by the Trump administration, has started to become clear from mediators involved in the talks.
First, confirmation of the ceasefire announced in early April, not long after the Kentucky rally, and since extended by Mr. Trump well past its original two-week duration.
Then, a monthlong process of reopening of the Strait of Hormuz聽鈥� with Iran allowing free passage, and the United States ending its counterblockade of Iranian ports.
And alongside this, negotiations on what Mr. Trump has defined as the central aim of going to war in the first place: closing off Iran鈥檚 pathway to getting a nuclear weapon.
That could be especially delicate political territory for the president.
Any new Iran deal will inevitably be measured against President Barack Obama鈥檚 2015 nuclear agreement with Tehran, which Mr. Trump denounced as 鈥渉orrible鈥� and pulled the U.S. out of during his first term.
Even before achieving an acceptable resolution on any of these issues, Mr. Trump is being forced to confront a reality about the war that was becoming apparent when he claimed victory in places including Kentucky: its 鈥渁symmetric鈥� nature, echoing America鈥檚 long involvement in, and ultimate retreat from, Vietnam.
Yes, U.S. and Israeli forces had comprehensively outgunned Iran. They had struck thousands of targets across the country, sunk much of its navy, and killed its senior leaders.
In conventional military terms, Iran was incapable of matching America鈥檚 power.
Yet Tehran showed no sign of wanting to sue for peace.
Its regime and its military had survived. It was launching drones and missiles at America鈥檚 Gulf Arab allies, and was effectively blocking the strait through which one-fifth of the world鈥檚 oil and natural gas supplies usually traveled.
Iran retains that leverage. And, as Mr. Trump now seems to recognize, it鈥檚 unlikely to be undone even by a full-scale return to war 鈥� something key Arab allies are especially keen to avoid.
This means that the possibility, and eventual shape, of a negotiated agreement depends on Iran鈥檚 priorities as well.
Reports on the ongoing talks in recent weeks have suggested the Iranians are open to a ceasefire and a gradual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
Even on some key nuclear issues 鈥� to judge by the indirect talks with Iran before Mr. Trump launched the war 鈥� there seems to be a prospect of common ground.
Iran鈥檚 leadership has long insisted that it does not intend to develop a nuclear weapon. It鈥檚 been receptive to diluting its near-weapons-grade stores of uranium, or perhaps moving them to an agreed third country such as Russia.
But in talks this week with representatives in the Gulf state of Qatar, Iran鈥檚 negotiators appeared insistent on an early U.S. commitment to free up billions of dollars of Iranian assets in foreign banks that have been frozen by sanctions 鈥� one of the features of the Obama administration鈥檚 nuclear deal that Mr. Trump most vigorously attacked.
The Iranians also appear to envisage retaining long-term control, along with the Arab sultanate of Oman across the Gulf, over the Strait of Hormuz.
How, and whether, Mr. Trump鈥檚 negotiating team manages to finesse these issues with Iran will determine whether a deal is as close as some of his recent social media posts have suggested 鈥� or, if it continues to prove elusive, whether he might act on threats to order further military strikes.
In remarks on Wednesday, the president gave what has become a familiar nod to both options.
The talks were going 鈥渧ery well,鈥� he said. The Iranians were 鈥渟tarting to give us the things they have to give us.鈥� But pointing toward Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, he added that if they didn鈥檛 do so, 鈥渢he man on my left will have to finish them off.鈥�
Still, Mr. Trump鈥檚 apparent reluctance to return to major combat in recent weeks suggests he has come to accept that all-out war is unlikely to bring the prospects for a negotiated deal any closer.
Last week, an article drew a trenchant parallel with the Vietnam War.
It said the Trump administration had taken a mere two months to 鈥渞ace through all five years of the [Lyndon] Johnson administration鈥檚 Vietnam policy: entry, escalation, frustrated stalemate, and negotiations.鈥�
Now, it suggested, Mr. Trump found himself on the Nixon administration鈥檚 homestretch: 鈥渇irst blustery threats, then gradual realization of the need to extricate via an unsatisfactory deal.鈥�
