海角大神

Some have taken the extraordinary dismissal of Bo Xilai, China's controversial Politburo member and party secretary from Chongqing, as a sign that the transition of power in China is in trouble. On the contrary, it shows that the process has matured and is working as it needs to.

Xi Jinping, the current vice president slated to be approved as general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the fall and as president of China the following March, will be the first leader not chosen peremptorily by China鈥檚 prior leaders. Rather, he was selected through a broader polling of CPC officials. While neither transparent nor anonymous, the process is a big advance in China鈥檚 long march toward 鈥渋ntra-party democracy.鈥�

China is an oligarchy, not a dictatorship, and ultimate authority will not be vested individually with Mr. Xi, but collectively with the CPC Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), currently with nine members. Everything in China reports to one of these nine. Xi will be first among equals, but equals the nine are, and their final composition shapes policy.

This explains the intense focus on the firing of Mr. Bo, because it was assumed he would become a PSC member in the once-a-decade top leadership shuffle. Media savvy, Bo had built a name for himself by promoting the 鈥淐hongqing Model,鈥� a leftist-populist mixture of strong state, Maoist paeans (鈥淩ed songs鈥�), crime crackdown, equality over productivity, and wealth redistribution.

It was never that simple. Even had he reached his peak, Bo would not have ranked in the PSC鈥檚 top half. Moreover, some of his purported backers did not share his somewhat recent leftist views. Elite politics in China is not simplistic and one-dimensional, the mere maneuverings of competing factions. Loyalties run on personal relationships as well as political philosophies, and coalitions wax and wane around specific issues.听听

While many people praised Bo for jailing corrupt officials (even for executing them) and for reversing garish economic disparity, many officials worried, privately, about the revival of political mass movements and the potential for chaos. The Cultural Revolution, China鈥檚 decade-long descent into ideological madness that would end up crushing millions, hovers like an unexorcised demon.

Following the bizarre 鈥渧isit鈥� to the US Consulate of Chongqing by Vice Mayor Wang Lijun, Bo Xilai鈥檚 right-hand man for anti-mafia strikes (which liberals said violated human rights), Bo was fired. Irrespective of Bo鈥檚 deeper offenses or coming fate, the political fallout is unambiguous: The leftist-statist Chongqing Model has collapsed. This will become clearer as the PSC slots are confirmed for reformers.听

Of the nine PSC members, all will have run large geographic regions and/or ministries, and six or seven will have led at least two provinces or major municipalities (as party secretary or governor/mayor). As such, all will have worked with Western CEOs and other sophisticated foreign leaders.

Like his colleagues, Xi is not given to radical change. Not incidentally, following the Bo tumult, Xi called for 鈥減urity鈥� among officials and admonished senior comrades not to 鈥渟eek fame and fortune.鈥� Major decisions, Xi wrote, 鈥渟hould be decided according to collective wisdom and strict procedure.鈥�

For 25 years Xi served in China鈥檚 grassroots, running every level of government 鈥� village, county, city, province. He led three dynamic regions 鈥� Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, and Shanghai 鈥�听that were by population, economic vitality, and social complexity the equivalent of three European nations.

Xi differs from his colleagues by the travails of his youth 鈥� his revolutionary hero father, Xi Zhongxun, was purged and humiliated by Mao Zedong for 16 years. As a result, a teenage Xi Jinping was packed off to a poor, remote mountain village where he spent six years chopping hay, reaping wheat, and herding sheep. He lived in a cave house.

Xi was strengthened by the harsh experience. Although a 鈥減rinceling,鈥� the offspring of a political leader (a millstone in Chinese politics), Xi is known for a common man鈥檚 touch. Xi has said, 鈥淢any of my practical ideas stem from my life during that period, which has influenced me every minute, even today. To truly understand common folk and society is fundamental.鈥� Take food quality: As governor of Fujian, Xi improved the process 鈥渇rom farm to dining table.鈥�

Characteristically cautious, Xi told me when I met him in 2006, 鈥淲e should not overestimate our accomplishments or indulge ourselves in our achievements.鈥� He called for China to see 鈥渢he gap between where we are and where we have to go.鈥� In order to learn the best practices from abroad to adapt at home, Xi has visited 47 countries.

Xi advised me that 鈥渢o understand our dedication to revitalize our country, one should appreciate the pride Chinese people take in our ancient civilization.鈥� Chinese 鈥渕ade great contributions to world civilization and enjoyed long-term prosperity,鈥� he said, 鈥渢hen suffered national weakness, oppression, humiliation. Our deep self-motivation is rooted in our patriotism and pride.鈥�

One could see this determined mind-set during Xi鈥檚 recent US trip, for which my colleague Adam Zhu and I prepared with Xi鈥檚 senior staff. Known for his disdain of 鈥渆mpty talk,鈥� Xi chided his staff: 鈥淒on鈥檛 tell me what you think I want to hear. Tell me what you really think.鈥� Reflecting his view that engaging the world is not just a matter of meeting other leaders, Xi鈥檚 visit to the US had a clear tripartite structure: diplomacy in Washington, people in Iowa, and business in Los Angeles. Throughout the visit, Xi was a man at ease 鈥� initiating spirited conversations, offering firm handshakes. He was having a grand time.

Xi鈥檚 personal motto is 鈥淏e proud, not complacent. Motivated, not pompous. Pragmatic, not erratic.鈥� Comfortable with authority, Xi manifests none of the airs of a high official impressed with his own status.

Xi, of course, upholds the primacy of the party. Yet, recognizing China鈥檚 鈥渆arthshaking change,鈥� he advises officials to embrace greater change 鈥� to 鈥渆mancipate our minds and overcome the attitude of being satisfied with the status quo, the inertia of conservative and complacent thinking, the fear of difficulties, and timid thinking.鈥�

Though some would have Xi quicken reform, political as well as economic, he will likely move slowly. Stability will continue as China鈥檚 touchstone.

One challenge for Xi Jinping is high expectations. A senior aide confided, 鈥淴i is ready, but it won鈥檛 be easy.鈥�

Where exactly Xi and his fellow Politburo Standing Committee members will take China is not clear. What is clear is that they will move forward with reform step by pragmatic step, not backward to Maoist nostalgia or cult of personality populism.

Robert Lawrence Kuhn, an international corporate strategist and investment banker, is a longtime advisor to China鈥檚 leaders. He is the author of 鈥淗ow China鈥檚 Leaders Think鈥� and 鈥淭he Man Who Changed China,鈥� the biography of former President Jiang Zemin.

漏 2012 Global Viewpoint Network/Tribune Media Services. Hosted online by听海角大神.