海角大神

After an聽Iranian arms dealer uses聽shadowy international procurement channels聽to purchase microchips made聽in Arizona, a聽roadside bomb kills a young American lieutenant on patrol in聽Iraq. To聽most observers, the two incidents聽appear unrelated. But the microchip made in聽Arizona was聽a key part of the bomb's precision聽triggering device; an聽American product had聽helped聽to kill an聽American soldier.聽

This was not an isolated episode. In聽Operation Shakespeare: the True Story of an Elite International Sting,聽journalist John Shiffman聽illuminates the network of smugglers, brokers, governments, and聽corporations that facilitates the illegal聽sale and shipment聽of sensitive American聽military technologies to foreign enemies.聽His story centers on聽the efforts of an聽undercover Homeland Security squad to complete聽a sting operation that will ensnare an Iranian arms dealer. The book has the glamour of a spy novel and聽the gravity of a meticulously researched expos茅. It's an impressive and important work.

Implementing a sting聽overseas is a logistical nightmare; countless bureaucratic, diplomatic, and political obstacles threaten聽the operation at聽every stage. At one point, Justice Department officials nearly expose the entire affair to the media before agents can pursue the dozens of leads a seized聽laptop has generated. Later, a聽missing signature on a single form almost jeopardizes the extradition of an arms dealer from Georgia.聽

The American government's control over the export of military technologies depends on a shaky聽patchwork of separate agencies that often fail to share information with one another. The items on lists聽of products banned聽for export change constantly, and compliance is largely self-enforced.聽Roughly 19,000 suspicious contacts from foreign buyers are reported annually in America, but only 30 to 40 arrests for smuggling military technology are typically announced.

The miniaturization of聽many component devices has been a boon to smugglers. A vital component that helps guide an international ballistic missile system is no larger than a poker chip. But the聽same part also has civilian applications, which makes it difficult to determine why a foreign buyer wants the product.聽Arms dealers typically use a practice called transshipment to deceive export authorities. By聽routing goods through Dubai, Singapore, and聽certain former Soviet republics,聽they can聽obscure a final destination in Iran or Iraq. Front companies, false names, and forged documents are all聽standard business procedure. The Internet聽also helps dealers to conduct sales with聽so many intermediaries that the final buyer is effectively obscured.聽

The result of these tactics is聽that everything from night vision goggles to electronic combat systems are frequently sold to聽foreign buyers聽likely to deploy聽them in battle聽against Americans. The deeper conflict that聽Shiffman pinpoints is between a free market ethos that聽values all paying customers and the聽military's聽need to preserve its advantage in combat by聽restricting the sale of technologies聽that聽confer its聽superiority. Major international banks like Credit Suisse and Barclay's have been implicated in money laundering schemes related to arms trafficking, and some American companies are facing fines聽for failing to comply with export laws.

The agents Shiffman聽interviews are bold and effective; they often聽work undercover, floating between digital and physical realms and traveling聽around the world as they聽pursue聽major targets.聽The book presents a vivid case study on how agents working within a聽vast bureaucracy can聽remain nimble and creative. But as long as American defense contractors can聽knowingly sell the same weapons to the United States government and its enemies聽and receive only a financial penalty when caught,聽American factories and labs will聽continue to stock聽the arsenals aimed at American聽troops.

Nick Romeo is a Monitor contributor.