It could be time for China to back down
Throughout the media, mainstream and otherwise, and especially since the financial crisis, are discussions of China鈥檚 growing importance鈥� be it in or in . However, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard takes a different tack. When it comes to the current issue of Chinese yuan appreciation in particular, he questions whether China鈥檚 aggressive ire may have risen a little too far too fast.
From The Telegraph:
鈥淐hina鈥檚 premier Wen Jiabao is defiant.
鈥溾�業 don鈥檛 think the yuan is undervalued. We oppose countries pointing fingers at each other and even forcing a country to appreciate its currency,鈥� he said yesterday. Once again he demanded that the US takes 鈥榗oncrete steps to reassure investors鈥� over the safety of US assets鈥�
鈥溾�ays earlier the State Council accused America of serial villainy. 鈥業n the US, civil and political rights of citizens are severely restricted and violated by the government. Workers鈥� rights are seriously violated,鈥� it said.
鈥溾�楾he US, with its strong military power, has pursued hegemony in the world, trampling upon the sovereignty of other countries and trespassing their human rights,鈥� it said.
鈥溾�楢t a time when the world is suffering a serious human rights disaster caused by the US subprime crisis-induced global financial crisis, the US government revels in accusing other countries.鈥� And so forth.
鈥淚s the Politburo smoking weed?鈥�
The problem, as Evans-Pritchard explains, is that Beijing鈥檚 above approach to the problem is overly one-sided. China fails to acknowledge its own role in global trade imbalances and, as a result, ends up looking a bit out of touch with reality.
Another important point he brings up is the tarnish that could finally be forming on China鈥檚 otherwise lustrous wealth of foreign reserves鈥�
鈥�Michael Pettis from Beijing University argues that China鈥檚 reserves of $2.4 trillion 鈥� arguably $3 trillion 鈥� are a sign of weakness, not strength. Only twice before in modern history has a country amassed such a stash equal to 5pc-6pc of global GDP: the US in the 1920s, and Japan in the 1980s. Each time preceeded depression.
鈥淭he reserves cannot be used internally to support China鈥檚 economy. They are dead weight, beyond any level needed for macro-credibility. Indeed, they are the ultimate indictment of China鈥檚 dysfunctional strategy, which is to buy $30bn to $40bn of foreign bonds every month to hold down the yuan, refusing to let the economy adjust to trade realities.鈥�
Interestingly, here is an insistence that China accept the same set of rules that other world economic powers have chosen to adopt. Yet, it clearly hasn鈥檛 accepted other generally accepted practices鈥� democracy for example鈥� and it seems to be doing alright.
It may not benefit China to adjust itself according to Western realities, a route Japan seemed to take. Perhaps it would be better off championing a new economic strategy it envisions as potentially more successful in the global economy of the future. That said, as hard as it is to know what motivates US politicians, it鈥檚 even tougher to guess what the Chinese leadership may have in mind.
Are lines being drawn in the sand? Is it the Western way or the highway? Evans-Pritchard seems decided on the outcome, writing 鈥渁 clash would not be 鈥榤utual assured destruction鈥�, as often claimed. Washington would win.鈥� It sounds awfully reassuring to hear, but it鈥檚 unlikely we can be so sure.
This has all the makings of a must-read article, and you can have a look for yourself at The Telegraph鈥檚 coverage of .
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