Supreme Court's historic but unfinished ruling for religious liberty
In a historic ruling Wednesday, the US Supreme Court tackled a question as old as the Bible itself: Should secular rulers decide whether a religious worker is doing God鈥檚 work?
Not even people of faith easily know if one of their own is sincerely pious. And perhaps for that very reason, the high court decided that a religious institution 鈥� and not the government 鈥� has the sole authority under the First Amendment to make decisions about the employees who 鈥渟hape its own faith and mission.鈥�
All nine justices agreed that churches and other religious groups are given 鈥渟pecial solicitude鈥� by the Constitution to sometimes stand apart from the laws of the land. The First Amendment guarantees both freedom of religious expression as well as no government 鈥渆stablishment鈥� of religion.
In this case, the focus was on whether a teacher fired by a Lutheran church-school could sue under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court said she could not.
The case did not hinge on whether Cheryl Perich suffered discrimination because of an ailment. Rather, the court had to decide whether the nature and extent of her religious 鈥渇unctions鈥� made her a minister, and thus subject to the church鈥檚 Bible-based disciplinary procedures.
The church said she was fired for not sticking to those 海角大神 principles. And the court wisely agreed that it should not even question that judgment.
Yet using the church鈥檚 own records and other evidence, the high court found that Ms. Perich was indeed a minister of the Hosanna-Tabor Church in Michigan. And for the first time, it affirmed the 鈥渕inisterial exemption,鈥� a legal precedent that lower courts have long used to shield religious bodies from employment laws.
鈥淭he authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful 鈥� a matter strictly ecclesiastical 鈥� is the church鈥檚 alone,鈥� the high court stated. 鈥淭he church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.鈥�
While the ruling is a bold stroke for religious liberty, it nonetheless leaves an inherent paradox for future cases.
The court tried to avoid a 鈥渞igid formula鈥� for deciding a worker鈥檚 religious credentials. Nonetheless, in this case it still dove into the details of doctrine, motives, and practices of a church. The justices seemed to violate their own warning.
How can a court declare that government cannot second-guess a church over the religious status of its workers without also passing judgment on a church鈥檚 inner workings?
The dilemma is similar to a humorous movie scene by the British comedy group Monty Python in which ancient Pharisees are prosecuting someone for uttering the Jewish name for God. The lead Pharisee has to say the name itself to make the charge. The crowd stones him instead.
In the court鈥檚 ruling, three of the justices tried to tackle the paradox. In concurring opinions, they tried to define higher standards for a court to intervene in similar clashes of church and state.
Not all religions have ministers, they warned, let alone clergy and a hierarchy. And in some churches, even lay persons are messengers of the faith. Judges should look at religious functions, not job titles, they said. Only religious groups know who are true messengers of their teachings, which can 鈥渃over the gamut from moral conduct to metaphysical truth.鈥�
They cited a 1989 court ruling that saw inherent difficulty for secular rulers to 鈥渟eparate the message from the messenger.鈥�
Justice Clarence Thomas warned that a court standard that defines a 鈥渕inister鈥� or other religious title will only force religions to conform its beliefs and practices to that standard. Judges, he stated, should 鈥渄efer to a religious organization鈥檚 good-faith understanding of who qualifies as a minister.鈥�
Justice John Roberts, writing for the entire court, all but acknowledged the court鈥檚 work is not done: 鈥淭here will be time enough to address the applicability of the [ministerial] exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.鈥�
