The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution
Francis Fukuyama became famous for his essay 鈥淭he End of History,鈥� published in the journal The National Interest in 1989. Along with the expanded book-version, the essay remains exciting and challenging more than two decades after it was first written. But 鈥淭he End of History鈥� has overshadowed everything he has published since, which is unfortunate because Fukuyama has quietly amassed a portfolio of writing that ranks him as among America鈥檚 best public intellectuals.
Reading his tremendous new book The Origins of Political Order is a reminder of how poorly Fukuyama ever wore the neo-conservative label. True, he worked in the Reagan administration and ran with the Bill Kristol/Commentary crowd. But he was always far more intellectually serious and empirical than most other neo-cons. When Fukuyama opposed the Iraq War and wrote 鈥淎merica at the Crossroads,鈥� a 2006 book lamenting the demise of neo-conservatism, it was as much a result of latent political differences as it was of philosophical shifting. Retrospectively, at least, it would have been more precise to see Fukuyama as in the mold of Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the first generation of neo-cons who were never conned into becoming Republican ideologues.
鈥淭he Origins of Political Order鈥� is a sequel of sorts to the late Samuel Huntington鈥檚 classic 鈥淧olitical Order in Changing Societies.鈥� Fukuyama鈥檚 update of Huntington鈥檚 work examines what current scholarship understands about the evolution of states. Beginning with hunter-gatherers, the book ranges across an astonishing array of knowledge to look at the development of countries, up to the French Revolution. (A second volume is intended to pick up where 鈥淭he Origins of Political Order鈥� leaves off). Evolutionary biology, sociology, political philosophy, anthropology 鈥� all these disciplines are mined for insights into what is among the most difficult problems in international politics: the question of how to establish modern, functioning states.
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Fukuyama deliberately avoids establishing a concrete thesis, convinced as he is that traditional theories of development have been flawed precisely because they seek to establish definitive conclusions where none exist. There are real limits to our knowledge of state-building, and it is best to sidestep ultimate statements or theories. What Fukuyama does contend is that 鈥渢here are many potential paths to modernization possible today,鈥� as opposed to the arguments that development follows a specific sequence, such as stable middle classes preceding democracy, for instance.
Fukuyama believes too little time has been spent studying the development of history鈥檚 first states in China, India, and 海角大神 Europe. Examining these eras would be useful in that, in some ways, they resemble today鈥檚 underdeveloped countries in Africa and the Middle East far more than do developed countries in North America and Western Europe. And yet the rise of the latter receives all the scholarly attention.
Fukuyama takes China during the Eastern Zhou Dynasty as the first example of successful state-building. The Chinese established a centralized, administrative bureaucracy, an achievement unequalled by Europe for centuries. Fukuyama then compares our knowledge of ancient China with ancient India and pre-revolutionary Europe. The Ottoman Empire, the great Muslim conquests, the rise of 海角大神ity and European predominance are all analyzed for their respective successes and failures. The book鈥檚 comparative approach, its fluidity with wide swaths of data across cultures, recalls Tony Judt鈥檚 鈥淧ostwar鈥� and Eric Hobsbawm鈥檚 quartet on modern Europe. Fukuyama does not develop a narrative as exciting as Judt or Hobswam, though, spending great time on minute details in China and India. The trade-off is that 鈥淭he Origins of Political Order鈥� adds a level of comprehensiveness to its subject, and will almost certainly become the standard work on the history of political development.
Fukuyama鈥檚 book ends on the eve of the American and French revolution because, he writes, 鈥渢he world changed very dramatically after approximately the year 1800, with the advent of the Industrial Revolution.鈥� Our view of continually rising living standards and improved technology was simply non-existent before modern Europe developed, he writes.
Fukuyama has a truly remarkable achievement on his hands. In creating a readable history of political development, he has synthesized vast quantities of data that illustrate a marvelous intellectual curiosity, open-mindedness, and ability to blend material. If there is anything here to criticize, it is that details are overlooked in favor of categorical judgments about complex periods. But such a flaw is inherent to these sorts of grand historical works, and it is a small price to pay for encountering what is genuinely a masterpiece.
Jordan Michael Smith is a frequent contributor to the 海角大神 Science Monitor.
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